

Life and Will in the Philosophies of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche: What Preferred Alternative for the Emancipation of the African Subject Agent for Africa's Development?

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In this paper, we try to understand the difference in approach of the Schopenhauerian and Nietzschean philosophers with regard to the notions of life and will, by highlighting the distance that separates them. Beyond highlighting this distance, we wonder about the lessons that the African subject, as an agent of history, can draw from it, first for his emancipation, then to promote the development of history Africa.

Keywords: life, will, will to power, willing to live, nihilism, Amor fati

Introduction

Engaging in a reflection devoted to the theme of life and will in the philosophies of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, two major figures of the Western metaphysical tradition who sign the think modern philosophy may seem like a challenge. Indeed, the Schopenhauerian and Nietzschean philosophizing appear, at first glance, plausible. However, in trying to penetrate their intelligibility, it is clear that they are fundamentally incompatible in nature. Nietzsche develops an approach to life that is at odds with that of Schopenhauer.

The starting point of Schopenhauer, as we know, on life is the consideration as will, long before Nietzsche. This reflection is all the more daring as it shattered certain human beliefs, "too human" will say Nietzsche. Schopenhauer exercised considerable influence in several fields, including philosophy and art. Nietzsche was generally enthusiastic about his thinking, and particularly his approach on the will. Therefore, Nietzsche devoted a pamphlet to him entitled "Schopenhauer: The Educator". However, Nietzsche's opposite Schopenhauer is one of both attraction and rejection, a rejection which is based essentially on the renunciation of life, the flight towards nothingness. On the other hand, attraction is based on the intelligibility of will at work in life.

Then, a fundamental question arises for the interpreter: Does Nietzsche's perception of the concepts of life and will differ fundamentally from that of Schopenhauer? In this study, we thematize the Schopenhauer's, philosophizing shared between the grasp of the will as the driving force of life and the conclusion to which it leads, particularly the inclination towards the abandonment of will live's, and Nietzsche's will to manifest, beyond the exaltation of the will's, concept of a "yes" to life, which he designates by the concept of "Amor fati". Through this reflection, we try to understand the difference in approach of the two philosophers on the

notions of life and will, by highlighting the distance that separates them. Beyond highlighting this distance, we wonder about the lessons that the African subject can draw from the insights that Schopenhauer and Nietzsche provide on the notions of life and will to drive the development of Africa.

To carry out this study, we thought that we had to choose hermeneutics as method of approach. The choice of hermeneutics is justified by the fact that it helps to penetrate the intelligibility of the texts studied, and to proceed, concomitantly, to their elucidation. That said, our study is structured around three axes. First, we present the Schopenhauerian approach to life seen as will and as suffering and its counterpart to nihilism. Second, we examine Nietzsche's lawsuit against Schopenhauer. Third, attempt to articulate the achievements of the Schopenhauerian and Nietzschean philosophers in the process of emancipation of the African subject for the development of Africa.

Life as Will and Suffering and Its Nihilism

Schopenhauer, in his desire to make the enigma of the world intelligible, presents will as the energy, the "force" which sustains all reality in the world and, beyond the world, the entire universe. In fact, man only moves thanks to this "force". It is she who makes the planets move, in short, everything being to use a Heideggerian term. This will, of which the psychological will is only a superficial manifestation, is the founding principle of reality.

Such an approach echoes the Kantian thesis of the thing in itself or noumenon. Indeed, Kant believes that the object that is offered to our gaze covers in its phenomenality an interiority that escapes the intellectual grasp of the subject. This interiority of the object is called by Kant noumenon or thing in itself. In the prolegomena to any future metaphysics which will have the right to present itself as a science, particularly the first part, Kant makes a quite radical observation by re-specifying his thought on the debate relating to the thing in itself:

I say, on the contrary, that things are given to us as external to us and graspable by our senses, but that we know nothing of what they can be in themselves, that we only know the phenomena, that is, the representations which they operate in us when they affect our sense. (Kant, 1805, § 13, p. 62)

To tell the truth, Kant identifies the transcendent object with the numene, that is to say with the thing in itself insofar as it is unrepresentable, and constitutes in its opacity, the matter of phenomena. In other words, the thing in itself which opens to us from our intellectual intuition conceals a part of "nothingness which escapes and remains absolutely hidden" (Balazut, 2011, p. 11). The very impossibility of our intellectual intuition to afford the intelligibility of numene "was the very thing that made possible our openness to the thing in itself as an absolutely hidden and unfathomable reality" (Balazut, 2011, p. 11).

