

Diversification of Security and Possibilities for “Cultural Security”: Focusing on the Cases of the EU and France

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Security in international relations has been at a crossroads, especially after the end of the Cold War. National security has not been the only framework of security; human security has also occupied an important position. This “paradigm shift” of security occurred due to changes in the global security environment, such as the emergence of insecurity caused by poverty and ethnic conflict. It is obvious that national security based on a sovereign state and military forces are not enough to prevent war-fighting or to resolve its basic causes, so human security has attracted considerable attention, which complements national security. Human security needs the protection of communities in which people can find their identities and lead a peaceful life. For example, in Europe, a French riot by immigrant young people in 2005 indicated a lack of human security, where the shortage of protection of communities of immigrants under politics by the French government made the situation very serious. We present a new framework, “cultural security”, which complements human security in that the former protects communities based on each culture. It is ideal that all three dimensions of security work well as, if national security lacks, it may cause civil war or a failed state; if human security (in the narrow sense, focused on only individuals) lacks, it may lead to reinforced authoritarianism or a despotic regime; and if cultural security lacks, a civic nation would be developed but social life may be instable.

Keywords: security, community, governance, culture, migration

Introduction

As globalization permeates every aspect of our political, economic, and social lives, transforming the world into a network of relations, great changes are also taking place in the field of security. One point that is often discussed in this connection is the transition from a narrow focus on traditional national security to a broader interest in “new security”, or the existence of both paradigms side-by-side. “New security” includes economic security, information security, environmental security, and, in particular, “human security”, which has been the focus of much attention since the late 1990s. This move away from national security toward human security also appeared to represent a shift in the security paradigm.

This study includes a review of the various aspects of human security in light of recent trends in international politics and, on the basis of this review, seeks to answer the following questions: (1) Whether

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security today functions effectively in the face of globalization and (2) whether a “cultural security” perspective may be what is really needed.

Focusing on the situation in the European Union (EU) since the release of the European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003 (Council of the European Union: General Secretariat, 2003), the study examines the relationship between globalization and security broadly and analyzes the secure/insecure conditions seen in EU countries and the wider world. Having done so, an attempt is made to clarify the effectiveness and challenges of employing the concept of “cultural security” in complement to that of human security.

Globalization and Security

This discussion stems from the perception that security now stands at a critical juncture. But what is security in the first place? To return to the traditional definition of Wolfers (1952), a realist, security is “in an objective sense, (...) the absence of threats to acquired values” and, “in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked” (p. 485). In that case, the questions we must reconsider here are where do threats and fears come from (causes), who is subjected to them (objects), how to eliminate them (means), and who is responsible for doing so (actors). These factors of analysis changed most notably after the Cold War, with discussion focusing on a paradigm shift in security.

This paradigm shift is examined in the next section, but it is worthwhile at this point to review the characteristics of globalization, which can be said to have changed the way in which security is conceptualized. The security landscape changed dramatically at the end of the Cold War with the elimination of the East-West conflict structure. Yet, in the broader economic, political, and societal context, it is globalization that has had a more comprehensive and fundamental influence, transforming the way in which the world is arranged. According to Scholte (2001, p. 14), globalization can be broadly divided into the following five aspects:

1. Internationalization—or greater interaction and interdependence among countries;
2. Liberalization—or the removal of restrictions on movement among countries to create an open and integrated world economy;
3. Universalization—or the dispersal of various objects and experiences to all corners of the world;
4. Westernization—understood in terms of Americanization in particular;
5. Deterritorialization—or the diminishing influence of territorialism, which lay at the heart of international relations, represented in terms of territorial spaces, geographical distances, and geographical borders.

Despite this multiplicity of meanings, the term “globalization” can essentially be understood as the expansion and strengthening, beyond political and social boundaries, of interrelation and interdependence of networks across all aspects of social life. As to when the process of globalization occurred, Scholte (2000) explained that if the emergence of material movements across national borders within social life is taken as the origin of globalization, then globalization began in the mid-19th century and has become pronounced on a global level since the 1960s.

