

Ingel's Theory on International Fairness Based on Simplified Voting System of UNSC

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According to the *Charter of the United Nations*, the United Nations Security Council adopts a “collective security system” authorized voting system, which has prominent drawbacks such as difficulty in fully reflecting the will of all Member States. Combining interdisciplinary, qualitative and quantitative research methods, in response to the dilemma of Security Council voting reform, this article suggests retaining the Security Council voting system and recommending a simplified model of “basic and weighted half” for voting allocation. This model not only inherits the authorized voting system of the collective security system, but also follows the allocation system of sovereignty equality in the Charter. It can also achieve the “draw on the advantages and avoid disadvantages” of Member States towards international development, promote the transformation of “absolute equality” of overall consistency into “real fairness” relative to individual contributions, and further promote the development of international law in the United Nations voting system.

Keywords: United Nations Security Council, authorized voting, model and formula, Security Council reform, international law research

Introduction

Charter of the United Nations stipulates that the United Nations Security Council has the international legal responsibility to “maintain world peace and security”¹. Its voting system is divided into sovereignty and authorization in nature, and distribution and voting in form. But it has been several decades since the Charter came into effect, and the basis it provides for solving international law problems is no longer suitable for the development of today's world. The voting system of the Security Council, as the core power of the international community, should be adjusted in a timely manner according to the needs of the times. This article introduces negative factors when discussing the allocation of voting rights to improve the voting system of the United Nations Security Council. In other words, the voting formula model not only includes positive factors such as contribution to international organizations and population size, but also includes factors such as the number of membership breaches in history and whether there are violations of international law for weighted voting reduction, which is more conducive to regulating the positive efforts of various countries towards time development and international cooperation. In addition, especially when discussing the reform of the voting

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¹ *Charter of the United Nations*, art. 1, para. 1.

system of the United Nations Security Council, the qualitative and quantitative aspects of the model are proposed. By using qualitative and quantitative analysis methods in science, the specific influencing factors of weighted thinking are introduced into the voting allocation system, such as positive factors: contribution to the international organization, population size, level of development, comprehensive national strength, and geographical location. This article believes that each factor has a certain proportion, and summarizes these factors into a more unified formula to calculate a more scientific and fair number of votes, further simplifying the measurement method of weighted voting, and helping to improve the administrative efficiency of the United Nations.

The Problem and Dilemma of Authorized Voting System

This chapter is also based on the overview of the United Nations voting system in Chapter 1, and further analyzes the authorized voting system of the United Nations Security Council. Combining theoretical and empirical research, the current situation and reform difficulties are analyzed. Based on the reform suggestions of the international community and China on the Security Council, a model of the United Nations Security Council voting system that combines basic and weighted voting is constructed.

The Current Situation and Problems of the United Nations Security Council Voting System

The questioning of the voting system of the United Nations Security Council has a long history. On April 29, 1946, the Security Council passed a resolution establishing a committee to review issues related to Spain. Although permanent members have chosen to abstain from voting on non-procedural matters, it is still regarded as legally binding with restrictive conditions, which has raised doubts among Member States about the effectiveness of the Security Council's voting system (Gross, 1984, p. 430). The Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950, considering the establishment of a "satellite state" in a buffer zone with Europe and America; the former Soviet Union chose to be absent from the United Nations Security Council and did not use the "one-vote veto" to reject the United States proposal for a "United Nations military". As a result, the permanent members failed to shoulder their international legal responsibility for maintaining peace (Krisch & Frowein, 2002). When the Vietnam War broke out, the United Nations Security Council did not hold an emergency special meeting, and Supervisory and Control Commission in Indo-China, the predecessor of the International Monitoring Commission, did not effectively maintain peace and avoid war (Li, 2014, p. 331). On January 14, 1980, the sixth emergency special session of the United Nations discussed the "Afghanistan War" and passed a series of resolutions on the unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. However, the effectiveness of the resolutions was clearly insufficient, and it was not until 1989 that the former Soviet Union withdrew its troops from Afghanistan². On April 3, 1982, at the 2350th meeting of the United Nations Security Council, resolution 502 (1982) was passed with a 10:1 vote, accusing Argentina of endangering peace and invading the Malvinas Islands. However, Argentina did not actually engage in any acts of aggression. It can be seen that the voting of the United Nations Security Council cannot objectively and effectively reflect actual issues (White & Ülgen, 1997). On November 29, 1990, although the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 678 (1990) on "using all necessary means to force Iraq to withdraw unconditionally", the United States used this as an excuse to invade Iraq and annex a province³. On March 24, 1999, without authorization from the United

² The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 377(V).

³ The United Nations Security Council Resolution 678, para. 2.