The idea that the representations that we make to ourselves of things in themselves which constitute the primordial background without which phenomena would not come into existence, supports Schopenhauer in establishing a sort of equivalence between the thing in itself and what it is called the will. It is in the second book of *Le Monde as will and as representation*, entitled *The World as Will*, that Schopenhauer, in fact, identifies the will by the Kantian thing in itself. In § 23 of this work, he recognizes that:

The will, as a thing in itself, is absolutely different from its phenomenon and is independent of phenomenal forms in which it enters in order to manifest itself, and which, therefore, only concern its objectivity [objectivity?] and are foreign to it. Even the most general form of representation, that of the object, as opposed to the subject, does not achieve it; still less the forms subject to it, and whose general expression is the principle of reason, to which space and time belong. (Schopenhauer, 1966, § 23, p. 184)

In short, what Kant calls thing in itself or noumenon, Schopenhauer designates under the concept of will. Thus, if the phenomena have an effective existence only thanks to the numene, the essence of which we do not know, if it is not itself the essence of the world, then the thing in the world that is most widely answered is willingness. Thematizing the concept of will at work in the world, Schopenhauer writes:

[...] This world where we live and exist, is at the same time and in all its being everywhere will, everywhere representation; that representation already supposes, as such, a form, that of the object and the subject, and that therefore it is relative; that finally, if we ask ourselves what remains, apart from this form and all those which are subordinate to it and which are expressed by the principle of reason, this residue, considered to be different in every point (totogenere) from the representation, cannot be other than the will, that is to say the thing in itself properly so called. Everyone is aware that he himself is this will, constitutive will of the intimate being of the world; each one too is aware that he himself is the knowing subject, of which the whole world is the representation; this world therefore only exists in relation to consciousness, which is its necessary support. (Schopenhauer, 1966, p. 252)

According to Schopenhauer, it is obvious that, there is no need to separate the body from the will. In other words, the body and the will do not constitute two antithetical entities, on the contrary. To understand the intelligibility of this statement, we can start with a fairly simple example, namely the coin. Indeed, in a coin, there are two sides, the face side and the tails side. The tails side opposite to the face on which the value of the coin is inscribed does not constitute a reality distinct from the currency to the point of saying that the face side is not part of it. Undoubtedly, there is no coin without considering both sides. The embossing on one side of the coin does not make the change and does not constitute the coin. Likewise, the world only exists because there is a consciousness that represents it. In Chapter 18 of his work, where he is treated of the nature of body as it illuminates that of other objects, Schopenhauer makes the body/will evanescent distinction:

My body and my will are one;—or else: what I call my body as an intuitive representation, I call it my will, inasmuch as I am aware of it in a completely different way and which does not suffer from comparison with any other;—or else: my body, apart from being my representation, is only my will. (1966, p. 169)

So Schopenhauer simply gets rid of the notion of the difference between wanting and doing and thinks that:

It is for reflection alone that there is a difference between wanting and doing: in fact, it is the same thing. Every real, effective act of the will is immediately and immediately a phenomenal act of the body; and on the other hand, any action exerted on the body is by fact and immediately an action exerted on the will: as such, it is called pain, when it goes against the will; when it conforms to the contrary, it is called well-being or pleasure. (Schopenhauer, 1966, p. 166)

Therefore, we understand that the will is the unique essence of all beings. However, the will, or this motive “force” which moves all beings in all universes, pursues no goal and has no goal to achieve; it is simply blind. One of the great French media philosophers, Michel Onfray, in his commentary that he elaborates on the concept of will, does not say anything else when he points out:

In so far as it exists independently of the phenomena in which it is embodied, the will can be said to be a thing in itself. It is also endless effort, eternal becoming and perpetual flow. Its supreme goal? The fulfillment of desire. She does not know what she wants, she is without a cause, without a goal and without a reason. It is one as a thing in itself, but diverse and multiple on the empirical ground (...). Outside of it, nothing exists, for it is the basis of all phenomena. Insatiable desire, she still wants life. (Onfray, 2010, Vol. 6)

Driven by the concern to make intelligible the concept of the will in Schopenhauer, Christian Godin did not fail to show the blind character of the will as it is understood in the Schopenhauerian device:

The Will wants nothing. Or rather, it wants nothing more than its own perpetuation, which manifests itself as inertia in non-living matter and as sexuality in living beings. In nature there is no plan or goal. Everything is subject to the perpetual cycle of return: succession of seasons and generations. As for representation, it is the image that human beings have of themselves through the prism of their thought. Unlike the phenomenon in Kant, representation has no truth value. (2007, p. 470)

It is because it is blind, this force, seen from the perspective of man, is suffering. In fact, as long as man manifests this will or what amounts to the same thing, this will to live, he only encounters setbacks and troubles. Thus, from inert matter to living matter, manifests in its intimate essence a will, an effort, a continuous effort, without goal, or rest (Schopenhauer, 1966, p. 465). By Schopenhauer's own admission, wanting, striving, translates a lack, which is the consequence of a need: "everything to want has for principle a need, a lack, therefore a pain" (Schopenhauer, 1966, p. 465). And our life, the life of man, is part of this tension between suffering and boredom, and inevitably ends in death. Therefore, the human condition is characterized by this uninterrupted balancing act according to which joy follows pain and pain succeeds boredom. In short, from birth to death, human life is at most only suffering, endless tragedy. As evidenced by Schopenhauer's words, we deplore the lack of stability through which human life could have been seen:

