

A Securitization-Perspective Analysis of Water Disputes in the Jordan River Basin

ZHANG Jieying

Fudan University, Shanghai, China

Severe water shortage and uneven water distribution plague countries in the Middle East, especially the Jordan River Basin. As a strategic resource with competitive political nature, water resources are closely related to national security, and become the core resource arena that countries along the river basin compete for. This study argues that under the combined effect of the natural factors of water shortage, the geographical factors of uneven distribution of rivers across boundaries, and the subjective factors of water politics (the unfair setting of rules for water allocation), water disputes in the Middle East have become obstacles to regional peace, and the serious uneven distribution of water is the root cause of regional water disputes. Neither the historical water conflicts nor the existing water cooperation framework has solved the problem of balanced water distribution, which makes the people in basin countries directly face the crisis of survival rights and national security, and lays the fuse for the outbreak of regional water disputes and even future water wars. This study proposes the concept and analytical framework of “water securitization” based on securitization theory, and applies it to the Jordan River Basin, to analyze the reasons for the uneven distribution of water resources in the Middle East. The power-dominant state with asymmetric power in the river basin obtains the status of water hegemony by securitizing water, realizing the self-interested distribution of water resources, which leads to the uneven distribution of water resources, and ultimately leads to the outbreak of conflicts and disputes. Specifically, it mainly adopts three mechanisms of discursive securitization, operational securitization, and institutional securitization. Looking to the future, it is difficult to successfully resolve water disputes in the Middle East in the short term, and a “de-securitization” approach is particularly important in resolving water disputes and easing regional security tension. Only by adopting a multi-field joint strategy can it provide the possibility to effectively resolve water disputes in the Jordan River Basin.

Keywords: the Middle East Region, the Jordan River Basin, water disputes, securitization, water securitization

Introduction

Historical water conflicts and existing water cooperation frameworks have failed to address the issue of balanced water allocation in the Jordan River basin, making antagonism the norm in regional water disputes. This has led to “water hostility” replacing “water sharing” and “water cooperation”, and has sown the seeds of water wars in the Middle East. On this basis, this study aims to analyze the causes of the unequal distribution of water resources in the Jordan River Basin. By securitizing water, countries with asymmetrical power in the basin gain the status of the dominant water power and achieve self-serving distribution of water resources, resulting in unequal water distribution in the basin and eventually leading to disputes and conflicts. Specifically, this is

ZHANG Jieying, Ph.D. candidate, School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University, Shanghai, China.

achieved through three mechanisms: discursive securitization, operational securitization, and institutional securitization. Because of the position of one of the dominant water powers, it can coerce other riparian countries into accepting unfair water allocation agreements, precisely because the powerful have the ability to secure their water rights and interests through the calculation of gains and losses within the framework of the international system, while the weak, due to their inferior power position, are largely unable to have an equal voice and reciprocal rights of a fairer distribution of water.

Securitization and Water Securitization

Securitization theory is a constructivist approach to security analysis developed by the Copenhagen School. Its central claim is that security is not an objective condition, but a product of “specific social processes”. In its meaning, securitization is considered to be a more extreme form of “politicization”. Theoretically, the process of securitization of an issue goes through three stages: firstly, the depoliticization stage. All public issues can be considered as issues that the state does not need to deal with and that do not give rise to public discussion and decision; secondly, the politicization stage. In this stage, certain issues become part of public policy and require the government to allocate resources or adopt special governance mechanisms; thirdly, the securitization stage. Certain issues emerge as existential threats or potential threats that require urgent action by actors and can justify action beyond the limits of existing political processes (Buzan, 1997, p. 14). Thus, if an issue is securitized, it means that the actor can use special means or obtain the necessary resources to guarantee that security, and it also means that the issue requires decision-makers to decide and deal with it in preference to other issues.