Nations Security Council, NATO unilaterally bombed homes, schools, monuments, embassies, and other buildings in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for 78 days. The leakage of its 31,000 depleted uranium bomb explosion resulted in a much higher cancer mortality rate for Serbian citizens than other European countries. Afterwards, the United Nations did not impose sanctions on NATO (Jiang, Zhang, & Wang, 2021). After the 9/11 incident, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1373 on September 28, 2001, but the resolution did not authorize the attack on the Taliban regime in Afghanistan⁴. In 2003, the United States launched the “Second Gulf War” without authorization by the United Nations Security Council, citing Iraq’s hidden weapons of mass destruction, fully demonstrating that the current voting system of the United Nations Security Council is no longer able to truly defend world peace (Pu, 2003, p. 78). On March 17, 2011, the 6498th meeting of the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1973 (2011), which stipulated the establishment of a “no fly zone” in Libya, nominally protecting the safety of citizens, but in reality forcing the Gaddafi regime to lose its airspace and perish⁵. In 2011, the Syrian civil war broke out, and the United Nations accused the Syrian government forces and opposition of committing war crimes. In April 2017, the United States, Britain, and France launched an attack on Syria without authorization from the United Nations Security Council (Savage, 2018). In March 2022, the United Nations finally passed the resolution of “Russia’s unconditional withdrawal from Ukraine”, but the fact did not effectively stop Russia’s military actions, indicating a serious issue with the binding force of the United Nations Security Council resolution⁶.

Looking back on the past, the United Nations Security Council has dealt with international disputes, and if there is a dispute between two small countries, it can still resolve the conflict; if there is a dispute between a large country and a small country, it can only satisfy the interests of the large country; if there is a dispute between the two major powers, the United Nations will lose its effectiveness⁷. The reason for this is, firstly, the low efficiency of the unified voting system among major powers. Article 43 of *Charter of the United Nations* stipulates that peacekeeping forces composed of Member States must be authorized by a “special agreement” before they can engage in military action⁸. Due to the fact that the United Nations peacekeeping force is composed of various Member States, there are differences in the interests of each country, which makes it difficult to unify opinions on the issue of special agreements. Due to the time-consuming process of reaching consensus, the collective security system of the United Nations is also greatly restricted (Yang, 2009, p. 61). Secondly, it is unable to effectively constrain the “peacekeeping military operations” of Member States. Article 39 of *Charter of the United Nations* stipulates the issue of defining the degree of “threat and breach of peace”. The United Nations Resolution on the Definition of Aggression does indeed provide a clear legal opinion on the degree of threat or breach of peace⁹. However, in practical and complex international issues, the interests of each country may differ, and the specific problems they face may still not be resolved according to existing international law. Therefore, the collective security system still needs to be further improved. Thirdly, the existing voting system of the Security Council can only serve as a symbol of international power authorized by major powers, and cannot reflect broad international democracy. This is reflected in the uneven regional

⁴ The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1372.

⁵ The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, para. 6-12.

⁶ The United Nations Security Council Resolution 2623.

⁷ See Chains, 1979—Inside stories of the Sino-Vietnamese Border War. Discoveries, 1989 (Z1), p. 91.

⁸ *Supra* note 1, at art. 7, para. 43.

⁹ Annex Definition of Aggression, The General Assembly.

distribution of Security Council members, a clear lack of representation from developing countries, and a lack of participation from African regions in particular. Fourthly, the existing voting system for the Security Council cannot reflect the representativeness of demographic and cultural factors. Issues such as insufficient representation of Islamic countries on the Security Council and asymmetric representation of India, one of the world's most populous countries. This indicates that the voting allocation system of the Security Council needs to fully consider factors such as population and culture (Thakur, 2004). Fifthly, as the number of United Nations Member States increases, the representation ratio of permanent members of the Security Council has been decreasing year by year. In 1945, there were 51 members of the United Nations and 11 members of the Security Council, with a representative ratio of 21.57%; in 1965, the number of members of the Security Council increased to 15, with a representation rate of 13%; In 2011, there were 193 United Nations Member States, with a representative rate of 7.77% (Mao, 2017). Therefore, Cuba advocates "expanding the number of members of the Security Council" to expand the representativeness of the United Nations Security Council. Sixth, the Security Council relies too much on political and diplomatic means such as negotiation and consultation in dealing with international issues, rather than democratic voting methods (Shaw, 2008, p. 1221), which cannot fundamentally solve problems in practice. This requires enhancing the effectiveness of Security Council resolutions and continuously improving the Security Council voting system.

Difficulties in the Reform of the United Nations Security Council and Its Voting System

The *Charter of the United Nations* itself creates institutional obstacles to the reform of the voting system. The reform of the United Nations voting system generally requires the amendment of the Charter. Articles 108 to 109 of the *Charter of the United Nations* stipulate that individual amendments to the Charter require two-thirds approval by the General Assembly to take effect. If it involves a re-examination of the Charter, it requires parallel approval by two-thirds of all members of the United Nations General Assembly and two-thirds of all Security Council members who have not used the veto power before amendment can be made. The Charter also stipulates the establishment of a "Preparatory Committee for the Charter Review Conference" to oversee the procedures and mechanisms for amending the Charter. In the seventy-seven years since the establishment of the United Nations, only three successful "individual amendments" have been made to the *Charter of the United Nations* (December 1963, December 1965, and December 1971, respectively), and they have only been limited to simply increasing the number of members of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, without addressing the essential issues of the number of permanent seats or the applicability of the veto power (Liu, 2009, p. 4).