One dimension in which this process of globalization can be seen to impact the domain of security is—in relation to the last of Scholte’s five categories listed above—the relativization of national borders and erosion of state sovereignty. Where the relativization of national borders is concerned, one reason identified for the growth in transnational economic activity by multinational corporations is that global economic activity has become more interdependent and networked, rendering state controls increasingly meaningless. In what Strange

(1996) described as the “retreat of the state” stated, which held absolute power (sovereignty) within the political boundaries of their territorial borders and controlled economic activity by exercising this power, loosened their controls on economic activity to avoid damaging their own interests, retreating and ceding control to market mechanisms. The movement toward regional integration in the EU has culminated in cross-border market integration and the introduction of the Euro as a single currency (albeit not in all countries); this development is essentially part and parcel of economic globalization.

On a more political level, we must understand that the sovereignty exercised by states has been restricted. In modern political theory, states are considered to have various characteristic features, such as centralization (of power) exclusivity (maintenance of sovereignty against external actors), institutionalization (establishment of hierarchies of power), and territorialization (inviolability of national boundaries); however, in the international relations of today, states no longer appear to have all of these mechanisms at their disposal (Badie & Smouts, 1999)¹. It is needless to say that as states become less powerful, it becomes necessary to focus our attention on non-state actors instead. As mentioned above, these changes have prompted a major transformation in the security paradigm.

A Paradigm Shift in Security: The Emergence of Human Security

The various social changes brought about by globalization, along with the new post-Cold War international environment and global order, greatly changed the environment around security. Two particularly prominent factors that destabilized the international community after the Cold War were poverty and ethnic conflict.

Let us first consider poverty. Take the case of African countries: Few of the many countries that achieved independence from colonial rule through the 1950s and 1960s were able to operate stable political and economic systems independently; without stable politics and economic systems, countries were overwhelmed by the rigors of economic globalization and were unable to develop their domestic industries to the level at which stability and international competitiveness could be secured. Consequently, many African countries were left in a poverty-stricken state. These countries were caught up in a vicious cycle of conflict, economic instability, poverty, and further conflict. The roots of poverty persisted as economies failed to stabilize, and the discontent remained among citizens who wanted to improve their lives. Growing discontent often led to conflict due to issues involving political rights and to provocative interventions by ambitious leaders. Forces seeking to find hope by breaking the deadlock sometimes turned to terrorism, manipulated by such leaders. Then, terrorism began to transcend national borders and threaten the wider international community. Poverty is by no means a direct cause of terrorism, but one cannot ignore the possibility that the two problems are related.

Then what about ethnic conflict? Conflicts between contending ethnic groups are sometimes accompanied by unreasonable discrimination and hate and can be intense affairs. There are cases in which conflicts with politically dominant ethnic groups occur as other ethnic groups genuinely seek to establish cultural independence or conserve their identities. However, particularly in countries and regions where ethnic conflict overlaps with poverty, there are also cases in which ethnicity is used as a symbol to mobilize groups of people during conflicts centered on political and economic interests or alleviation of gaps. Moreover, there are cases in which ethnic groups lay claim to lands beyond those they originally inhabited, leading to conflict and hate relations expanding their presence in the form of terrorism beyond national and continental boundaries.

¹ Also see the following for a discussion of restrictions on the state, Badie (1999; 2020).

Although the September 11 attacks of 2001 in the United States can be considered a symbolic event in this regard, these attacks were actually predated by many terror incidents in Europe linked to Islamic fundamentalists. This is a manifestation of an increase in hostile behavior grounded in cultural and ethnic differences, which broadly views people of Western culture as the enemy.

It is hard to deny that globalization has enabled the transnational spread of violence rooted in poverty and ethnic conflict. The network structure that globalization has created is facilitating the transmission to other places in the world of factors of insecurity in the lives of people subject to poverty and ethnic conflict. It is not only in the countries and regions experiencing war, poverty, and ethnic conflict that people's lives are threatened: The influence of these problems easily spills out to other countries and regions. Local factors of instability become global, spreading instability throughout the world. Such structures have necessitated change in the way security operates.