Life therefore oscillates, like a pendulum, from right to left, from suffering to boredom: these are the two elements of which it is made, in short. Hence this fact, which is very significant by its very strangeness: men who have placed all pain, all suffering in hell, to fill heaven have found nothing but boredom. (Schopenhauer, 1966, p. 465)

Who among the creatures endowed with speech would doubt that life is a perpetual struggle? In one of his beautiful pages where the idea of the absurdity of life already appears, Schopenhauer on a pathetic and moving time states:

Life itself is a sea full of pitfalls and pitfalls; man, by dint of prudence and care, avoids them, and yet knows that, even if he overcomes by his energy and his art of slipping between them, he does nothing but advance little by little towards the great, the total, the inevitable and the irremediable shipwreck; that he has his sights set on the place of his loss, on death; this is the last end of this painful journey, more formidable in his eyes than so many pitfalls hitherto avoided. (Schopenhauer, 1966, pp. 467-468)

Schopenhauer compares life to a journey, but a painful journey. It is all the more painful as it shows the lost illusions of man. Undoubtedly, each one imagines himself amassing wealth in order to enjoy it eternally, to taste the pleasures of the world, to make fun of others, and, taking advantage of his social position, to step on the lives of others. So, we but we often forget that all this does not happen, is that ephemeral, and lasts only the moment of a moment. Let us recall, in this regard, that in § 16 of Book Premier of *Le Monde as will and as representation*, Schopenhauer presents joy and happiness as feelings which show the inanity of life.

Also all living joy is an error, an illusion, because the enjoyment of satisfied desire is not of long duration, and also because all our good or all our happiness is given to us only, for a time, and as if by chance, and can therefore be delighted to us later. All of our pains come from the loss of such an illusion; and so our good and our ills all come from incomplete knowledge; this is why pain and groans are foreign to the sage, and why nothing can shake his ataraxia. (Schopenhauer, 1966, p. 153)

Clearly, Schopenhauer means by this that, by his cunning, man thinks he is escaping and slipping through the cracks of fate; this one inexorably always catches up with him and it is always lying down that he dies. Man thinks he understands the world, understands the laws that govern it, barely faces existential discomfort, and

suddenly he is downcast, disoriented. This moment of morbid confusion indisputably testifies, argues Schopenhauer (1966, p. 153) that he was mistaken, that he did not know either the world or life, and that he did not know that inanimate nature, by chance, or animated nature with a view to an opposite end, or even by malice, at every step contradicts the particular wills. So Schopenhauer is surprised that some men put so much relevance in their way of being and adorn themselves with many tricks to give themselves a clear conscience, even though death surreptitiously awaits them on the lookout for reducing them to nothing.

Really, one can hardly believe how insignificant, meaningless, in the eyes of the foreign viewer, how stupid and thoughtless, on the part of the actor himself, the existence that most men flow; foolish waiting, foolish suffering, a staggering march, through the four ages of life, to that end, death, in the company of a procession of trivial ideas. Here are the men: clocks; once mounted, it works without knowing why; with each conception, with each birth, it is the clock of human life that goes up, to use its little ritornello, already repeated an infinite number of times, sentence by sentence. (Schopenhauer, 1966, p. 479)

It is therefore pure madness for man to want to satisfy his needs at all costs, even at the risk of his life, when that is to say life does not belong to us. Life is only given to us to be taken back. This feeling of vexation shows how a man is not free and is not at all responsible for his actions. So what happens to free will? Is it rejected at the end of the Greek calendar? Yes, definitely. Indeed, in his essay on free will, Schopenhauer relieves man of responsibility for the acts he performs throughout his existential journey. Acts that are said to be freely performed by man are not, especially as they are out of necessity.

Man never does what he wants, and yet he always necessarily acts. The reason is that he is already what he wants: because from what he is everything he does naturally follow. If one considers his actions objectively, that is to say from the outside, one recognizes with evidence that, like those of all beings of nature, they are subject to the law of causality in all its rigor; subjectively, on the other hand, each one feels that he never does what he wants. But this only proves that his actions are the pure expression of his individual essence. This is what every creature, even the smallest, would feel similarly if it were to become capable of feeling. (Schopenhauer, 2013, p. 175)

Human beings, Schopenhauer tells us, are predetermined. Everything he does; he does not do on his own initiative, that is to say, it does not emanate from his own particular will, but rather comes under the initiative of the will at work in the world. Proceeding in a subtle way, to the elucidation of this force which sets in motion all that is, Marc Halévy (n.d., p. 6) believes that the meaning and the value of man are not in man. Why? Simply because, "A mysterious inner energy maintains this drive for accomplishment. A subtle energy whose lasting deficiency is lethal to both body and mind. Without it, man lets himself die, physically, intellectually, emotionally, spiritually".

