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On the Underdetermination of Theory by Experience and Related Issues
José Luis Rolleri
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DOI:10.17265/2159-5313/2026.02.004
Autonomous University of Queretaro, Queretaro, Mexico
The subject matter of this paper is the thesis on the underdetermination of theory by experience, in the local account due to Duhem and in the global version due to Quine. This thesis has significant implications concerning some epistemic uncertainty about the accuracy of the tested predictions of theories. We find this thesis plausible, though more feasible, limited to physical theories, as in Duhem’s approach. We examine the thesis of the impossibility of crucial experiments that Duhem finds implied by his thesis on empirical indeterminacy, as well as the thesis of the possibility of empirically equivalent theories that are logically incompatible, which Quine also finds linked to his thesis on empirical indeterminacy. From a conceptualist approach that acknowledges the abstract character of physical concepts and the idealized nature of physical laws, and assuming Hanson’s thesis on the theory laden of scientific observation, we conclude that the anterior Duhem’s thesis is sound, although the preceding Quine’s thesis does not seem viable.
holism, empirical indeterminacy, epistemic uncertainty, crucial experiments, equivalent theories, conceptual content
José Luis Rolleri. (2026). On the Underdetermination of Theory by Experience and Related Issues. Philosophy Study, Mar.-Apr.
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