

# The Role of Traditional Rulers in Addressing Security Challenges: Reflections on Native Authority System in Colonial Sokoto Emirate, 1903-1960

Attahiru Ahmad Sifawa  
Sokoto State University, Sokoto, Nigeria

Sokoto Emirate was one of the three (later four) constituent emirates in colonial Sokoto Province, Northern Nigeria. The others being Sokoto, Gwandu, Argungu, and Yauri Emirates. It is located at the northwestern most part of Nigeria. The Sokoto Emirate covers the present day Sokoto and Zamfara states of Nigeria. During the British colonial administration, native authority (NA) system was a model of local government administration created under the “indirect rule system”. It was a system where by the pre-colonial traditional leadership institutions were modified and allowed to function in the local government administration introduced by the British. This paper assessed the role played by traditional leadership institutions in addressing security challenges during the British colonial administration of Sokoto Emirate. In particular, the role played by the NA in arresting *Mahdist* uprisings, and other related extremist religious movements on the one hand, as well as rural banditry, armed robbery, theft, among other security challenges in the emirate, are highlighted. The paper further argued that some of the roles played by the traditional leadership institutions in successfully addressing those challenges are still relevant in addressing the problems of insurgency on the one hand, and some of the recent emerging security challenges, in northwestern Nigeria, such as cattle rustling, rural banditry, kidnappings, robbery, and other related challenges.

*Keywords:* traditional rulers, security challenges, native authority

## Introduction

The 19th century Jihad in Hausaland, West Africa, led by Sheikh Usman bin Fodiyo, facilitated the emergence of Sokoto Caliphate (Last, 1967; Kani, 1985). The Caliphate, with its headquarters at Sokoto, was an Islamic State guided by the Islamic *Shariah*. It covers the territories of the present day northern Nigeria; some part of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Benin Republics. It was the largest empire in pre-colonial West Africa. It had over 30 emirates and numerous sub-emirates, over 250 ethnic-groups, and a landmass greater than the present day Nigeria (Usman, 1979). The city of Sokoto was the headquarters of the Caliphate, from where, since 1815 after the migration of Sheikh Usman bin Fodiyo from Sifawa, the administration of the entire Caliphate was piloted. The numerous emirates under the Caliphate, more or less, functioned in a quasi-federal arrangement, with considerable local autonomy over the day to day conduct of their administration. In addition to the constituent emirates, there was what was known as the capital emirate, consisting of Sokoto and its

---

Attahiru Ahmad Sifawa, Ph.D., Senior Lecturer, Department of History, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Sokoto State University, Sokoto, Nigeria.

environs, as well as the territories of the defunct Kingdom of Zamfara (Nadama, 1977). These territories were under the direct supervision of the Caliphate central authorities, carried out either through some senior council officials, such as the Magajin Gari, Galadima, Sarkin Yaki, etc., who exercised supervisory roles over particularly the old Zamfara districts, as *Kofas* (liaison officers/officials in charge of the supervision of the administration of some emirates or districts); or through appointed district heads directly in charge of some individual districts, such as Yabo, Sanyinna, Sifawa, Tureta, Kebbe, Gwadabawa, Silame, Rabah, Gandi, Gada, Sabon Birni, Tambuwal, among others. Together, these territories were often referred to and described by some scholars as the Sokoto Sultanate or capital emirate, in the history of the Sokoto Caliphate (Mukhtar, 2015; Jumare, 1995). Strikingly, the territory of the Sokoto Sultanate was what comes to be known as “Sokoto Emirate” within the Sokoto Province, after the establishment of British Colonial Administration (Sifawa, 2016)<sup>1</sup>. This research covers the Sokoto Emirate.