Under these conditions, the free will that the Judeo-Christian religion presents as the power of man to determine himself without constraint, by his will alone, is at most a fiction. Indeed, subject to the pure play of the cosmic will on the march towards the fulfillment of its founding desire, the free will to which humans claim is, for Arthur Schopenhauer, only pure illusion, pure fantasy. Its determinism is absolute. His fatalism too. Hence his reputation as a pessimist, no doubt (Halévy, n.d., p. 6).

In short, embedded in the whirlwind of the cosmic will, man is the toy of this same will which constitutes the essence of the world. Its action is programmed to such a degree that life is not worth living. Everything he does is subject to the principle of reason, which takes away even the beauty and/or charm of existence. So it's not enough to say that life is nonsense. What is the point of living, if all business is doomed to failure, man inexorably on the road to death? This pessimistic fatalism leads Schopenhauer to pose the equation: life =

suffering = nonsense of life. Suffering and death, which is its counterpart, alone symbolize the ugliness and absurdity of existence.

At this point in our reflection, a question arises: Did Nietzsche take into account the pessimistic vision of life developed by Schopenhauer? Obviously, no! Because, if it seems acquired that Nietzsche was a fervent reader of Schopenhauer as underlined by Vincent Stanek (2002, p. 1) that the latter (Schopenhauer) allowed him to understand the concept of will as a constitutive element of the essence of the world, it remains nonetheless true that Nietzsche initiated a lawsuit against Schopenhauer.

Nietzsche's Lawsuit Against Schopenhauer

Recall that Schopenhauer's work, as we know, had a considerable impact both on writers like Samuel Beckett, Thomas Bernhard, among others, and on philosophers, Max Scheler, Georg Simmel, Friedrich Nietzsche, to quote only those. With regard to Nietzsche, he admits very frankly his debt to Schopenhauer. Also in his *Inactual Considerations* he presents "Schopenhauer as an educator". In any case, Nietzsche is full of praise for Schopenhauer.

However, the acknowledgment of his debt to Schopenhauer's place in no way weakens his critical thinking. Determined to deconstruct the nihilist Schopenhauerian approach, Nietzsche sues Schopenhauer. Indeed, the trial that Nietzsche brings to Schopenhauer is above all the trial of his philosophy, at least of his vision of the world tinged entirely with pessimism. Schopenhauer, it should be remembered, presents the world as a valley of tears, a place of perpetual suffering. In other words, human existence is punctuated by recurring difficulties, which no consciousness can reduce or eliminate. These difficulties, on closer inspection, infiltrate our good conscience, and, above all, deprive life of all of its charm.

Now, we can never say it enough, the whole of Schopenhauer's philosophy rests on the thesis according to which everything being, everything that is, in its emergence or, what amounts to the same, in its phenomenality, is will, but "will of life". Undoubtedly, such an approach could not suit Nietzsche who postulates that everything is "will to power".

In Book II of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, which bears the title "Du surpassement de soi", Nietzsche circumscribes the issue of the debate with Schopenhauer and highlights the meaning he assigns to the concept of will to power.

This one did not reach the truth which launched towards her the word which speaks of will to be there: this will—it does not exist!

Because: what is not, cannot will; but what is in being, how could it still want to achieve being?

It is only where there is life that there is also will: but not will to life, but—this is my teaching—will to power!

For the living, many things count more than life itself; but what speaks in this estimate is the will to power!

This is what life taught me one day: [...]

Truly, I tell you, there is good and evil that would be imperishable—there is no such thing! They are forced to overcome themselves, to constantly surpass themselves. (1983, p. 142)

This occurrence clearly shows the radical difference between the Schopenhauerian "will to be there" or "will to live" and the "will to power" dear to Nietzsche. Indeed, the relation of the "will" to the "will to life" is—if one places oneself in the perspective of Nietzsche—thematized differently in the Schopenhauerian and Nietzschean devices. If Schopenhauer conceives the "will to life" as the effect of the movement of will, that is to say of the intention (to live), on the other hand, for Nietzsche, the movement of the will can in no way want to manifest what it already has, in this case existence.

In his article cited above, Stanek (2002, p. 10) believed it necessary to suspect Nietzsche of committing an enormous misinterpretation by making believe that Schopenhauer uses the concept of “will of existence” (Wille zum Dasein). In reality the concept of “will to exist” does not exist in Schopenhauer. On the other hand, what exists with him is this “impulse to exist” (Drang zum Dasein), this “thirst for existence” (Suchtn nach Dasein). This is not surprising since in a particularly interesting text, Schopenhauer specifies it:

If we consider the will where no one disputes it, that is to say in beings endowed with knowledge, we find it everywhere as a fundamental tendency in all beings, its own conservation: omninaturavultesseconservatrixsut [everything to be tends to its own conservation]. But all the manifestations of this fundamental tendency can always be reduced to an effort to seek or pursue, to avoid or to flee, depending on the occasion. Now this is what we can see even at the lowest degree of nature, that is to say of the objectification of the will, when bodies no longer act except as bodies in general, that is to say, become objects of mechanics, under the sole reports of impenetrability, cohesion, solidity, elasticity and gravity. (2017, p. 1169)

What is implied here is the idea that in Schopenhauer the will has this natural tendency to want to keep itself. This tendency to self-preservation is made possible by the concept of selfishness which, when you look at it, is the very essence of man.