“Water securitization” refers to the process of protecting water resources as an object of concern that affects survival and security and that can be addressed and responded to with extraordinary measures. The most fundamental reason for actors to securitize water is water scarcity. When water is portrayed as an important component of national security, it has a legitimizing basis for securitization. With this, it leaves the realm of negotiation and compromise (Trottier, 2008; Zeitoun, 2007), any change to existing allocations can be seen as a threat to national security, and proposals for change are portrayed as attempts to undermine national interests. On this basis, water conflicts have been identified as a significant obstacle to national security and regional peace (El-Sayed & Mansour, 2017, p. 230). The typology proposed by Itay Fischhendler, a leading scholar at Hebrew University, suggests that securitization includes both “strategic securitization” and “tactical securitization” (Fischhendler, 2015, p. 247). For water securitization specifically, strategic securitization refers to the linking of all riparian countries within a basin in a complex network of environmental, economic, and political interdependencies. Water resources are elevated to a status that affects the survival and national security of riparian countries. Tactical securitization refers to the linking of “low-political” issues relating to water resources with traditional “high political” issues, a tactical choice that was made in the 1994 Peace Treaty between Jordan and Israel was a case in point. Whether strategic or tactical securitization, water is at the heart of national security and needs to be addressed by policymakers outside the conventional political agenda.

Approaches to Water Securitization

This study focuses on the process of water securitization under the influence of power, as the dominant power in the basin, whose power is mainly manifested in material hard power and discursive soft power. Material power refers to the explicit aspects of military power, economic strength, population size, and level of scientific and technological development, but also includes the “locational power” of upstream dominance due to objective

geographical distribution factors. Discursive power derives from the credibility and recognition of the actors' narrative and the state's control of the discourse in the construction of the water distribution system. Material power is the basis of discursive power, and discursive power facilitates the development of material power. Both of them are complement to each other.

There are two main stages in the process of water securitization under the influence of the dominant power: firstly, the dominant power's discursive narrative of the "existential threat"; and secondly, the response action that breaks with conventional political procedures. Therefore, this study examines the issue of pathways to water securitization at three levels: discursive, operational, and institutional mechanisms, as shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Approaches to water securitization.

The discursive mechanism corresponds to the first stage of the securitization process, namely the construction of a discourse of securitization through the discursive narrative of an existential threat. In this process, the actors identify and discursively describe the existential threat to water resources, thereby evoking a sense of urgency and crisis in the audience, to achieve maximum acceptance. It is only based on widespread acceptance by the audience that legitimacy can be gained for actions that go beyond conventional political processes. The discursive mechanism is therefore an important part of the process of achieving water securitization.

Operational and institutional mechanisms together constitute the second stage of the securitization process. The operational mechanism is the practice of securitization through response actions that go beyond conventional political processes. Specifically, it refers to the protection of and access to water resources by one's strengths, after gaining legitimacy to act under the role of the discourse mechanism. On the one hand, protection against water resources includes protection of the water itself and protection of the physical infrastructure, for example, the creation of demilitarized zones and the installation of early warning systems around water systems to protect them from deliberate pollution, poisoning, terrorist attacks, etc. (Gleick, 2019; Caruso, 2017; Zarneh, 2014). On the other hand, targeting access to water resources means using one's power advantage to obtain as much water as possible. For example, competing for water resources through coercive means to achieve the reallocation of water resources across basins.

Institutional mechanism refers to the establishment of institutional arrangements and normative frameworks in a basin to ensure self-serving water allocation security and thus national security. In water interdependence situations between riparian countries, institutions set the agenda and identify specific problem areas, thereby establishing norms and guidelines for transactions in water interdependence. In turn, countries in the basin use institutional mechanisms to set rules and interact in water interactions, thereby influencing the transfer of bargaining chips in water negotiations to create self-serving institutional arrangements. Specifically, this is

reflected in the following two ways: firstly, by placing military representatives or diplomatic officials. Secondly, embedding water agreements into higher security-related agreements. For example, the water agreements included in the Oslo Peace Accords between the Palestinians and the Israelis were considered in the context of the overall security agreement (El-Sayed & Mansour, 2017). It is worth noting that securitization theory is a power-driven narrative, where institutional mechanisms exclude civil society and NGOs from governance and where elite politics is more persuasive in securitization issues (Fischhendler, 2015, p. 248).

Water security is achieved through the pathways of discourse, operation, and institutions. The discursive mechanism is the basis for water securitization, the operational mechanism is the outcome of the discursive mechanism in practice, and the institutional mechanism is the consolidation and complement of the discursive and operational mechanisms. However, whether it is a discursive mechanism, an operational mechanism, or an institutional mechanism, the success of securitization is difficult to separate from the influence of the power position of the actors themselves, and the riparian countries in the basin are not only concerned about the absolute benefits of water interaction, but also the relative benefits. It is difficult to transcend the dilemma of competing powers.