Under the previous system, (1) states used military power to protect their citizens from foreign threats, whereas under the new post-Cold War system, (2) states, non-state actors (NGOs, etc.), and international organizations protect people from threats, such as war (civil war), poverty, famine, and environmental destruction through methods such as preventive diplomacy, humanitarian aid, and human development. If (1) is the traditional framework of national security, then (2) may be seen to represent the human security paradigm.

Yet, it is wrong to assume that national security has been abandoned completely and replaced by human security; rather, the two systems coexist side-by-side, and it is possible to consider the characteristic features of societies and states by cross-referencing both². In fact, in stable democracies—which most developed countries are—national security norms and processes function adequately, and at the same time, human security norms and processes are duly guaranteed: There are two functioning modes of security. Next, let us take a closer look at how the two are related and what kind of challenges they entail.

The central object that human security must protect is the individual. The goal is to free the individual from the aspects of insecurity that threaten them. This is essentially about combining what Secretary-General of the United Nations Kofi Annan called “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want” (Annan, 2014). In other words, human security seeks to remove encroaching dangers to human life due to the use of military force in contexts, such as oppression and civil war, while also overcoming famine and food scarcity, which arise when economies fail; situations in which schools are not provided or families cannot afford to educate their children; and unhygienic living conditions involving the spread of infectious diseases. The first critical task is to furnish communities—the basic units of human living—with environments in which dangers to life can be avoided and people can construct their lives by their own means.

A 2003 report examining these processes and various related discussions submitted to Secretary-General Kofi Annan by the Commission on Human Security (co-chaired by Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen) (Commission on Human Security, 2003) organized human security around two key concepts: protection and empowerment. The point of human security is to establish frameworks that protect individuals and enable empowerment that can help people construct their lives with their own free will.

² Registers of action such as diplomacy, intervention and development are added to the military tool, but do not replace it in some kind of alternative. In France, for example, operations in the Sahel are partly justified by the R2P (Responsibility to Protect), and if the army acts well on the national territory especially with a view to anti-terrorism within the framework of government public-security measures (“Vigipirate” regime) and Operation Sentinel, the fact remains that in the event of a natural or ecological disaster the army can also intervene in a logic of “human security”, whether on the national territory or abroad. So it must be present as an “enrichment” of action repertoires rather than as a “replacement”.

Yet in the process of human security, not least in the first, protection, stage, the support of third nations and international organizations that already leverage military power is essential. This elimination of aspects of insecurity by military force brings us back to the very principle of national security. Thus, we can understand the need to focus on the perspective of complementarity between national and human securities. In other words, even now that the Cold War is over and the alliance-based style of conflict under the balance-of-power system seen in the 19th and 20th centuries no longer applies, as situations are occurring throughout the world that require a human security response, traditional national security has not become entirely obsolete, but rather plays an important role in the advancement of human security. Nevertheless, this military force is not used to expand one's territory, as it was during the wars that took place under imperialism, but rather to protect people who are under threat. Its role is therefore close to that of a police force. The job of policing and maintaining security cannot be done by NGOs and citizens' groups. Unless the people themselves afford a legal monopoly on violence to those who hold political power in the region, and this legitimate power is exercised, any form of policing would only serve to induce conflict and civil war between militias. States are required to maintain military force and carry out policing duties to the minimum necessary level, under the strict supervision of the international community.

