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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License
Beata Guziejewska
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DOI:10.17265/1548-6591/2016.07.006
University of Lodz, Lodz, Poland
This paper presents the conclusions from the qualitative and quantitative parts of the project, the aim of which was to investigate the consequences of the current system of financing local self-government in Poland in the context of a broader phenomenon, the so-called “fiscal illusion”. The first part of the research (qualitative) was based on in-depth interviews with 10 councilors of the Municipal Council of Lodz (Łódź); the second part was based on an improved questionnaire and closed-ended questions (quantitative). The questionnaire was sent by email to the councilors of seven largest cities, in terms of population, in Poland. The main results reveal little importance of local taxes and local fiscal autonomy in the eyes of the members of the council. The largest group of respondents (86%) pointed to higher shares in PIT (Personal Income Tax) and CIT (Corporate Income Tax) and higher subsidy and grants from the central budget (68%) as the most desirable method of raising revenues for the municipal budget. The 71% of the respondents were against increasing local taxation. This paper summarizes the results from the whole research project and refers to the hypotheses. The synthetic findings fully confirmed the main research hypothesis, which stated that the system of financing local government in Poland, which was based on revenues from transfers, led to the origin and perpetuation of fiscal illusion.
fiscal illusions, fiscal relations, local taxes, grants
Journal of US-China Public Administration, July 2016, Vol. 13, No. 7, 483-489
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