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John Rawls on Overlapping Consensus
Luís Lóia
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DOI:10.17265/2159-5313/2021.08.006
Portuguese Catholic University, Lisbon, Portugal
Although conceived as a rational deduction, the choice of the principles of justice requires a consensus about the same basic conception of justice since we must consider that there are different comprehensive conceptions of it. That means that is not possible to accomplish such a task within a political strict consensus. We must reach an overlapping consensus grounded in conditions of reciprocity. We then must inquire in what conditions this overlapping consensus may be reached, because we may find a difference between political or constitutional consensus and moral consensus. If the former does not raise many difficulties to be understood, since it deals only with political basic structure of one society, the latter seems to be more problematic. We aim to show that Rawls interpretation of the theory of moral sentiments may be more appropriate for the understanding and justification of the need for an overlapping consensus in the establishment of a just society. For if that could be the case, each citizen will engage the same liberal conception of justice for their one moral reasons.
justice, constitutional consensus, overlapping consensus, public reason, moral sentiments
Luís Lóia. (2021). John Rawls on Overlapping Consensus. Philosophy Study, August 2021, Vol. 11, No. 8, 637-641.
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