According to David and Roche (2002), human security is generally understood, and applied to policy, from three mutually complementary angles. The first is an angle that reflects the legal concept of security, which includes cases where the international community demands that states where problems arise respect individuals and minorities. The second is the humanitarian angle, which includes cases where the international community intervenes to avert crimes, such as genocide when they are certain to occur. The third is socio-economic intervention, which aims to eliminate factors that underlie armed conflict and violence, to help war-stricken societies enjoy the benefits of sustainable development (pp. 114-115). It is also said that, “Human security is achieved when peace is consolidated” (David & Roche, 2002, p. 115). Yet, if we are to respect the argument set out in the Commission on Human Security report mentioned above, we must also go beyond this and extend our focus to the level of the empowerment of individuals. That is to say, even some developed societies where military conflict is unlikely today have not achieved this broader security goal, which may be said to encompass even social security.

Human security has also been criticized as simply a catchphrase, due in part to its conceptual haziness and catch-all nature. Indeed, human security is a concept that will only come to life once reflected in concrete policies. In that sense, it is worth nothing that Europe has placed human security at the center of its strategy for shared diplomacy and security policy and has formulated concrete policy plans. The next section examines this EU endeavor.

Human Security in Practice: What Can Be Seen From Post-2003 EU Strategy?

In 1993, the European Union (EU) was established by the Maastricht Treaty. At that time, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was positioned as one of the three pillars of the Union. This marked the inception of a system for developing and promoting common diplomatic and security policy as a “single Europe”. However, the system that was created lacked power. Europe played host to a series of upheavals through the 1990s, including the breakup of Yugoslavia and conflicts in the former republics of Slovenia (1991), Croatia (1991-1995), Bosnia (1992-1995), and Kosovo (1999). These Yugoslav Wars brought into sharp relief how the CFSP had failed to function, as well as the fact that Europe was particularly dependent on

the United States in the domain of security. The conflicts in Yugoslavia—and Europe’s failure to put its own house in order—led to humiliation and introspection, which served to expedite efforts to strengthen the CFSP and construct Europe’s own security framework that departed from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

One significant change came with the Treaty of Amsterdam (effective 1999), which established the post of High Representative for CFSP as the face of EU diplomacy and security to represent the Council of Ministers in that domain. Further to this, Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) was introduced to facilitate decision-making, and the content of EU military actions was clarified through the so-called Petersberg Tasks—humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking—among other reforms.

In the closing years of the Cold War, the Western European Union (WEU) introduced the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) principle at the Platform on European Security Interests (The Hague, 27 October 1987), setting in motion a series of developments aimed at creating Europe’s own system of security based on the reorganization of the WEU. Then, in 1998, the leaders of Britain and France adopted the concept in the Saint-Malo Declaration, which stated that the EU “must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so”³. This represented a major policy shift for Britain, which had been reluctant to support any bolstering of the European military, and Britain’s willingness to take the initiative under Tony Blair boosted momentum for strengthening the ESDIA, culminating in the promotion of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) at the June 1999 European Council meeting in Cologne.

In the process leading up the subsequent Treaty of Nice (effective February 2003), a decision was made at a meeting of the European Council held in Helsinki in December 1999 to establish the European Rapid Operational Force, which was dispatched to Macedonia for its first mission in March 2003. The issue that arose here was that of realignment with NATO, or realignment of the United States and Europe on security. The ESS, announced in December 2003, cemented Europe’s active involvement in the international community in the area of security while considering this realignment (Council of the European Union: General Secretariat, 2003).

The ESS provided guidelines for CFSP after the Cold War and particularly after the outbreak of the Iraq War in March 2003. It expressed Europe’s intention to assume the position of a global player in international security. Regarding the kinds of security threats faced, several “global challenges” were identified, including loss of civilian life and creation of refugees due to war, poverty, and diseases, such as AIDS. “Key threats” included terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime. These references to migrant issues, lack of health and medical facilities, and growing instability in failed states demonstrate how the perspective of human security is included in the approach.

Moreover, one key strategic and philosophical consideration evident in the ESS is the need to overcome the “exclusion principle” inherent in the traditional state security (national security) approach. That is to say, exclusion of adversaries through the use of military force to ensure security under a national security approach creates conflict; exclusion begets exclusion in retaliation and cannot lead to a fundamental resolution. This new strategy saw a stronger emphasis placed on the principle of inclusion, as opposed to exclusion, in Europe’s security approach.

