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Article
A Rebuttal to Belief-Eliminativism
Author(s)
WANG Linlin
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DOI:10.17265/2328-2177/2023.07.003
Affiliation(s)
Shandong University, Jinan, China
ABSTRACT
Belief-eliminativism is a theory of belief in the philosophy of science whose basic position is that there is no belief, and that belief, as an immature concept, should be eliminated along with the progress of human understanding. The two different soils, philosophy of mind and epistemology, have nourished two kinds of belief-eliminativisms with different emphases: Belief-eliminativism based on neurobiology by cognitive scientists is an extreme view of naturalism; belief-eliminativism based on Bayesianism by epistemologists is a model used to describe the belief status of ideal subjects. However, these two types of belief-eliminationism have never been able to withstand the interrogation from psychology and common sense theory, and anti-realism is not a proper choice for human subjects after all.
KEYWORDS
belief, eliminativism, credence, Bayesian Challenge
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