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Article
Author(s)
HUANG Qiyu
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DOI:10.17265/1548-6591/2023.05.004
Affiliation(s)
China University of Political Science and Law, Beijing, China
ABSTRACT
Sustainable use of common pool resources is crucial, especially with China moving away from relying solely on resource stock for economic development. Managing common pool resources is vital for the shift in economic development practices. Using Elinor Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development framework, this study focuses on Neilong village in Fujian Province. It examines how overplanting by villagers for eucalyptus cultivation led to a decline in the water table. The villagers’ unique utilization of groundwater as a common pool resource involves an indirect seizure. The village’s distinctive clan culture, coupled with the absence of rules, results in a collective action dilemma. Villagers, boundedly rational and lacking corrective learning mechanisms, face challenges in self-correction. The paper suggests that government intervention is the most effective solution to address this dilemma.
KEYWORDS
institutional analysis, collective action dilemma, common pool resources, indirect seizure
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