³ Joint Declaration on European Defense, issued at the British-French Summit (Saint-Malo, 4 December 1998).

To substantiate the ESS in policy, the High Representative for CFSP Javier Solana commissioned a study to Mary Kaldor of the University of London, leading to the release in 2004 of a report titled *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe* (Barcelona Report) (European Parliament, 2004). The report clarifies the division of security duties between Europe (the EU) and the United States and sets out specific actions to be taken by the EU. The first basic principle is, “The European Union’s security policy should be built on human security, rather than state security”, wherein, “Human security means individual freedom from basic insecurities” (European Parliament, 2004, p. 4). The report called for importance to be placed on the following principles aimed to guide actions under a strategy based on human security (European Parliament, 2004, pp. 9-16):

1. Primacy of human rights;
2. Establishment of legitimate political authority capable of upholding human security;
3. Multilateralism;
4. Bottom-up approach;
5. Regional focus;
6. Use of legal instruments;
7. Appropriate use of force.

The point worth noting here is that use of force is to be kept to a minimum with a focus on action in non-military (civil) fields. For example, Principle 6 states, “At an operational level, the primary task of any deployment is to assist law-enforcement. This means that a much larger investment will have to be made in civilian capabilities for law-enforcement, i.e. police, court officials, prosecutors and judges” (European Parliament, 2004, p. 15). Furthermore, the word “use” in Principle 7 supposes a level of force akin to the police with an emphasis on “minimum force” (European Parliament, 2004, p. 16). Finally, drawing on these principles, the creation of a Human Security Response Force that combines civil and military elements is proposed to execute the task of “(re)establishment of law and order, reconstruction, humanitarian aid and development, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), transitional justice, institution-building, support for civil society, independent media and education” (European Parliament, 2004, p. 17).

It is important to note that the use of military force to support national security is not completely ruled out in this context. Rather, when working to guarantee human security, states are still positioned as key actors, and human security and national security coexist while fulfilling different functions. In other words, this also refers to the division of roles between the United States and Europe in the domain of security (Glasius & Kaldor, 2006; Sakai, 2006).

This section has examined human security, which has become the cornerstone of the EU’s security strategy. But are the aspects of human security dealt with here broken down all the way down to the individual level? As stated in the report by the UN Commission on Human Security mentioned above, to guarantee the security of individuals, it is essentially necessary to establish communities—the basic units of human living. However, although *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe* contains many references to “individuals”, the term “community” is hardly mentioned. Kaldor, who was a core member of the team that drafted this doctrine, mentioned communities as follows: “Human security (...) is not about war-fighting; it is about protection of individuals and communities, and it is about expanding the rule of law, while squeezing the arena of war”; however, she made no specific reference to the substance or foundation of communities (Kaldor, Martin, & Selchow, 2007, p. 280). The Commission on Human Security report also notes the importance of communities, yet without sufficient detailed consideration of the ties that bind those who establish them. In a review of EU

security policy that draws on Kaldor’s study, Matlary (2008) criticized the new strategic narrative: “The only contribution the concept of human security makes to all this is to give a name to a security paradigm based on the human rights of the individual” (p. 142). This indicates that if human security is to function more effectively, the lack of in-depth exploration into the substance of communities, both academically and in policy terms, poses a major challenge.

Communities can only function as such if there is mutual understanding among their members that they belong to that community. The first community in this sense is the family, the smallest unit of human living, which is based on kinship. However, we can assume that social life generally takes place within a unit that is larger than the family—such as local society. It may be possible to improve the effectiveness of the EU’s security strategy based on human security by identifying these units of living and implementing political activities accordingly. In addition to averting conflict in the regions surrounding the EU, this should be a focus of attention within the EU, which is supposed to be a group of countries that have achieved high levels of political and economic stability and are unlikely to experience further wars. That is because, in addition to human insecurities caused by external factors, such as terrorism and environmental destruction, internal factors within developed countries in Europe and elsewhere have the potential to create situations that could threaten the lives of individuals.