It is noteworthy to remind that security of the lives and properties of the citizens is the primary concern of every responsible administration. Despite the wars and turmoil which characterized the period of active Jihad Campaigns in Hausaland and other parts of the Caliphate, the leadership of the Caliphate took serious measures to ensure the protection of the lives and properties of the citizens. In fact, most of the tracts and books compiled by Sheikh Usman bin Fodiyo and his lieutenants, particularly Abdullahi Fodiyo and Muhammad Bello, took serious measures to address issues that would ensure the security of the lives and properties of the citizens<sup>2</sup>. Apart from issues, such as armed robbery, theft, murder, raids, and other forms of insecurity, the Caliphate authorities ensured the safety of the entire territories of the Caliphate, particularly the Sokoto Emirate, which was under the direct supervision of the central Caliphate authority. This accounted for the large scale movement of goods and persons, trade, diplomacy, itinerant scholarship activities, and tourist and or European exploration missions (Kani, 1986; Abubakar, 1979; Adamu, 1982). In addition to local scholars, various European explorers, such as Clapperton, Heinrich Barth, and Lander, all attested to the existence of adequate security measures to ensure the safety of the lives and properties of the citizens and commuters within the Caliphate territories (Maishanu, 2007). As earlier observed, the availability of sound security system not only facilitated the free flow of economic activities, trade, learning, peaceful co-existence among the multi-ethnic communities, but facilitated the sedentarization of nomads, establishment of more settlements, and rural industrial centres, particularly within the capital emirate, i.e., Sokoto Emirate (Chafe, 1990; Abubakar, 1982).

The Caliphate authorities, reformed the existing traditional security institutions, such as the *Dogarai/Yandoka* (traditional police and body guards), prison officers, as well as introduced the office of *wali al-shurta* (police boss), and *Muhtasib*, who took charge of the *hisbah* (civil defence) affairs (Last, 1967). In addition to this elaborate security structure, the *sarakuna* (native chiefs) at all levels played vital roles in securing their territories. Any security threat, such as raids from enemies or bandits, armed robbery, theft, other criminals as well as the menace of pseudo-religious scholars, and anything considered detrimental to the security of the Caliphate was promptly reported to the higher authorities, if it was beyond the capabilities of the

---

<sup>1</sup> National Archives Kaduna, hereafter referred to as (NAK). Sokfrof, 5751, annual report Sokoto Province 1939, paragraph, hereafter referred to as (prg.). Where paragraphs are cited in referring Archival sources, prg. is used. Where page(s) are cited, pp. or p. (sing.) is used. 1-3, by Resident R. D. Ross.

<sup>2</sup> Usman bin Fodiyo, *Bayan Wujubul Hijrati Alal-Ibad*. See also Abdullahi bin. Fodiyo, *Tazyin Al-Waraqat*; and Muhammad Bello. *Usulul Siyasat*; and Muhammad. Bello, *Jawabun Shafin, wakhidabunminnakaafinila-Akhinafil-Lahi Muhammad Jelani*.

village or district leadership to handle (Sifawa, 2012). The community policing role played by the hierarchy of administrative structure was no doubt a key factor in ensuring the security of the Caliphate and its territories.

This paper seeks to examine the role played by the traditional leadership institutions in addressing security challenges, during the British colonial administration of Sokoto Emirate. The paper, in particular, assesses the roles of the native authorities (NAs) in responding to *Mahdist* uprisings and other questionable steps by pseudo-religious scholars, in addition to arresting criminals and other elements threatening the peace of the society. The paper argues that if some of the steps taken by colonial administration in making the traditional leadership institutions part of the active and duly recognized stakeholders in security services are utilized, it will go a long way in addressing the contemporary security challenges in Nigeria.

### **The Establishment of British Colonial Administration in Sokoto Emirate**

Academic discourses on the British conquest and establishment colonial administration in Sokoto Province and by extension Northern Nigeria are relatively satisfying (Tibenderana, 1988; Bello, 1962). It is, however, not out of place to note that by March 1903, the gradual conquest of the territories of the Sokoto Caliphate by the British imperial forces reached the capital emirate. Sokoto (the headquarters of the Caliphate) together with the territories directly administered by the central Caliphate authority, not by any of the constituent emirates, was called the capital emirate). After the conquest and the fall of Kano Emirate, Sokoto was the last emirate to be conquered by the British. On 15th March, 1903, amidst confusion over the possibility of either embarking on *Hijrah* (emigration) or militarily engaging the British conquerors, the British invading forces arrived Sokoto. The central Caliphate authority under Caliph Attahiru I (Adeleye, 1971; Mufet, 1954; 1978; Backwell, 1969; Ikime 1977)<sup>3</sup> hastily prepared and faced the invading forces outside the city of Sokoto. Courtesy of the British superior military technology, the over 3,000 fighting men mobilized by the Caliphate were defeated at the famous battle of Giginya. The people scattered in confusion after the defeat, the Sultan, the *Qadi al-qudat* (chief judge) of the Caliphate, Abdallah, many officials, and the *Talakawa* (masses), emigrated as earlier ruled by the *Quadi al-qudat* (Bello, n.d.). However, the Wazir, Muhammad Bukhari, a number of princes and officials halted at Dinawa, before later moving to Marnona, thinking of the next line of action. Upon invitation from Lugard, the Wazir and the people around him returned and submitted to the British, marking the official conquest of the Caliphate (Maishanu, 2007). Between 19th to 21st March, the British endorsed the selection of Muhammadu Attahiru II, thus installing him as the next Sultan (Caliph) of Sokoto. In the Sultan's letter of appointment and Lugard's speech, the basis of the principles guiding the administration, and the roles of the Sultan (and by extension traditional leadership institutions) were outlined (Kirk-Greene, 1965).