As the host country and one of the founding countries of the United Nations headquarters, the United States relies on its own hard power to surpass other countries in the international community, prioritizing its own interests before the international collective interests, greatly damaging the credibility of the United Nations in the international community (Liu, 2021, p. 10). The direction of United Nations reform is multilateralism rather than unilateralism, and it is necessary to make the Security Council accountable to the General Assembly through a voting system.

The dilemma of Security Council reform lies in the difficulty of reaching a consensus on the reform of the veto power itself. Firstly, the veto power requires the consensus of the five major powers, but their ideologies are different and their natural value judgments vary. If the members of the Security Council unify their ideology, it will lose the significance of voting representation. Secondly, in a multilateral international

community based on decentralization, the interests and differences of Member States are not entirely the same, making it difficult for the Security Council to unanimously adopt major issues, thereby reducing the decision-making efficiency of the United Nations. Once again, most countries are unable to become permanent members, making it impossible for the Security Council to truly express the will of the majority of Member States. The majority of the council members are Western countries, indicating that the voting system of the Security Council is aimed at safeguarding the rights and interests of Western countries. Finally, even if we want to reform the voting system, in practice, it will still be shelved through collective voting among Member States to maintain their vested interests.

According to the previous analysis, the number of members of the United Nations Security Council is expected to increase, but in practice, most nominations for members are from countries with relatively developed economies. Large countries have more seats on the board and become larger “rich country clubs”, while small countries still make reservations, which will increase the disparity in international discourse between large and small countries. The determination of council seats or the system of voting allocation in the Security Council should fully consider factors such as population, culture, international contribution, military strength, and leverage the role of developing countries in the international community to make them more regional and representative (Mao, 2008, p. 18).

The emphasis on security over development has always been an irreversible obstacle to the Security Council's actions. Although the *Charter of the United Nations* grants the Security Council the authority to maintain world peace, the purposes of the Charter are the two important tasks of “maintaining peace and development”. The purpose of the Charter is similar to the “superior law” of the United Nations, which requires compliance by various internal institutions. Due to the special nature of the voting system of the Security Council, since the effectiveness of existing Security Council resolutions is stronger than that of the United Nations General Assembly, it should also shoulder and play the important role of “development”. On the other hand, the reform of the voting system of the United Nations Security Council requires an economic foundation such as a smaller international wealth gap to ensure it (Chen, 2022, p. 16).

The inertia of ignoring democratic voting and illegally using force to resolve disputes. The *Charter of the United Nations* stipulates that force can only be used when necessary for self-defense or peacekeeping. On the one hand, certain countries violate the rules of international law by expanding the “legitimacy” of military force without authorization, leading to illegal use of force in other countries. These countries rely on their own hard power advantages, ignore humanitarian and democratic concepts, and control small countries through illegal and coercive means to obtain local resources, or force them to align with the ideas of powerful countries themselves. On the other hand, these powerful countries also restrict the legitimate use of force by other countries within their own countries. Powerful countries create exaggerated or unfounded political opinions on other countries, thereby affecting their normal development and enhancing their own control over them. Such countries disregard international law, leading to a significant reduction in the effectiveness of the United Nations in the international community and even more detrimental to the normal development of the democratic voting system.

The voting privileges of the “Big Country Club” cannot effectively maintain world peace. The five major powers, as permanent members, have the particularity of having a “one-vote veto”. On the one hand, certain countries abuse them to hinder their role in maintaining peace, and on the other hand, the Security Council is unable to prevent certain powers from undermining peace through the authorized voting system (Dai, 2018, p.

111). Secondly, although Article 27 of *Charter of the United Nations* stipulates that “the parties to the dispute cannot participate in voting”, certain major powers have not complied. Once again, the Charter does not explicitly specify specific situations that undermine peace, which has led some countries to exploit loopholes and seek benefits for their own countries. Overall, as the veto power still has a certain progressive significance, retaining it is an inevitable choice, and therefore requires certain restrictions in order to improve it.

The Reform Position of the International Community to Reform the Authorized Voting System

The permanent members hope to have greater international control both positively and laterally, while the non-permanent members are eager to join the permanent members. The international community expects the United Nations Security Council to undergo reform, but due to the diverse interests of each country, there are also different positions on the reform, making it difficult for countries to reach a consensus.