Subsequently, the EU’s security strategy turned to focus on the links between insecurities outside the region and insecurities within the region as terror and turmoil ensued in member states where problems had arisen around the social integration of migrants. The new Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy released in 2016 notes the following:

Internal and external security are ever more intertwined: our security at home entails a parallel interest in peace in our neighbouring and surrounding regions. It implies a broader interest in preventing conflict, promoting human security, addressing the root causes of instability and working towards a safer world. (European Union, 2016, p. 14)

As this suggests, while human security continues to be the central concept, there is now a stronger sense that the EU is looking to respond to the growing sense of crisis in the region.

Cultural Security: Significance and Possibilities

In November 2005, youths took to the streets in the suburbs of Paris and other French cities. The catalyst for the riots was an incident in late October, in which two boys of African origin hid in an electrical substation in a Paris suburb thinking they were being pursued by police, where they died from electrocution. The incident intensified tensions between police and groups of youths in the local area. Since the two boys were African migrants, debate over the pros and cons of integrating migrants into French society compounded with high unemployment and worsening security in the suburbs, sparking heated arguments and an escalation of tensions across the entire country.

The riots were not, however, an isolated incident but a manifestation of deep-seated political and social issues that had accumulated in France over time. These were problems with migrant integration, education, the economic system, and the way the police functioned. Nevertheless, at the root of these tensions was the problem that migrants were *effectively* excluded from the French national community, not in the institutional sense of nationality, but on the basis of differences with the so-called “French people” in areas, such as language, religion, origin, and ethnicity. This situation has been described as “French apartheid”, with criticism

focusing on the failure of successive governments to resolve the problem despite indications that “integrated France” (French people) and “ghettoized France” (migrants) were “at risk of becoming yet more disconnected” (Vidal, 2005). Migrant youths who could not integrate were denounced by the authorities, which quite rightly incited further conflict, causing a further worsening of tensions with the majority society (Vidal, 2005).

Then, in January and November 2015, France suffered a series of terrorist attacks. The January attack targeted the headquarters of the satirical newspaper *Charlie Hebdo*. It is understood that *Charlie Hebdo* was fiercely critical of Islam through its satirical cartoons, which angered Muslims and drove a small number of extremists to violence. In 2011, France imposed a law banning the wearing of the burqa, a garment worn by Muslim women, in public spaces, exposing major differences between the Western view, which valorizes gender equality and sees the burqa as a violation of women’s right by men, and the Islamic view of the burqa as an ordinary dress culture. The case in question can be understood as a violent manifestation of friction between the host society and Muslim migrants brought about by such value differences.

The coordinated terrorist attacks that took place in and around Paris in November 2015 targeted the general public at a soccer stadium in a Parisian suburb and a theater in the city. The group of attackers had turned to violent action through Islamic fundamentalism, and although the attacks were different from the assault on the *Charlie Hebdo* headquarters that January, they were the same in the sense that they targeted French society as an embodiment of Western values. It is also important to note that the attacks came amid airstrikes by the French government on Islamic State (IS) targets in Syria, launched in September of that year (Sakai, 2016).

The issue of integrating France’s Muslim migrants, in particular, has been the subject of much discussion among sociologists since the 1980s (Blum Le Coat & Eberhard, 2014; Poinsoot & Weber, 2014). Yet, there has been little study of this problem from a political science perspective, nor has the problem been addressed as a security issue in international relations. Since, as we have seen, security is about protecting the nation state from foreign military threats, it is understandable that social problems internal to the state do not figure in such discussions. However, human security can be positioned as a policy concept to provide a perspective that could enable such a discussion.

What we must consider here is the role of communities, which are in fact emphasized in the human security paradigm, and the question of what community ties migrant youths in French suburbs perceive to be under threat. It can indeed be argued that when considering the components that serve to connect them, rather than their origins, ethnicities, or languages, the focus should be on economic components, such as unemployment. Yet, this is not to say that the former components are altogether insignificant, but rather that they function as ties that connect migrants at a fundamental level. Accordingly, the focus of this discussion is on positioning “culture” as the construct underlying the fundamental unit of human life required to reduce and eliminate insecurities perceived by individuals and thereby ensure their security.

