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Article
Author(s)
Candida Bussoli, Marisa Gigante, Maria Bruna Tritto
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DOI:10.17265/1537-1506/2015.08.003
Affiliation(s)
Candida Bussoli, associate professor of financial markets and institutions at the University LUM Jean Monnet, Casamassima (Bari), Italy.
Marisa Gigante, Ph.D., assistant professor in financial markets and institutions at the University LUM Jean Monnet, Casamassima (Bari), Italy.
Maria Bruna Tritto, assistant professor in financial markets and institutions at the University LUM Jean Monnet, Casamassima (Bari), Italy.
ABSTRACT
In the banking system, a context characterized by growing instability and by the speed of evolution of business dynamics, the system of corporate governance plays a key role, both for large banks and for banks with a smaller size. The paper aims to investigate the influence of corporate governance of the banks that operate in the cooperative credit system on performance and quality of loans, over the years 2010-2011-2012. In order to achieve this aim, the following research hypotheses have been formulated: There is a statistically significant relationship between the size and the structure of the board and banks performance operating in the cooperative credit system; there is a statistically significant relationship between the size and structure of the board and the credit quality of banks operating in the cooperative credit system. The analysis is conducted on a sample composed of 48 Italian banks, divided into 24 cooperative banks and 24 popular banks. The sample is made up of banks from all over Italy and very different in terms of dimension. For the sample construction, data relative to governance of banks were collected from the balance sheets in the period from June to August 2014. Financial-economic data were collected from the Financial Statements and from Bankscope database. The methodology of analysis is based on multivariate OLS (ordinary least squares) regression models. The main results refer to the presence of significant relationships between board dimension and the quality of loans and among the number of committees and performance and the quality of loans. The presence of a significant and negative relationship between the board dimension and the ratio of impaired loans to gross loans indicates the possibility that enlargement of board dimension allows a better quality of loans. The presence of a positive relationship between the number of committees and the ratio of impaired loans to gross loans signals the possibility that a greater number of committees can produce a worse quality of loans. The presence of a negative relationship between the number of committees and bank performance suggests to limit and manage the complexity of governance in banks operating in the cooperative credit system.
KEYWORDS
bank, cooperative credit system, corporate governance, loans quality, performance
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