Suggestions from the International Community on the Reform of the United Nations Security Council Voting System

On December 11, 1992, at the 47th session of the United Nations General Assembly, representatives of 79 countries expressed proposals for an increase in the number of permanent seats on the Security Council and fair distribution¹⁰. On December 3, 1993, the 48th session of the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution proposing to “increase the number of seats on the United Nations Security Council”, which is reflected in the Security Council’s voting allocation system calling for the principle of fair distribution and discussing the increase in the number of permanent members in the voting system¹¹. In 1997, the President of the 51st United Nations Conference, Razali Ismail, submitted the “Razali Plan” for Security Council reform, proposing the addition of five permanent members (including three developing and two developed countries) and four non-permanent seats, and requiring the five major powers to meet the conditions before using the veto power to balance global power (Volger, 2010, p. 654). On July 14, 1997, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan officially proposed a plan to “reform the United Nations” at the 51st session of the United Nations General Assembly, proposing an increase of six permanent members and eight non-permanent members, each consisting of two countries from Asia, the Americas, Europe, and Africa. Developing countries have given strong support, but the United States has expressed opposition (Liu, 1997, p. 61). In 2004, the “Four Nation Alliance”¹² composed of Germany, Japan, India, and Brazil longed to obtain permanent membership in the Security Council. However, due to opposition from neighboring countries, they compromised and sought a “non-veto permanent seat”, but ultimately they were also opposed (Yang, 2005, p. 1). It can be seen that in the past thirty years, the international community has generally called for reform of the voting system of the United Nations Security Council, but it has been difficult to make progress.

In recent years, the United States has supported Japan and India’s accession to the WTO, but has denied Russia’s veto power. On September 26, 2021, US President Biden held a bilateral meeting with Indian Prime Minister Modi. The US expressed support for allies such as India becoming a permanent member and joining

¹⁰ The United Nations General Assembly Resolution, 47th Session, art. 62.

¹¹ The United Nations General Assembly Resolution, 48th Session, art. 26.

¹² The “charge again” of Security Council reform: Public opinion still difficult to adjust, consensus still hard to find. *United Nations News*, 2020-12-16. Retrieved from <https://news.un.org/zh/story/2020/11/1072272>.

the Nuclear Suppliers Group¹³. In 2022, the United States hopes to amend the veto power of Russia in *Charter of the United Nations* with the aim of calling for Russia to withdraw from the permanent seat. However, Russia will veto the United States' proposal to withdraw from the Security Council through one vote of veto¹⁴. On May 23, 2022, US President Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida held talks in Tokyo, stating that they would "promote UN reform and support Japan's accession to the Standing Committee"¹⁵.

The Russian representative once proposed in the United Nations General Assembly that "acts of force must be authorized and supervised by the Security Council, and Russia aspires to become a regulatory body authorized by the United Nations" (Zagorski, 1996). In 1998, Russia proposed that the Security Council voting system needs to better reflect regional balance and should grant Germany and Japan a veto power¹⁶. On October 19, 2021, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov proposed that "more seats on the United Nations Security Council should be included in developing countries such as Asia, Africa, and Latin America, so that the authorized voting system of the Security Council should be more democratic" (Liu, 2021).

The European Union has proposed to the United Nations to "re-divide the regional groups of the United Nations Security Council, aiming to enhance the effectiveness of Europe in the Security Council through the voting allocation system" (Long, 2007, p. 29). On October 1, 1997, Britain agreed to increase the number of seats on the Security Council for Germany, Japan, and developing countries, but denied that these countries had a veto power¹⁷. German scholar Gilbert Zibla believes that "the voting system of the United Nations Security Council is still incomplete, so the United Nations has not received its rightful place in the world" (Hüfner & Naumann, 1970). France has the veto power as one permanent member, which is inconsistent with the stance of other EU countries on the United Nations voting system (Tharoor, 2008). In 2008, French President Sarkozy stated that the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council should include Brazil, India, Japan, Germany, and one African country, which has always been France's position. Italy proposed to change the existing seats of European countries on the United Nations Security Council to one seat for the European Union, which greatly reduces the EU's voting allocation system on the Security Council and has been opposed by other EU countries (Winkelmann, 1997).

Other countries such as Japan have always been eager to become permanent members. In 2006, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a document on "United Nations reform", proposing that the United Nations Security Council should be expanded from 15 to 21, but without veto power. On September 22, 2020, at the summit commemorating the 75th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations, Japanese Foreign Minister Motegi Toshimitsu expressed "hope for reforming the United Nations Security Council and expecting

¹³ Joe Biden reiterates US support for India's entry in top UN body, nuclear group NSG. NDTV, 2021-9-24. Retrieved from https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/biden-reiterates-support-for-india-s-permanent-seat-in-unscc-entry-into-nsg-121092500584_1.html.

¹⁴ Global Times. Russian media: The United States is studying to expel Russia from the United Nations Security Council. The official account of *Beijing Daily*, 2022-03-03. Retrieved from <https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1726265952809861477&wfr=spider&for=pc>.

¹⁵ The face-to-face talks between the US and Japan leaders and the immediate agreement on this issue. *China News Network*, 2022-05-24. Retrieved from <https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1733664991610103817&wfr=spider&for=pc>.

¹⁶ Permanent Mission of Russia to the UN. *Statement by a representative of the Russian Federation in the working group on Security Council reform on veto issue*. United Nations Official Website, 1999-3-24. Retrieved from <https://www.un.org/en/site-search?query=Statement+by+a+Representa-tive+of+the+Russian+Federation+in+the+W+orking+Group+on+Security+Council+Reform+on+Veto+Issue%2C+24+Mar>.