In the contexts of international relations and political science, there are, broadly speaking, two ways to understand culture. The first sees culture as the foundation of community. In this sense, cultures are an aggregation of “designs for living” shared among community members (Hirano, 2000, p. 11). The other interpretation is of culture as global norms and ideals (Waters, 2001)⁴, which refers to the rules and

⁴ The interpretation of “political culture” as spreading globally beyond states and societies is also useful here (Waters, 2001, p.152).

understandings (sometimes implicit) shared among the international community that create and sustain international regimes and global governance. Since the focus of the present discussion is on the ties that constitute and underpin local communities, let us adopt the first of these views.

Table 1

Types of Security

	Actors	Objects	Sources of threat	Means	Objectives
National security	State	State (nation)	External, military power	Military power, diplomacy	Maintenance and survival of the state (nation) and sovereign nation system
Human security	State, people, communities		War, civil war, refugee crisis, famine, poverty, disease, repression of human rights, environmental destruction	Protection and empowerment, humanitarian intervention, humanitarian assistance, human development	Guaranteeing people’s dignity and survival
	Non-state actors, international organizations				
Cultural security	State, people, communities		Poverty, unemployment, discrimination, structural violence		Protection of the communities and cultures that form the basis of people’s lives

Source: Compiled by the author based on Kurusu (2007, p. 141).




Figure 1. Relations between types of security (Source: Compiled by the author).

Communities function as intermediate groups that connect individuals and the state. As mediators that sublimate opinions and ideas held by individuals to the state level, to be reflected in policies and state systems, communities function in a similar way to lobbying groups, consolidating individual opinions to a certain degree and passing them up to the state level. From the state’s point of view, communities are expected to act as mediators when policies are translated into practice, to facilitate their dissemination throughout the entire

nation. In either sense, communities play an important role in connecting the individual and the state and ensuring that the political community can rule and govern effectively while following the democratic process. “Culture” can thus be regarded as the component that underpins these communities and unites the individuals within them⁵.

Table 1 shows the characteristics of the three security paradigms; Figure 1 shows the different security frameworks that encompass individuals and the relations among them. Here we can see how all three types of security are necessary for individuals to enjoy freedom and peace in society and lead lives that are safe and secure.

First, if only two of these, national security and human security (in the narrow sense of the individual, not the community) are ensured, as in the case of France, a civic nation is formed around the concept of a French people formed through contracts with individuals and is protected from the use of military force by other countries and internal political unrest. However, the social units to which individuals are most closely anchored (communities) remain insecure and exposed to threats such as uprisings and demonstrations rooted in religious or ethnic ties.

Second, if human security and cultural security are ensured but national security is inadequate, the stability and survival of the nation are physically undermined, from within and without, and there is a danger that an unstable society might develop in the absence of good governance.

Third, if cultural security and national security are ensured but human security is inadequate, individual rights are restricted, and a situation resembling those seen in authoritarian states in Asia might develop as the security of individuals is undermined in the name of group security. (In some cases this group is a cultural group or community, in others the state itself.)

Thus, by introducing the new perspective of cultural security, communities have been foregrounded, and their importance recognized, as a tool for ensuring, in the true sense, the security that individuals ought to enjoy. Yet at this point, it is necessary to elucidate the significance of such an approach. This first task is to help make human security more effective in practice. To return to an earlier point, although the community-oriented perspective is already part of the human security paradigm, in societies that do not actively grant legitimacy to cultural groupings other than the nation and the people, this point may be neglected or ignored (as in France, where providing for such groups is barred by the constitution). Through the idea of cultural security, it is possible to illuminate the challenges faced in the midst of such political and social circumstances.

