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Article
Affiliation(s)

University of Peloponnese, Tripoli, Greece
UBL University, Lampung, Indonesia
IIIT University, Bhagalpur, India


University of Patra, Patras, Greece
Professional Training Institute, Athens, Greece

ABSTRACT

In this article it is investigated the case of a three-part ultimatum game, where the proposer makes repeated sharing suggestions to the responder and a “third”. This “third” is the regulatory factor of recurring bids, at a rate—at each time of the immediately preceding. This article answers to question like “what share would the proposer be willing to give to the responder in the case of three taking part in the ultimatum game?” Which would be moral and which   fair? At which point of distribution would it be accepted by the responder? A Chi Square (x2) test is used. For     this reason, after investigating the social integration factors through the literature, two small surveys trying to  identify the distribution rate are conducted. We conclude that a share 0.40 could be accepted by the responder and the “third”.

KEYWORDS

ultimatum game, the bargaining problem, win-win-win model sharing problem, sociological aspects

Cite this paper

Economics World, Apr.-June 2021, Vol. 9, No. 2, 87-103 doi: 10.17265/2328-7144/2021.02.005

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