¹⁷ *Supra* note 11, at 812.

Japan to become a permanent member”¹⁸. On September 28, 2018, at the 26th United Nations General Assembly, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir proposed that the veto power of the five major powers in the Security Council should have more than 2/5 of the votes passed before it becomes effective, otherwise it may become a partial democracy of certain countries¹⁹. In May 2022, South Korea opposed increasing the number of permanent members, but suggested adding non-permanent members elected regularly²⁰.

Overall, the international community has expectations for reforming the voting system of the United Nations Security Council, but due to the vastly different interests of countries or regions, it is difficult to form a consensus.

China's Proposal on the Reform of the United Nations Security Council Voting System

China has always held a positive and open stance on the reform of the voting system of the United Nations Security Council, particularly advocating for expanding the seats of developing countries and playing its due role. On February 24, 2003, at the 13th Summit of Non-Aligned Countries, Wang Guangya, then Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of China, elaborated on protecting the rights and interests of developing countries and promoting a new international political and economic order (Qiu & Yu, 2003). Therefore, the members of the Security Council should balance the seats of developed and developing countries. On September 9, 2004, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Kong Quan stated on the issue of “Japan’s desire to join the permanent membership” that Security Council reform is a result of joint exploration by all parties²¹, and therefore requires the participation of different interest groups in the discussion. On November 10, 2012, the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China proposed advocating for a “community with a shared future for mankind”²², which requires more Member States to participate in international common governance. In December 2021, the United Nations held the 6th Review Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, and China proposed the position paper on “regulating artificial intelligence in military applications” for the first time. This is also the first time that the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons has classified the “field of artificial intelligence” into the category of world peace and security²³, in order to continuously improve the application of the Security Council voting system in emerging fields.

China advocates a collective commitment to inclusive and open multilateralism. In 2021, the high-level meeting of the United Nations General Assembly pointed out that multilateralism is an effective way to solve complex world problems²⁴. Multilateralism refers to the equal consultation and dialogue among Member States,

¹⁸ Japan calls for expanded Security Council at UN 75th Anniversary Meeting. *The Japan Times*, 2020-9-22.

¹⁹ General debate of Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir: New Malaysia persists in mutual respect, mutual benefit, and win-win. *United Nations News*, 2018-09-28. Retrieved from <https://news.un.org/zh/story/2018/09/1019142>.

²⁰ Biden’s support for Japan’s “entry into the standing committee”, South Korea’s statement. The official account of *Global Times*, 2022-03-23. Retrieved from <https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1733629649306000101&wfr=spider&for=pc>.

²¹ On September 9, 2004, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Kong Quan answered reporters’ questions at a regular press conference. The website of the Office of the Special Representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China in the Macao Special Administrative Region, 2004-09-09. Retrieved from <https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/como/chn/gsxwfb/fyrth/t156577.htm>.

²² The Communist Party of China first proposed a “community with a shared future for mankind” advocating for peaceful development and common development. *People’s Daily*, 2012-11-11. Retrieved from <http://cpc.people.com.cn/18/n/2012/1111/c350825-19539441.html>.

²³ China’s Position Paper on Regulating the Military Application of Artificial Intelligence.

²⁴ Interview: “China makes important contributions to the practice of true multilateralism—Interview with President Shahid of the 76th United Nations General Assembly”. The website of www.beiqing.com, 2021-10-24. Retrieved from <https://t.yinet.cn/baijia/31622672.html>.

regardless of their overall national strength and other factors, based on international law that respects the unity and equality of sovereign states. It aims to oppose one-sided national development theories such as hegemonism or unilateralism led by a specific country, thus forming an international order of world diversity and common development²⁵. China calls on the international community to fully assist developing countries, underdeveloped countries and regions, and emerging countries in building their development. The United Nations should fully play its role in safeguarding the common development of all sovereign countries. The one-vote veto system of the United Nations mainly reflects the dominant discourse of the five major powers, but it does not reflect the balance of small countries' exercise of their power. At the same time, although the *Charter of the United Nations* requires sovereign states to be equal and united, the existing voting system of the Security Council does not take into account the "common" and "equality" of Member States. If relatively weaker countries are given greater voting power, they can achieve common development with major powers. Therefore, the voting system of the United Nations Security Council still needs to be continuously improved.

China advocates for an international legal order centered around the United Nations and maintains world peace. The purpose of the United Nations is peace and development, although the possibility of a world war breaking out among the five major powers in the context of maintaining world order under international law is extremely low. However, the binding power of the United Nations is insufficient to fundamentally defend world peace, leading to some hegemonic countries provoking local conflicts to hinder sovereign countries from exercising the voting power of the United Nations independently. Since its accession to the General Assembly, China has always adhered to the purposes of peace and development of the United Nations, striving to defend world peace as a major country, and has joined almost all intergovernmental international organizations, fulfilling treaty obligations and international commitments, with the aim of maintaining an international order centered on international law. For example, China actively participates in international negotiations, safeguards the rights and interests of many developing countries, and advocates for balanced development of the international order; China will increase communication with the international community and participate in the revision of international rules and regulations, in order to jointly formulate more up-to-date international legal rules²⁶; China is also deeply promoting international cooperation on anti-corruption and other issues, and is committed to promoting the establishment of its governance system; China also strives to participate in judicial activities to jointly combat cross-border crime with the international community, starting from technology sharing and legal commonality. It can be seen that China advocates for a balanced distribution of voting power among Member States in the international order, calls on the international community to take into account the differences between developing and developed countries, fully expresses the voices of different interest groups, and promotes the joint efforts of the two to maintain world peace and development.

