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Article
Author(s)
Leonidas A. Papakonstantinidis
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DOI:10.17265/1537-1506/2012.06.004
Affiliation(s)
Leonidas A. Papakonstantinidis, Professor, Head of the Local Government Department, School of Management and Economics, The Higher Technological Educational Institute of Kalamata.
ABSTRACT
Local development as a local management process tables a number of questions, mainly concerning on conflict resolution between the three power local poles: (1) State and its appointed State peripheral Departments; (2) Local authorities; and (3) Local people and their local movements/lobbies. As the three poles are in a constant negotiations, then each of them should prevail over the other two, thus be introduced in the bargaining problem. Bargaining behavior must therefore be defined. The suggested “win-win-win papakonstantinidis model” (coming from Nash win-win extended approach) tries to find ways for the three-pole bargaining conceptual equilibrium, under conditions, thus maximizing expected utilities for all the involved parts in local decision-making by applying a combination of Descriptive Behavior (DB), Rational Choice, Instrumental Rationality, and the Applied Behavioral Analysis (ABA) methodologies, then an updating community’s behavioral state is expected, thus transforming the technical territory-community perception to a behavioral community perception, by sensitizing its population, towards the “guanxi relations” paradigm.
KEYWORDS
behavior bargain, conflict, community, decision making, knowledge creation, sensitization process, guanxi relations paradigm
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