Water Disputes and Water Securitization in the Jordan River Basin

The water dispute in the Jordan River basin is a reflection of the irrational allocation of water resources between Israel and other states in the basin. Israel, as the dominant power, has taken the upper hand in the water securitization agenda by virtue of its power, and through the discourse and practice of securitization, has taken and consolidated its position as the dominant power in the basin. The disparity in power makes it difficult for other countries in the basin to break the status quo of the power structure, further exacerbating the inequitable distribution of water resources in the region and leading to water disputes.

Historical Disputes Between Basin Countries

The conflict between the Arab countries and Israel has to a large extent a direct impact on peace and development in the Middle East. The Arab-Israeli conflict dates back to the late 19th century, and since then, water resources have been at the center of disputes between the two sides, along with various other conflicts involving survival and development. In the history of international relations, a series of issues such as the immigration of Jews to Palestine and the struggle over land ownership triggered armed conflict between the two sides that lasted for decades. As the idea of a sovereign state in Palestine grew among Jewish settlers, Britain, then the colonial ruler, left the fate of Palestine in the hands of the United Nations, which in 1947 decided to divide Palestine into a provisional state, a Jewish state and an Arab state. And it was planned that 44% of the land would be allocated to the Arab state and 56% to the Jewish state. However, the fact that the Arabs in Palestine, who made up more than two-thirds of the population, originally owned 93% of the land, greatly fueled the conflict between Arabs and Jews (Söderblom, 2003). This led to the First Middle East War in 1948. This war led directly to the creation of the state of Israel and the Rhodes Armistice Demarcation Line, marking the emergence of an irreconcilable political conflict between Israel and the Arab states. 1967 saw the outbreak of the Third Middle East War, which had a profound impact on the situation in the region. As a decisive event, it changed the nature of the conflict, the location of the coastal areas, and the distribution and use of water resources in the region, which in turn affected the use of water by the inhabitants of the rivers and the pattern of friendly and hostile relations between states. For the Arab states, the war ended in their defeat, with the loss of important territories

and the re-enforcement of Israel's military superiority. As a result, the international borders between states within the Middle East that were formed after the 1967 war have largely been maintained to this day, with new borders and territorial structures directly affecting the right to access to water. The territorial and water resource conflicts that have developed on this basis continue to persist, as the political and historical conflicts between the two sides have not been fundamentally resolved.

Imbalanced Power Structures and Uneven Water Distribution Within the Basin

In the case of the Jordan River, many countries, including Palestine, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and others, claim the right to share the water resources of the basin. Israel, under its dominant position in the power structure of the basin, has created a markedly uneven distribution of water resources in the Jordan River basin.

Table 1

Countries Sharing Water Resources in the Jordan River Basin (United Nations Development Programme, 2006)

Basin name	Number of basin countries	Name of basin country
Jordan River Basin	6	Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Syria

Firstly, on an objective level, Israel holds a clear position of strength in comparison with other countries along the Jordan River basin. On the one hand, Israel is developing rapidly in economic, military, and scientific terms and is stronger than the neighboring Arab countries. In terms of economic GDP indicators, Israel achieved a GDP of US\$ 481.59 billion in 2021¹, compared to Jordan's US\$ 45.24 billion in the same period², and Palestine's GDP was only US\$ 18.04 billion (Country Economy, 2022). On the other hand, Israel has long been supported by Western countries such as the United States, especially during the historical Middle East war phase, and with the support of extraterritorial countries, Israel has consistently turned the tide of war and won. In contrast, the extraterritorial support of countries such as Palestine and Jordan came mostly from Arab countries in the Middle East and was less powerful. In the 1950s and 1960s, for example, Israel had the economic strength to unilaterally implement the Negev Canal Project despite the opposition of other basin states by absorbing large amounts of international funding. Through its strength and the support of extraterritorial forces, Israel has established a strong presence in the region since the Third Middle East War and has become an agenda-setting power in the entire Middle East. In addition, it has become a strategic power in the Jordan River basin due to its control of the core water sources along the basin.