China calls for an international partnership of "consultation, co-construction, and sharing". The global governance system, based on the limited resources of the Earth, needs to integrate the concept of a "community with a shared future for mankind" throughout the entire international community, through mutual cooperation, support, and sharing, in order to achieve common development and win-win results, and fully mobilize the enthusiasm of developed and developing countries to complement each other's strengths (Hu, 2021). The "community with a shared future for mankind" requires the five major powers to fully play the positive leading

²⁵ China United Nations Cooperation Position Paper. *People's Daily*, 2021-10-26, at A6.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

role of the United Nations Security Council's authorization of the "one-vote veto system" in order to achieve effective international consultation and cooperation. The voting allocation system of the Security Council also needs to take into account the equal status of sovereign countries and implement certain incentive mechanisms to promote the continuous development of Member States. This also requires various Member States to continuously resolve disputes in civilized society through consultation and negotiation, in order to achieve unity of ideas or form a majority system. China must firmly uphold the purposes of the Charter, fully promote international peace and development, effectively defend the legitimate rights and interests of its members, and truly achieve a "community with a shared future for mankind" under the global governance system.

Ingel's Theory on International Fairness

This article believes that it is inevitable to retain the voting system of the Security Council and reform its voting distribution system. The good development of the international order lies not only in maintaining it, but also in formulating it. Relying solely on maintenance cannot fundamentally solve the problems of international order; only by continuously improving the voting system of the United Nations can we fundamentally avoid or resolve international disputes and differences. Due to the greater emphasis on authorization in the voting system of the United Nations Security Council, while respecting the commonality of sovereign equality (one country, one vote) among all countries, it is also necessary to consider the individual differences in the development of each country in order to determine the proportion of national rights to the allocation of votes by the Security Council. Emphasizing the contribution of input-output ratio in distribution does not contradict the principle of sovereign equality, but rather helps Member States to assume more international responsibility, in order to maximize the relationship between fairness and efficiency (Shi, 2006, p. 86). Global governance requires a more scientific integration approach that combines the advantages of sovereignty and authorized voting. This helps to achieve the principle of sovereign equality, where "formal fairness" relative to overall consistency is transformed into "essential fairness" relative to individual contribution, forming an up-to-date voting system for the United Nations Security Council, and thereby safeguarding the international discourse of each Member State to maintain world peace and development.

Firstly, a general introduction to forward and reverse weighting factors. There are five positively weighted factors, with the first four being "innate factors" and the fifth being "acquired factors". Although the charter and legislation do not specify specific methods for peacekeeping operations (Sheng, 2018), in order to fully stimulate Member States to participate more in international affairs and make contributions, and to provide opportunities for "inherently deficient" Member States, I believe that the sum of the first four items should be less than the fifth item, expressed as: $PCNS + NP + LA + NENS < CW$. On the other hand, although the weights of "innate factors" and "acquired factors" are different, the differences in their importance are not significant. Therefore, there is no need to use half (five to five, or 1:1) for measurement, and instead use a specific majority system of four to six (2:3) for modeling, denoted as:

$$\frac{PCNS + NP + LA + NENS}{PWI} = \frac{2}{5} \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{CW}{NWI} = \frac{3}{5}$$

or as:

$$\frac{PCNS + NP + LA + NENS}{CW} = \frac{2}{3}$$

Secondly, the reason why the first four positive weighting factors, the second and third factors, are

independently measured from the comprehensive national strength to form a “partial comprehensive national strength” is because “the larger the population and land, the more difficult the national governance is” and various sectors have repeatedly proposed incremental measures for many years. At the same time, the number of ethnic groups (Brooke, 1988) and the types of national systems can represent differentiated interest groups, so it is unreasonable for a single ethnic country and a multi-ethnic country, or a country with multiple systems and a country with one system, to have the same vote. In addition, according to Ray Cline’s comprehensive national strength equation (Cline, 1977), factors such as economy, politics, and military focus on “development” in the purposes of the United Nations, while population, land area, number of ethnic groups, and national system focus more on the need for “peace” and better reflect the voices of various groups. Therefore, the first four items are measured side by side and have the same proportion, namely: $\text{PCNS: NP: LA: NENS} = 1:1:1:1$.