In both humans and animals, among all the motives, the most important and the most profound is egoism, that is to say the desire to be and to be well. [...]

Egoism, in animals as in man, is rooted very strongly in the very center of being, in its essence: let us say better, it is this very essence. [...]

Selfishness, by its nature, does not suffer from limits: it is in an absolute way that man wants to preserve his existence, to remain free from all suffering, and among the sufferings he counts all that is lack and deprivation; he wants the greatest possible sum of well-being he wants to possess all the pleasures of which he is capable. (Schopenhauer, 1991, p. 141)

If men’s actions are to be interpreted, Schopenhauer says, in the light of selfishness, Schopenhauer’s will is not as rich as one might be tempted to believe. Indeed, from the moment when the will, in Schopenhauer’s perspective, is in the grip of lack, of suffering, it cannot therefore reach that higher egoism which accompanies the march of ascending life (Stanek, 2002, p. 11), because, with Schopenhauer the pain has an anesthetic effect in the body. It diminishes and destroys the chances of the will to be able to assert itself. In this Schopenhauer promotes altruistic morality, that is, the morality in which selfishness withers (Nietzsche, 1974, p. 78).

To tell the truth, Nietzsche rejects the Schopenhauerian idea tending to make the will live the essence of the will. In his posthumous *Fragments* dated Autumn 1885–Autumn 1887, Nietzsche puts forward the reasons for such a rejection. According to him, the will at work in the world does not push reality to just live. In other words, not everything is content to live, simply because the will to live is not the finality of the will. The will to live is only a moment of the will without constituting its terminal stage. In other words, all reality longs for power. And that therefore, the essence of will is power. In other words, the values to which we are attached, values which govern our behavior, are the result of multiple interpretations obeying particular and/or individual perspectives. These interpretations are, in fact, meaningful evaluations, that is to say they allow us to “live” (Poulin-Goyer, 2015, p. 16), while inciting us to persevere power, understood that we are the embodiment of the most successful figure of the will to power:

That the value of the world lies in our interpretation (...) that the interpretations have hitherto been appreciations from a particular perspective, thanks to which we keep ourselves alive, that is to say in the will to power, increase in power. (Nietzsche, n.d., L.2, § 108)

Obviously, the creative activity of the will to power is limitless. As the will's aspiration for "more power" grows relentlessly, so does it give rise to other possibilities, to other horizons. In any case, this is what Nietzsche emphasizes when he writes: "Any extension of power opens up new perspectives and makes people believe in new horizons" (Nietzsche, n.d., L.2, § 108). So, in this drive to always increase "power", there is a kind of negation of negation. What to say? Certainly, the will asserts itself in order to maintain life, but this maintenance of life is by no means a rest; rest is fundamentally an illusion, since this impetus does not annihilate the manifestation of "power".

The will to power interprets: when an organ takes shape, it is an interpretation; the will to power delimits, determines degrees, disparities of power. Simple disparities of power would remain incapable of feeling themselves as such, there must be something that wants to grow, that interprets by reference to its value anything else that wants to grow (...) In truth, interpretation is a means in itself of being master of something. The organic process presupposes a perpetual interpreter. (Nietzsche, n.d.)

It is obvious that the will is fighting against itself. Indeed, on the one hand, it manifests life, and, on the other hand, it maintains the undefined impulse of "more power".

Obviously, in Nietzsche, the question of the will has a very central place in his study. It is the key that gives access to all Nietzschean conceptual architecture. Life in part linked with the will. It is basically one of the manifestations of the will to power. The French philosopher Patrick Wotling (2001, p. 56), one of the world's foremost scholars of Nietzsche, is in this dialectical connection, the process of intensification of power. As he says: "... it [life] is interpretation and as such a process articulated with intensification and growth". The two concepts "will to power" and "life" are inextricably linked. One cannot be understood without the other. There is therefore a dialectical link between the "will to power" and "life". Indeed, "What is life?", asks Nietzsche in *Fragments XII: 2*. This question reveals a new approach to life that Nietzsche states quite clearly: "We therefore need here a new more precise version of the concept of 'life': on this point, my formula is stated: life is will of power" (Nietzsche, n.d.).

