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Article
Debt Covenant Violation and Real Earnings Management: Evidence From the U.S.
Author(s)
YANG Yingjie, ZHANG Wenjia
Full-Text PDF XML 36 Views
DOI:10.17265/1537-1514/2024.01.005
Affiliation(s)
China Foreign Affairs University, Beijing, China
ABSTRACT
Purpose: This article examines the real
earnings management activities of U.S. firms after their covenant violations. Design/methodology/approach:
Regression discontinuity design is adopted to conduct the analysis. Findings:
This study shows that, instead of manipulating accruals, the firms make more
real earnings management after their financial covenant violations. When
covenant violations are classified on net worth and current ratio covenant
restrictions, different patterns of real earnings management are detected. Research limitations/implications: This
finding enriches the debt covenant hypothesis on whether managers carry out
real earnings management after a covenant violation. Practical implications: This paper provides a new
perspective for understanding earnings management and is of great significance to alert stakeholders and
the monitoring system to the firm’s
self-interest behavior and emphasizes the significance of investor protection
in the context of covenant violation. Originality/value: The issues investigated in this paper
have never been studied in the literature. This study provides a new
perspective for understanding earnings management and is of great significance
to alert stakeholders and the monitoring system to the firm’s self-interest
behavior and emphasizes the significance of investor protection in the context
of covenant violation.
KEYWORDS
covenant violation, earnings management, real earnings management, regression discontinuity design
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