Secondly, at the subjective level, there is an incentive and a desire for Israel to become the dominant power in the basin. On the one hand, Israel has undertaken several unilateral water initiatives, such as the Israeli National Water Carrier, which brought water from the Jordan River to the southern part of the country for irrigation in the face of opposition from all Arab countries. On the other hand, Israel has extensively used its discursive power to build its legitimacy over water rights by promoting a discourse of "otherness" to domestic audiences, seeking solidarity and identity, and linking its historical right to the water resources of the Jordan River basin to the maintenance of the status quo. Israel's rhetoric of being the victim of an Arab "siege" and "wanting to destroy the State of Israel" seeks emotional support from the international community. This led to the Johnston Plan, a U.S.-led water allocation plan for the Jordan River basin, to raise Israel's water quota to about 40 percent of the total (Wang, 2015, p. 51). Therefore, this contributes to the effective realization of Israel's water security.

¹ World Bank. (November 2022). <https://data.worldbank.org/country/israel?view=chart>.

² World Bank. (November 2022). <https://data.worldbank.org/country/jordan?view=chart>.

Finally, at the level of outcomes, Israel has acted forcefully in dealing with water disputes in the Jordan River basin, producing the result of an uneven distribution of water resources within the Jordan River basin. After the Third Middle East War, the Jordan River flowed almost entirely through Israeli territory. As a riparian state, Israel diverted 75 percent of the Jordan River's water before it reached the Palestinian West Bank (Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, 2002). By controlling the Banias River, Lake Tiberias, and the lower Jordan River, Israel was able to prevent neighboring Arab states from approaching the upper Jordan River and use Lake Tiberias as an outlet to block off the upper Jordan River for its own water storage needs. In addition, with the occupation of the West Bank, Israel also controls the Palestinian groundwater resource, the Mountain Aquifer. Overall, Israel controls 90% of the shared water resources of the West Bank (Louka, 2006, p. 50). Although the 1959 Johnston Plan specified the Palestinian share of the Jordan River water at approximately 20 billion cubic meters per year, Palestinians were denied access to river water in the east, in addition to most of the water in the West Bank aquifer, and Israel continues to receive the largest share of water (Rouyer, 2007). In this context, Palestine is at a clear disadvantage compared to other riparian actors in terms of access to sufficient and equal quotas of water resources. Conversely, Israel, with its advantage as the dominant water power, is the only country that receives a disproportionate share of water benefits from the Jordan River basin.

Pathways and Impacts of Water Securitization

Pathways to Water Securitization in the Jordan River Basin

First, the discourse mechanism. The discursive mechanism is the first step in the process of water securitization, that is, to identify and describe the existential threats. By controlling the discourse, it guides and even shapes the perceptions of the countries in the basin, creating a common perception of water rights in the basin that is favorable to its own side. Since its founding in 1948, Israel has used its water resources for large-scale agricultural and economic development. Therefore, the availability of sufficient water resources is of great importance to Israel's national development. Moshe Sharett, the first Foreign Minister of Israel, once stated that "water is not a luxury for Israel, it is life itself for us" (Cao, 2018, p. 48). Thanks to the intensive development of irrigation and water conservation techniques in agriculture, by 1965 most of Israel's freshwater resources were fully utilized. As a result, Israel needed to find new water resources to replenish. In this process, Israel constructed water as the life of Israel, believing that access to water was a matter of national security, and achieved the first process of securitizing water through a discursive narrative. Furthermore, Israel has linked its water security discourse to the need for national security, stating that water pipes and wells in the Palestinian territories are frequent targets of terrorist attacks and that Palestinians regularly "steal water" in Israel, claiming that such actions are a serious threat to Israel's national security.

In 2002, Lebanon's development of the Wazzani Springs and the construction of a water pipeline on a tributary of the Hasbani River in southern Lebanon was also seen by Israel as a threat to its water supply. The action was then portrayed in the Israeli media as a national security issue that would lead to a military confrontation. Commenting on the matter, then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon said, "Israel cannot ignore this. If the Lebanese side does not immediately stop the construction of the water diversion, Israel will use force to resolve this dispute" (Allouche, 2005, p. 16). Israeli officials combine Israel's power over water with its survival, often portraying themselves as being in danger and being widely reported and disseminated by the media. This legitimized discourse of securitization inevitably leads to responses that violate conventional political rules and, in some cases, international law, and Israel's refusal to comply with some UN resolutions has been criticized by

the international community (Hammond, 2010).³ Through the discourse of securitization, Israel has clarified the importance of water as an object of national security, providing the basis for its unconventional political action of securitization.