Sweeping away vitalist conceptions, which attempt to understand life by referring to the environment, Nietzsche shows that

Life is not adaptation of internal conditions, to external conditions, but a will to power which, from within, submits and is always incorporated more "exterior" (FP XII: 7). Life therefore does not refer to the instinct of preservation, which instinct probably reflects a lack: The most general character of life, it is by no means scarcity, famine, it is rather wealth, opulence and even absurd waste. (Nietzsche, 1974, § 14, p. 66)

The approach developed by Nietzsche is, as P. Wotling (2001) underlines, the fundamental antagonism that opposes ascetic morality to life. In other words, it comes down to this: Ascetic morality is based essentially on values of decadence, the very ones that lessen power, while life is fundamentally conquered to, exploitation, appropriation, and not rest. In an extremely important passage, Nietzsche¹ points out that:

Life itself is essentially appropriation, attack, conquest of that which is foreign and weaker, oppression, harshness, imposition of its own forms, incorporation and at the very least, in the most moderate cases, exploitation—But why always use these words, marked from time immemorial with an intention to slander? [...] "Exploitation" does not belong in its own right to a perverted or imperfect and primitive society: it belongs in its own right to the essence of living things, as a

¹ We reproduce here the translation of Patrick Wotling (2001, *Le vocabulaire de Nietzsche*, Paris, Ellipses, p. 56), which seems more judicious to us.

fundamental organic function, it is a consequence of the authentic will to power, which is precisely the will for life. (1973, § 259, p. 265)

It is easy to understand, whether it is Schopenhauer or Nietzsche, the notion of will refers itself to the instinctual reality of the body. But in the interpretation that the two philosophers make of it, opinions differ. With Schopenhauer, the “will” is taken to mean that the instincts have a lack, a need to be filled. As long as this desire is not fulfilled, satisfied, the suffering will go on indefinitely, which means that will equal instincts that desire. In Nietzsche, on the other hand, “will” rather refers to the idea that instincts are in a dynamic of exigency, not because they want to fill a void, a lack, that is to say something that they want causes suffering and pain, on the contrary. They always want the “full”. What characterizes them is the energy, the power to command, in short, to always command. Characterizing the Nietzschean will in its effective deployment, Jomphe remarks:

Suffering, lust and the feeling that one lacks something, far from characterizing the will, are rather, according to him, a sign that the will is in decline and that one is ill-suited to command. The difference is quite considerable: in one case, we can say of an instinct that it wants to the extent that it is thirsty—and the more violent the will, the more thirst will be too—, in the other, insofar as he commands and tries to exercise a certain authority, thirst being rather the sign that the will is diminishing. (2015, p. 32)

In short, the analyses developed by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche on the concepts of life and will are fundamentally opposed. The whole question is to ask which of the two approaches is likely to help the African subject to come out of his state of minority, to use an expression dear to Kant, to start as best they can; the process of the development of Africa?

What Preferred Alternative for the Emancipation of the African Subject as an Actor of Africa’s Development?

The Schopenhauerian and Nietzschean philosophers are unique in that they are antithetical. Schopenhauer’s approach culminates in what he calls the will to live. Indeed, in Schopenhauer, the will in its unfolding seeks to conserve itself, to surrender to itself. However, behind this abandonment, hides a will which misunderstands life, a will which dedicates a hostility to life. The meaning of this will, to be honest, is nothingness. In other words, the will, thought from the perspective of Schopenhauer, is a will which refuses combat, a bit like what Hegel called “the fight to the death”.

This way of considering the will is mocked by Nietzsche (2002, § 28, p. 181), when he notes that “Man still prefers to want nothing rather than not wanting at all ...”

In short, the Schopenhauerian will is directed by a nihilist instinct testifying to an impoverished life, consequence of an ontological decadence. In fact, tired of life, unable to endure it, this instinct prefers to disguise the weakness of its will under ascetic ideals, themselves symptoms of a sick life (Stanek, 2002, p. 10). As we can see, the Schopenhauerian theory of the will remains trapped in a nihilist conception in that it refuses to recognize the pain inherent in existence. Besides, does not Schopenhauer (2017, § 67, p. 559) say that “pain is essentially and inseparably united to life”? So, Schopenhauer prefers a life without suffering. Wanting life to be painless is not that putting yourself in the place of God. Cannot we say that life is not our life; it was simply given to us so that we can live it as it is? If life is a gift, do we have the right, if not the power, to take away one of its aspects; was it tragic? Obviously, no!

We only judge life to the extent that we can no longer live it in an active, spontaneous and affirmative way. The origin of such a judgment can only be a diminished life, afraid of life, and which needs to be justified and reassured. (Simha, 1988, p. 48)

Basically, Schopenhauer did not understand what life is exactly: Life is through and through tragic. From the tragic nature of life, he inferred it to be pain, suffering.

Now, in the *Twilight of the Idols*, in the chapter entitled “What I Owe to the Ancients”, there is an occurrence which perfectly accounts for the distance taken by Nietzsche in relation to Schopenhauer’s interpretation of tragedy. This is the place to point out echoes that of Aristotle, namely that tragedy operates in man a real catharsis, a purification of the long repressed passions of the soul. Nietzsche disagrees with such an interpretation, asserting that:

The tragedy is so far from proving in any way a pessimism of the Greeks in the sense of Schopenhauer, that it must on the contrary be understood as a refutation and a help against this theory. Acquiescence in life, even in its most remote and difficult problems; the will to live happily sacrificing its most accomplished types to its own inexhaustible fruitfulness [...]