Secondly, the theory of positive weighting factors. One is the population size. Taking the “2020 World Population Statistics” ranking table released by the World Bank as an example, 235 countries and regions participated in the ranking. China (including Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan) ranked first in the world with a total population of 1,439,323,776 (World Bank, 2021). The country with the smallest population was the Vatican, with a total population of 801²⁷. Due to the large sample range, the results obtained by allocating according to the “total number of people” result in the third and fourth intervals having no countries and being too concentrated in the first interval, resulting in effective allocation. So, based on the “overall ranking” as a reference, we divided the 235 countries into five equal groups on average: 189th to 235th (distribution rights: 1%), 142nd to 188th (distribution rights: 2%), 95th to 141st (distribution rights: 3%), 48th to 94th (distribution rights: 4%), and 1st to 47th (distribution rights: 5%). Therefore, 47 countries in each interval receive the same population weighted allocation rights to fully utilize scientific research resources. The second is the land area. According to the national and organizational profiles released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 197 countries included in the statistics are divided into seven categories based on their land area²⁸: micro countries (< 10,000 km²); super small countries (10,000-50,000 km²); small countries (50,000-100,000 km²); medium sized countries (100,000-500,000 km²); large countries (500,000-1,000,000 km²); super large countries (1,000,000-5,000,000 km²); giant countries (> 5,000,000 km²)²⁹. I will analyze this on a numerical axis as Figure 1:




Figure 1. Numerical axis.

²⁷ Population Division in Department of Economic and Social Affairs of United Nations. *Countries in the world by population (2021)*. Worldometer, 2021. Retrieved from <https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/population-by-country/>.

²⁸ “Country and Organization” column. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2021-08. Retrieved from https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/yz_676205.

²⁹ *World land area ranking*. World Land Area Ranking Network, 2021. Retrieved from <http://114.xixik.com/world-ranking-of-territorial-areas>.

According to Zheng Jiaheng's concept of "excluding outliers", in order to express the average more reasonably, it is necessary to remove extreme intervals (Zheng, 1995), and thus 197 countries are divided into five categories. The decimal counting units commonly used in daily life, such as "single digit, tens, hundreds, thousands, ten thousands, hundred thousands, millions, and ten millions", were counted (Zhang, Peng, & Xu, 2021). Therefore, they were ultimately divided into five levels: < 10,000 km², 1%; 10,000-100,000 km², 2%; 100,000-1,000,000 km², 3%; 1,000,000-5,000,000 km², 4%; > 5,000,000 km², 5%. The third is the number of ethnic groups and national systems. According to data from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People's Republic of China, Nigeria has the highest number of ethnic groups in the world with over 250 ethnic groups, while North Korea and South Korea are single ethnic countries³⁰. The difference between the countries with the highest and lowest number of ethnic groups is nearly 250. Divide them evenly into 5 equal parts, and their weighted proportions are: 1-50 ethnic groups account for 1%, 51-100 ethnic groups account for 2%, 101-150 ethnic groups account for 3%, 151-200 ethnic groups account for 4%, 201-250 ethnic groups and above account for 5%. Meanwhile, due to the fact that a very small number of countries are "multi system countries" (Liu, 1981), they are considered as additional points, that is, as long as a country has two or more systems, an additional 1% is added, but the total weighted factor of the number of ethnic and national systems does not exceed 5%. The fourth is the degree of contribution to the international community. The form of international contribution by Member States varies and the weight cannot be quantified. Therefore, consensus can be reached to determine this factor, which accounts for 30%.

Therefore, the premise for the use of the United Nations Security Council voting allocation system model is that the number of votes allocated is zero and the benchmark for recalculation is a new issue or a specified time period. The voting allocation system of the Security Council recommends the use of "basic and weighted combination". The Basic Vote (BV) adopts the average number of votes equally divided among countries; Weighted Vote (WV) refers to Article 12 (5) of the International Monetary Fund Agreement³¹ and the "weighting formula" proposed by existing research (Ge, 2013, p. 58). The Total Vote (TV) weight of the sum of the two is 100%, with each accounting for 50% to be balanced by leverage. The half distribution ratio takes into account that the responsibilities of the Security Council are different from those of international economic organizations that prioritize efficiency.

$$\frac{BV}{TV} = \frac{WV}{TV} = \frac{1}{2} \text{ or } \frac{BV}{WV} = \frac{1}{1}$$

Among them, it is recommended to use a combination of positive and negative weighting (e.g., negative score reduction system) as weighting indicators. Positive Weighted Index (PWI) can affirm and support the comprehensive development of Member States, including Part of Comprehensive National Strength (PCNS) of 5%, Number of Population (NP) of 5%, Land Area (LA) of 5%, Number of Ethnicity and National System (NENS) of 5%, and Contribution to the World (CW) of 30%; specific derivation process can be found in the appendix of this chapter. The Negative Weighted Index (NWI) can contain the disregard of the charter by powerful countries, including five items. Firstly, endangering world peace and security is in accordance with the purposes of *Charter of the United Nations* and the requirements of Article 2, paragraph 4, "Prohibition of the use of force" (Yu & Ma, 2006) and the threat of force. Secondly, opposing international cooperation goes

³⁰ *Supra* note 27.