Second, the mechanism of operation. In the context of the securitization discourse, states often act beyond conventional political procedures to carry out securitization practices. In 1965, when Syria attempted to divert the Banias River, Israel took military action, forcing Syria to suspend the project. In the Third Middle East War in 1967, Israel occupied the source of the Jordan River to ensure a more reliable water supply and deprived Jordanian territory of available water resources. After the Six-Day War, Israel sought to improve its hydro-strategic position by occupying the Golan Heights and the West Bank and, in blatant disregard of international law, refused to withdraw to the pre-1967 borders. The occupation of the Golan Heights blocked any attempt by Arab states to change the distribution and use of water from the Jordan River, and Israel controls half the length of the Yarmouk River as a means of ensuring its absolute dominance over access to and protection of water. Approximately 40 percent of the groundwater on which Israel relies today, and the increase in its water consumption, comes from water resources in the territories occupied in the 1967 war, namely the West Bank and the Upper Jordan River (Miriam, 1990). After the occupation of the West Bank, the Israeli side also took control of some of the Palestinian groundwater resources, severely restricting their minimum water rights such as basic agricultural and domestic water, which had a significant impact on the outbreak of the water dispute between the Palestinians and Israelis (Louka, 2006). Recalling the typology of water securitization mentioned before, Israel has achieved undisputed control of the Jordan River and the West Bank mountain aquifers through strategic securitization, always equating water security with national security.

Third, institutional mechanism. In 1995, as part of the Oslo peace process, Israel and the Palestinians reached an agreement recognizing Palestinian rights to a small amount of water, and have always controlled an overwhelmingly dominant share of water resources in the Jordan River basin through institutional arrangements. In the course of all Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, the resolution of disputes over water allocation, the status of Jerusalem, border demarcation, Jewish settlements, and the issues of the return of Palestinian refugees have been subjected to “final status negotiations” (Tselem, 2017), which shows how complex and difficult they are. At the same time, this approach to the issue has prevented the possibility of reaching a viable agreement on the water dispute, particularly concerning Palestinian water rights over the Jordan River and the Mountain Aquifer, as well as issues of water allocation and access. Because the final status negotiations are in effect a continuous delaying tactic, it perpetuates and maintains the current status quo of the established policy of negative allocation, hoping for a future solution that will hardly become a reality, and becomes a means for Israel to maintain its current advantage. The design of the joint water management framework established by the Oslo II accords further reinforces the power imbalance in water allocation between Palestine and Israel. In addition, the Israeli-Palestinian Joint Water Committee (JWC), seen as a “major breakthrough in cooperation”, is also seen as an instrument of domination rather than cooperation (El-Sayed & Mansour, 2017). One of its responsibilities is to review proposals for water projects and issue permits for those that are approved. However, this process is extremely slow and complex, with permits being issued for every stage of every project, often taking months or even longer, with the result that Israel’s undisputed monopoly on water development projects in the region

³ For a list of UN Security Council resolutions that directly criticize Israel for violating UN Security Council resolutions, the UN Charter, the Geneva Conventions, and other international law, see Jeremy Hammond (2010).

becomes an unalterable fact of life with time delays. In summary, Israel's access to water resources comes from maintaining control and exploitation of water resources in the occupied Palestinian territories. On this basis, Israel's reluctance to actively negotiate and compromise on the water issue has been met by tactical securitization initiatives to include water agreements, which have almost zero viability, in the overall peace agreements it has signed with riparian states. While these treaties have served as an attempt to "contain" water conflicts with riparian states, the end result has been an inequitable distribution of water resources and the perpetuation of a situation of "contained instability", further contributing to Israel's dominance of water securitization.

Impact of Water Securitization in the Jordan River Basin

Within the Jordan river basin, Israel has used three securitization mechanisms to consolidate its position as a power dominant state. Among the operational securitization mechanism, the military operations of 1967 and the occupation of the Golan Heights and West Bank effectively took control of Israel's water resources and established an era of Israeli water hegemony (Eran, 2000). Institutional securitization refers to Israel's embedding of inter-basin water agreements into peace treaties with less powerful riparian states, enabling a game of association to maximize its own interests. At the same time, discursive securitization has been widespread and long-standing in Israel's water dispute management processes, thereby exacerbating power asymmetries and inequitable water distribution patterns within the basin.