It is not to free oneself from terror and pity, it is not to purify oneself of a dangerous emotion by letting it discharge violently—as Aristotle understood it—, but for, beyond of terror and pity, to be oneself the eternal pleasure of becoming. (Nietzsche, 1974, § 5, p. 101)

Schopenhauer did not understand, fundamentally, the real role that Greek tragedy played. He is completely ignorant of the two principles at work in this tragedy, namely the Dionysian principle and the Apollonian principle. Indeed, if the Dionysian principle shows the chaotic and dissolving unity of individuality, the Apollonian principle, on the other hand, erases the pain of the individual by giving him the radiant image of good looks (Simha, 1988, p. 48).

The peculiarity of a living culture is therefore to think of the tragic opposition under the affirmative power of Dionysus, the god who affirming life also celebrates it without having the slightest concern to justify it. To the lies of idealism and cowardice of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche will oppose the assertive will to life characteristic of Greek tragedy, at least in his mind. It is not a question of accusing life of all the evils, because of its tragic essence, of the sufferings it inflicts on men, but of addressing a joyful yes to existence, according to Nietzsche’s beautiful formula “*Amor fati*”. This beautiful formula translates the Dionysian ideal of life: “the religious affirmation of life in its entirety, from which nothing is denied, from which nothing is taken away” (Nietzsche, 1995, § 464, p. 412). In suffering, one must always manage to say yes to life, to destiny, without any remorse, because the horrors of life, of whatever nature, are constitutive of reality. Go beyond the ugly and the beautiful, the good and the bad; it is celebrating fate, because the love of fate reveals “a will capable of wanting itself in a world made of frightening and formidable contrasts” (Beaubatie, 1994, p. 299). It is therefore about understanding that affirmation is action, but a tragic action for the reason that it affirms life. The intelligibility of this principle is the step which leads to what Nietzsche calls “gay knowledge”. However, gay knowledge, recalls Beaubatie (1994, p. 301), as a forgetting of historical meaning, is the discovery of life-giving forces in becoming. [...] *Amor fati* is love of what happens, of chance, of good and bad—a jubilant and transfiguring affirmation of the world.

The peculiarity of a living culture is therefore to think of the tragic opposition under the affirmative power of Dionysus, the god who affirming life also celebrates it without having the slightest concern to justify it. The Schopenhauerian philosophizing promotes a deadly culture. Behind the theorization of his wanting to live, there

is a kind of self-negation that leads to nothing, if not to emptiness. This is what Haar (1998, p. 137) emphasizes when he notes that the negation of the will to live is not dialectical negativity, a reflexive and productive negativity of being, as Hegel had so well thematized, but flat negation insofar as this self-negation cannot enrich its development with any result.

To make clear the difference in approach separating Schopenhauer from Nietzsche on the subject of the will, Brum writes:

The big difference between the will to live and the will to power derives from the fact that Schopenhauer made an accusation against the will which he described as insatiable and hungry. [...] He arrived at the concept of the negation of the will. It was his way of denying the tragic world he portrayed. Nietzsche, for his part—with his notion of the will to power—does not want to dismiss the terrible or suffering aspects of the world. [...] The error, according to Nietzsche, is that from the doctrine of the Will to Live follows the postulate of the negation of the will—the eudemonistic and pessimistic summit of Schopenhauer's metaphysics. (2005, p. 76)

Schopenhauer's image of willpower is most negative. If the will offers itself to interpretation as the survival power of being, the fact remains that in its essence it is inextinguishable. In other words, the will is unappeasable, that is, in its impulse to always want, to always desire, it is never satisfied; it always wants, and this indefinitely. In its bulimia, the will as it governs the real, particularly plunges the human being into a whirlwind of dissatisfaction, an endless ocean of trials.

However, the Schopenhauerian philosophizing works to sow doubt in man, and, consequently, to discourage the mind. It is therefore with good reason that Rosset (1994, p. 107) ends his work with a pathetic tone: "Schopenhauerian philosophy is non-interpretative, and repudiates as talkative any effort to replace the silence of the absurd. We must not count on the philosopher to find reasons to live". Consequently, the Schopenhauerian philosophizing cannot be a model to help the African subject to emancipate himself—if indeed that is to emancipate himself, it is to free himself from the state of serf or slave, in short free from the chains of slavery, both mental and economic. In an Africa plagued by interethnic conflicts—which most often are the result of external black hands, poverty, discouragement, where the only valid values are market values, Africa's situation is not—she not strongly imbued with nihilism?