Subsequently, other principles guiding the administration, including the reorganization and adoption of the existing hierarchy of administration, from the Sultan and his councilors, through the district heads, down up to the village and ward heads were established (Kirk-Greene, 1965; Lugard, 1970; 1965). The arrangement was that the local government administration was left under the traditional leadership institutions, headed by the *Sarakuna* (traditional rulers in the modern parlance, or the native chiefs as they were addressed by the British), while the British European officers exercised supervisory roles, though with executive powers, over the

---

<sup>3</sup> The title Sultan was first used and adopted by the British, referring to the head of Caliphate authority. However, up to 1903, the official title was Amirul Mu'umin, commander of the faithful, styled after the title of the rightly guided Caliphs in the early period of Islamic history.

traditional institutions. The key roles of the traditional leadership institutions were: collection of both cattle and overhead taxations, maintenance of law and order in their domains, and execution of British instructions. Although the policy mutation and initiation, as well as the executive powers lay in the hands of the British officers, the day to day execution of instructions and direct contact with the masses remained in the hands of traditional rulers. This was the basic feature of the local government administration introduced by the British, and it was what is commonly referred to as the “indirect rule system”, adopted by the British in the administration of northern Nigeria, where it was considered to work most successfully, before it was later extended to other parts of Nigeria (Lugard, 1970; Shea, 1983; Bello, 1962). It is worth stressing here that the colonial state recognized the traditional leadership institutions to be the key players in the local government administration, and that the maintenance of law and order was their cardinal role throughout the history of the British Administration of Sokoto Emirate.

### **Resistance against the British Colonial Conquest and Administration in Sokoto Emirate**

Although the defeat of the Caliphate forces at Giginya, the *Hijrah* of Caliph Attahiru I, and surrender of Wazir Muhammadu Bukhari and the remaining people of Sokoto marked the formal establishment of the colonial administration, there were series of resistance movements, throughout the first decade of British administration of the emirate, and beyond. Since the early stage of British imperial activities, and later, the beginning of direct colonial conquest, the people of Sokoto and the Caliphate authorities considered it a religious duty to resist the British domination (Adeleye, 1968). By the beginning of the 20th century, barely 100 years after the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate, Islamic values and principles have already become part and parcel of the society. Islamic *Shariah* was already established as the guiding principle of the Caliphate. Thus, universal value and basic human antagonism to foreign domination apart, it became a religious duty upon the Caliphate authorities and people to resist the British Christian conquerors (Adeleye, 1968; Sifawa, 2012). However, because of the fact that it already became clear to the people of Sokoto that given the superiority of the British military technology, the available military technology in the Caliphate could not match it, and thus the futility of military resistance was already clear (Muffet, 1971; Last, 1967). Conversely, the two conflicting views within the leadership of the Caliphate were; either embarking on *Hijrah*, to emigrate and leave the territory, in order not to subject self to the rule of unbelievers, or to stay and negotiate peace with the conquerors (Muffet, 1971; Last, 1967; Adeleye, 1968; Bello, n.d.). Proponents of both views made a cogent attempt to justify their positions within the context of Islamic *Shariah*, as examined elsewhere at some length (Muffet, 1971; Last, 1967; Adeleye, 1968; Bello, n.d.; Sifawa, 2011). Both views clearly demonstrated the seriousness of the people’s resistance to the British overrule in Sokoto Caliphate.