This has had a twofold impact on power patterns and inter-state relations in the basin: firstly, Israel has consolidated its position as the dominant power through discursive, operational, and institutional mechanisms. The first is the consolidation of Israel's position as the dominant power over water resources in the basin through discursive, operational, and institutional mechanisms. On the one hand, Israel has more access to water resources and enjoys to a large extent the right to allocate them. This greater access to water resources provides good conditions for domestic agricultural and economic development and contributes to a higher rate of social development. On the other hand, Israel's dominance in the allocation of water resources has, to a certain extent, increased its own soft power discourse. Thus, water resources in the Middle East act as a power resource in their own right, and the reality of Israel's control over more water resources directly enhances and consolidates its position of power in relations with riparian states, and further stabilizes its influence within the basin and at the regional level as a whole through water securitization.

Secondly, Israel's securitization of water has led to regional tensions and conflicts. In the late 1950s, with the support of the United States, Israel unilaterally implemented a plan to divert and convey water from the Jordan River to increase access to water resources. This directly inflamed the Arab-Israeli conflict (Wang, 2008). The Arab states saw Israel's national water project as a form of aggression and expansion, but as it was difficult to change Israel's established dominance in the short term, regional conflict was inevitable. Senior officials of the Palestinian National Authority have noted the Palestinians' belief that "the Israelis are stealing our water and this must stop. They must be reminded that they are sitting on our chests, and not through an act of justice, but through an act of war" (Rouyer, 2007, p. 186). The third Middle East war broke out in the 1960s with the completion of Israel's national water transfer project.

Israel's asymmetrical power advantage and the three mechanisms for securing water and consolidating its position as the dominant water power further contribute to the uneven distribution of water resources in the basin. Water disputes in the Jordan River Basin are inevitable and tend to be normalized due to the inability of the other riparian states in the basin to obtain equitable water allocation rights through their own power advantage.

Conclusion

The Middle East is one of the world's most water-scarce and unevenly distributed regions and has long been plagued by water disputes and conflicts that have seriously affected regional stability and harmony. At present, water disputes in the region are characterized by three major bounds dilemmas. First, the bounds between non-traditional security and traditional security are blurred. As a common non-traditional security threat, water disputes are permeated by traditional security issues such as the game of extra-territorial powers, and the effectiveness of the governance mechanism for resolving water disputes is severely constrained; secondly, the bounds between domestic security and international security are blurred. The Middle East basin countries about water rights and interests not only map out the needs of domestic livelihoods, but the conflict arising from the dispute involves the international security landscape changes, adding obstacles to the equitable distribution of dispute resolution system; third is the blurring bounds between development and security. Water rights are seen as both a security threat to a country's basic survival and a basic need for social development, and the zero-sum game mentality of stakeholders in the basin creates difficulties for the legitimacy and institutional enforceability of water dispute resolution mechanisms. In the case selected for this study, Israel in the Jordan River Basin occupies a dominant position of power within the basin and has the power to maintain and change the water allocation system. At the level of securitization discourse, the dominant states use their conceptual power to guide and even control other states in the basin to form a consensus on water allocation, and use their soft power to guide the content of water treaties to form self-serving water allocation systems and institutions; at the level of securitization practice, they use their material power to protect and acquire water resources in the basin beyond their own share of water rights and use their hard power to directly shape the self-serving imbalance of water allocation in the basin. The imbalance in the distribution of water in the basin is directly shaped by hard power. Moreover, the practice of self-defeating and uneven redistribution of water resources within a basin through the dominant water power state diminishes the equal water rights of other basin states, and when it is difficult to break this uneven or even monopolistic status quo, regional conflicts and confrontations escalate.

Overall, water disputes in the Middle East are unlikely to be resolved in the short term. It is the path of securitization that has led to the outbreak of disputes and potential conflicts in the basin, so the solution of de-securitization is particularly important in the process of resolving water disputes in the Middle East. At the institutional level, the existing international mechanisms need to be utilized and improved, and the relevant laws and principles need to be put into practice; at the practical level, the goal of de-securitization needs to be implemented in terms of both perceptions and regional structures. At the conceptual level, it is necessary to establish a sense of coexistence, to give the countries in the basin the right to survive, and to guarantee the water needs of the countries in the basin through the optimization of water resources at the technical level. In terms of the regional structure, we need to actively promote the building of a regional basin security community and the development of a peaceful and cooperative region.

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