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Antitrust Safe Harbors in the European Union and the United States: Institutional Paths and Theoretical Foundations



Author(s)

WANG Zichao

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DOI:10.17265/1548-6605/2026.02.001

University of International Business and Economics, Beijing, China

This article examines antitrust safe harbor regimes in the European Union and the United States. It outlines the EU’s legislation-led framework, centered on block exemptions and the de minimis rule, and the US model of de facto safe harbors developed through case law, agency guidance, and procedural practice. It also discusses the theoretical foundations of safe harbors, focusing on the error-cost framework and the chilling effect. The article highlights the common logic underlying different safe harbor models and their role in improving legal certainty and enforcement efficiency.

antitrust safe harbor, block exemption, de minimis, self-assessment

WANG Zichao.Antitrust Safe Harbors in the European Union and the United States: Institutional Paths and Theoretical Foundations.US-China Law Review, Mar.-Apr. 2026, Vol. 23, No. 2, 69-76