Indeed, Eurocentric Africanist literature has mobilized all its energy to project a very negative image of Africa internationally. She succeeded in creating, from these intellectual productions: books, articles, conference proceedings, in short all the mass media, a pathological imagination (filled with commun representations, negative prejudices) which prevents the African subject from having self-confidence, and to know that he is the agent of history. Think here of the expressions "The African is not capable of anything", "The African is cursed", "The Negroes of Africa have not received from nature any sentiment that rises above of silliness"; in short the appreciations of the European elites are legion.

Embedded in a globalization of which it does not control the ins and outs, the Africa of Kankan Moussa, Samory Touré, André Matsoua, Kwame Nkrumah, Patrice Lumumba, Cheikh Anta Diop, Nelson Mandela, etc., does not control any political lever and economic impact of this globalization. She has suffered and continues to suffer the diktat of the masters of the world. Under these conditions, is not the African subject won over by what has come to be called Afro-pessimism?

In any case, faced with these questions, the will of the African subject is severely tested, because it is not because the situation is difficult, even very difficult, that he must give up facing it, on the contrary.

It is only by risking your life that you keep your freedom. [...] The individual who has not put his life on the line may well be recognized as a person, but he has not attained the truth of this recognition as recognition of an independent self-awareness. (Hegel, 1941, p. 159)

No one ignores that with a valiant heart nothing is impossible. To be part of a poetic posture, that is to say creative for the survival of African humanity, such must be the leitmotif of any African subject.

The work of Nietzsche in general, and his approach to life and will in particular, are a good vein for the African subject to regain self-confidence. Indeed, in Nietzsche's philosophy, what is at work, fundamentally, is what he sums up in a very compact formula: "become what you are". It's a whole life program!

Either way, this formula highlights the possibilities that a human being is able to achieve. Nietzsche uses the metaphor of becoming to show the transformations that man undergoes due to a succession of stages through which new forms of life appear. The Nietzschean philosophizing therefore invites us to a self-transcendence. Basically, it is a paradigm shift that Nietzsche invites us to do. Beyond the burdens of history, the weight of the categories in which the supporters of Eurocentric Africanism have locked us, the African subject must arm himself with historical consciousness in order to resume his historical leadership. In a text remarkable for its relevance, Thiémélé and Boa, examining the importance of historical awareness, underline that:

Historical awareness, that is, real knowledge of oneself in history increases the desire to live better. She uses the feeling of belonging to a powerful and strong past to free the mind. Only the latter is the creator of civilizations: he believes in his capacities, he has confidence in his strengths. The desire for emergence becomes an ethical requirement to increase the heritage of humanity in knowledge, through the contribution of oneself. (2017, p. 46)

Historical memory urges us not to give up. It is therefore about awakening the creative energies that lie dormant in us in order to engage in the work of civilization to save African humanity *hic and nunc*. If the African subject is unable to use his intelligence to be able to find a place in the sun, it is a safe bet that the end of African civilization is near, because, this world is a world of crabs. Whoever gives up is immediately devoured, without qualms.

Conclusion

The concept of will is central to both Schopenhauer's and Nietzsche's concerns. It constitutes the framework of their thought. Both are developing quite opposite approaches. The Schopenhauerian approach to will borders on nihilism. On the contrary it does not lead to the celebration of life. She gives the world a fundamentally pessimistic view of being the toy of fate. The Nietzschean approach, for its part, makes will the place of affirmation of being. In the will something tends to manifest itself at the very moment when it seeks to sink. The will is underpinned by a dynamic of combat, that is to say it does not revel in its initial position, in what it has already acquired or what amounts to the same thing, in what it is; she always seeks to conquer. In fact, there is something unsatisfied with her.

The will, thought out from Nietzsche's perspective, invites man in general and the African subject in particular to surpass himself. Life should not be thought of in terms of retention, but rather in terms of growth for more potency. It is no longer a will that delights in the idealization of beat asceticism, but a will that affirms and asserts itself.

The stake of this study is the reappropriation of the approach of Nietzsche as a perspective likely to help the African subject to emancipate himself from the Western tutelage and consequently to start chugging along,

to solve cultural, political economic problems and spiritual induced by more than 600 years of colonization, neocolonization, and domination since Africa came into contact with the predatory West. Development is a quest for meaning which consists of starting from oneself in order to go towards oneself. Only those subjects who have confidence in their own intellectual capacities do this. The African subject must therefore not abandon himself; he must resume his historic leadership. You can never win victories without valuing yourself.

Under these conditions, Nietzsche's voice must not be a voice that resounds in the desert. Refusing any canonization of his philosophy, Nietzsche left this thought heavy with meaning: "For men today, I don't want to be light, I don't want them to call me light. These, I want to blind them. Flash of my wisdom, cut their eyes out!" (Jaspers, 2003, p. 110).

Is this the sign of a farewell? Certainly, yes! But this farewell is not friendly. How to understand this farewell? If not to say following Karl Jaspers that "Everything, then, depends on us. Only that which comes to us from ourselves is true" (2003, p. 110).

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