The second task is to articulate the possibility of a softer form of national integration. This would involve challenging, and applying a brake on, existing notions of political community, which, in the case of France, may even be called a kind of “individualistic national integration fundamentalism”. It would seem that the uprising of migrant youths in the autumn of 2005 and the wave of terrorist attacks in 2015 reveal the underlying pathological features of this French society and state. By foregrounding communities rooted in culture, it ought to be possible to explore more flexible paths to national integration.

⁵ We could emphasize that precisely one of French singularities, which goes beyond their thinking that they have a “cultural exception”, is really to think of a third definition of “community” between the two definitions that we evoked. In France, in a way, they refuse to recognize communities at the scale of groups in the cultural sense as political objects; the only cultural community that is politically valid is the national community, which is thought of as a “universal”, in the second sense of culture, international/global.

The third task is to create paths to dialogue between cultural norms based on Western universalism and non-Western cultural norms. In other words, we must elicit possible systems under which Western liberal ideals based on the individual and Asian socio-political ideals that valorize the group can coexist in shared spaces, without unduly rejecting either view. With the rapid advancement of globalization, transnational movements of people take place quickly, in great numbers and on a global scale. In such a world, it is unlikely that any state could bypass the question of how best to interact and coexist with other cultures. Thus, pragmatic inquiry into frameworks of governance aimed at coexistence is a critical policy issue, which the perspective of cultural security can illuminate.

Nevertheless, problems still remain regarding the effectiveness of the cultural security concept for this purpose. First, by labeling certain groups, we may again face the dilemma that was once resolved by interpreting human security in the narrow sense and carrying it through to the individual level. In other words, the outcome may be a zero-sum game in which people assume that the rise of one culture results in the fall of another. The crucial challenge here is not to politicize culture. Cultures are different, and they are separated by barriers. Yet, by further emphasizing and politicizing these barriers, we run the risk of inciting nationalism, which is good for nothing, and encouraging conflict and war. Politically, we must be intent and adept at avoiding such situations.

The second challenge is to bring stability to cultural relations in which security is guaranteed. In overlap with the first challenge, there is no definitive answer to whether the intercultural relations within a certain state are opposed, tense, or in conflict, or whether they are poised to coexist in a spirit of mutual acceptance. The role of politics is to investigate individual cases continually and explore and adopt the best possible policies.

Conclusion

The reason for focusing on the concept of cultural security was, of course, to identify and rectify pitfalls in the current security paradigm. Though there are many different definitions and perspectives of globalization, one point of commonality may be the transition from an era characterized by rigidity and static conditions, in which transportation and communications remained undeveloped, to one in which flexible, dynamic international relations have become the norm. Although the new paradigm of human security emerged against this backdrop in response to the security needs of the day, too much attention was paid to the security of individuals. Contrary to intentions, individual security now comes under threat when attention is not paid to cases in which the security of communities, where the lives of individuals are actually rooted, is not protected. Thus, while the present discussion has asserted the need for a security paradigm that considers communities, with reference to the cases of the EU and France, this—though it tends to be neglected—is actually already part of the human security paradigm.

In developed societies, in particular, where it is assumed that security is generally guaranteed under highly developed systems of national security, there is a lack of readiness to apply the tenets of human security to the home society. However, even if individual rights are guaranteed in accordance with Western liberal values, developed societies may still be faced with situations in which large numbers of individuals face danger. To ensure the security of communities, which perform the crucial role of buffering individuals from danger, it is imperative to protect the underlying cultures on which they are built. The development of such approaches and systems is a task not only for developing countries and post-conflict regions but also for developed

societies. Not only violence and poverty but a variety of insecurities are muscling their way into developed societies due to the increasingly interrelated and borderless landscape created by globalization, as demonstrated by the 2010 eurozone crisis, which began with the exposure of creative accounting by the Greek government on the national account, and the COVID-19 pandemic that spread rapidly throughout the world from 2019. The approach that seeks to guarantee the security of each individual also faces significant challenges and must continue to change.

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