³¹ Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, art. 12, para. 5.

against the concept of international common governance in a community with a shared future for mankind. Thirdly, the violation of human rights and racial discrimination stems from Article 1, paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Charter, which states that “the purposes of the United Nations include the protection of human rights and the promotion of freedom and equality for all”³². Fourthly, interference in national sovereignty and internal affairs is achieved through the Security Council’s voting distribution system to counter the sovereignty of equal status among sovereign countries. Fifthly, due to arrears in international organization contributions, as mentioned earlier in the Charter, the provisions on arrears in contributions are insufficient. Therefore, it is recommended to use two-year contributions as a benchmark and divide them into 100 equal parts. The proportion of outstanding contributions is proportional to the inverse weighting. As shown in Table 1, each of the top four positive weighting factors for each country is necessarily greater than 1%. If the reverse weighting factor is ignored, the basic weighting index of each Member State is actually 54%, and its contribution to the international community is not considered inaction, then in reality, Member States are easily able to obtain 60% of the voting rights. This ratio can also serve as a passing line to determine whether Member States have fulfilled their basic obligations and are in line with the international development order.

Table 1

Model of PWI for the Voting Allocation System of the United Nations Security Council

Item	Weighted	Item	Weighted	Item	Weighted
BV	50%	Sovereignty equally among all member states			
		Part of PCNS	5%	See Cline’s comprehensive national power equation	
				rank 189th-235th	1%
				rank 142nd-188th	2%
		NP	5%	rank 95th-141st	3%
				rank 48th- 94th	4%
				rank 1st-47th	5%
				< 10,000 km ²	1%
				10,000-100,000 km ²	2%
		LA	5%	100,000-1,000,000 km ²	3%
WV	50%			1,000,000-5,000,000 km ²	4%
				> 5,000,000 km ²	5%
				1-50	1%
				51-100	2%
				101-150	3%
		NENS	5%	151-200	4%
				201-250, or > 250	5%
				National system ≥ 1	+1%
				Total $\leq 5\%$	
		CW	30%	Consensus voting system	

Given the obstacles and difficulties in the reform of the United Nations voting system mentioned earlier, which may involve difficulties such as the bottleneck in the revision of *Charter of the United Nations*, conflicts of interests among voting groups, and collective consensus among the five major powers, the model’s recommendations may have some practical significance in theory, but the current international environment itself cannot pass resolutions on voting reform, and thus there is no opportunity to see the practical application

³² *Supra* note 1, at art. 1, para. 2-3.

of the model in the voting of the United Nations Security Council. In order to avoid the emergence of this paradox, it is also possible to refer to resolutions on the reform of the United Nations Security Council over the years, such as proposing that developed and developing countries be evenly divided among all permanent members, in order to break the existing unilateralism and the monopoly of voting groups by hegemonic countries, and to avoid the extreme situation of the International Monetary Fund being dominated by one vote, and thus more likely to truly achieve the purposes of peace and development of the United Nations (Zhang, 2012). The voting system of the Security Council should fully leverage the advantages of “restricted majority system and consensus based comprehensive application”, and complement each other’s advantages through voting democracy and consultation and discussion, in order to handle complex and ever-changing international issues more flexibly and effectively. Ultimately, the value of the United Nations Security Council voting model in future international community practice will be realized, thereby more effectively defending world peace and development. The above suggestions have a “should be” nature and are expected to help the international community reform the voting system of the United Nations Security Council.

Conclusions

The authorized voting system centered around the United Nations Security Council has problems such as low voting efficiency, lack of population, insufficient representation, and a decrease in representation ratio, making it difficult for the UNSC to effectively keep the peace of the world. This article suggests that the voting allocation system of the United Nations Security Council should adopt a “basic and weighted” model, and be compatible with the original authorized voting system. The voting allocation system model is divided into basic voting and weighted voting, each accounting for 50%. Basic voting, which is based on the sovereign equality of all Member States, with each country equally enjoying a basic vote of half. Weighted voting specifically includes forward weighting factors and reverse weighting factors. The positive weighting factor is divided into 5% of the overall national strength, 5% of the population, 5% of the land area, 5% of the ethnic and national system, and 30% of the international contribution. Reverse weighting factors, including threats to world peace and security, opposition to international cooperation, violation of human rights and racial discrimination, interference in national sovereignty and internal affairs, and arrears in international organization contributions. The results of the voting allocation system model can also serve as indicators to determine whether Member States have fulfilled their basic obligations and whether they comply with the international development order. In addition, the voting system of the United Nations Security Council still adopts the current international “restricted majority system”, which is a specific majority system approved by two-thirds of all members, and substantive matters are more important than procedural matters plus the one-vote veto system of permanent members. Combining the theories of collective security system and international legal responsibility, this article fully considers the principles of sovereign voting such as equality of sovereign states and international legal subjects, and further refines the proportion of each weighting factor in the model, in order to inherit and develop the *Charter of the United Nations* and effectively maintain world peace and development.

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Ethical Conduct

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Informed Consent

Informed consent was obtained from all participants following the publication rule. The corresponding author prepares to collect documentation of compliance with ethical standards.

Data Availability

Data supporting the findings are available upon request from the author.

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