In the first place, it was unanimously agreed by all, in the emirate, that fighting the British domination was a religious duty on the entire people of the Caliphate. However, the contemplation of either fighting or emigration was simply because of the pessimism of winning the war, in view of the British military superiority. This was demonstrated by their action when the British invading forces suddenly arrived Sokoto, the entire people came out and fought the British on 15th March, 1903, under the leadership of Caliph Attahiru I (Bello, n.d.). Secondly, the proponents of negotiating peace with the British clearly outlined the basis of their action, in a tract written by the leading scholar who championed the position. In it (Adeleye, 1968), Waziri Bukhari clearly concur with the proponent of the contending view championing emigration, that wilfully submitting to the rule of infidels is against the teachings of Islam and amount to disbelief; that the basis of negotiating peace

and submitting to the British rule was because of the inability of the Caliphate to resist them militarily; turmoil characterized by the period of colonial conquest; and absence of a safer place where the Muslims could go and practice their religion, freely. Therefore, on the basis of the foregoing reasons, Waziri Bukhari concluded that it was permissible to negotiate peace with the British, and so he did, together with many people who remained at Sokoto after the British conquest (Adeleye, 1968). What is important in this context is that people who accepted the British domination in Sokoto after the conquest did so, conditionally, hoping to get adequate strength in the future to reverse the conquest. Therefore, it was itself a clear act of resistance. Thirdly, on the part of the people who took the tougher option of embarking on the *Hijrah*, after the British conquest, under the leadership of the Caliph Attahiru I, they demonstrated a high level of resistance against the colonial domination. They left not only their beloved country, positions and wealth, but for many of them, households (Bello, n.d.). Ironically however, even after the *Hijrah*, the resistance continued as many people kept on trooping to join the Caliph on *Hijrah*. The level at which people pursued and continued to follow the Caliph on *Hijrah*, seriously frightened the colonial authorities. They believed that if the Caliph on *Hijrah* was allowed to continue attracting people, regrouping, and mobilizing, they could be capable of turning down the successes recorded by the British. Therefore, the British mobilized large number of army and pursued the Caliph. Finally, the invading and resisting forces met at Burmi, where they had many serious encounters before finally defeating the Caliphate forces and slaying the Caliph on 27th July, 1903 (Adeleye, 1972; Lawal, 1982).

The foregoing narratives demonstrated the early stage and dimension of resistance against the British colonial domination in Sokoto Emirate and the Caliphate as a whole. However, even after the defeat of the Caliphate and establishment of colonial administration in Sokoto Emirate, resistance against colonialism continued. This is what could aptly be considered as the post-conquest resistance. Strikingly, it also had two dimensions. There was underground resistance, manifesting itself in dodged civil disobedience and boycott of some colonial policies and programmes. Although this dimension persisted almost throughout the colonial administration, the other form of resistance, i.e., the military resistance movement was what is important, as far as the roles played by the traditional leadership institutions in ensuring peace and security, and in safeguarding the colonial state in Sokoto Emirate, were concerned (Sifawa, 2011)

### **The Indirect Rule System and the Consolidation of British Colonialism: The Response of the *Sarakuna* to Militant Religious Activities in Sokoto Emirate**

Since the British conquest of Sokoto city and the installation of Sultan Attahiru II in March 1903, the British Administration was established in Sokoto Province. What remained for the colonial state was to eliminate potential threats towards the survival of the administration and consolidated its rule in the emirate. As argued earlier, indirect rule was the system of administration adopted by the British in the whole of northern Nigeria. It was a system of administering the conquered territories through the existing traditional institutions after expunging all what were considered repugnant to British concept of good governance. Its basic feature was delegating the day to day running of the local government affairs in the hands of the *Sarakuna* (traditional rulers), under strict guidance and supervision of the British officers. Either the arrangement was direct or indirect rule, it does not matter. What is important in the context of this paper was that the traditional rulers were the key players in local government administration during the colonial period and that their roles in addressing security challenges are the issue at stake (Shea, 1983).

### Why the Indirect Rule System?

In examining the reasons for the adoption of indirect rule system by the British in Nigeria, two factors always dominated the discussion. There is the paucity of staff to administer so vast a territory, like Nigeria, and the scarcity of resources to finance the deployment of British personnel in the administration. This is what Perham, fondly, described as the “lack of men and money” (Perham, 1960, p. 173). However, another very important factor that fails to attract adequate attention from scholars was the collaborative motive of the indirect rule system. British experiences in ruling the overseas territories prior to the conquest of northern Nigeria have exposed them to the suitability of ruling the conquered territories through the medium of indigenous traditional leadership institutions. They found it not only cost effective, but the only realistic compromise that could win the cooperation of the local aristocracy, and forestall collective violent resistance struggles. This explains why, since before the direct colonial conquest, experienced British agents of imperialism have forewarned against any attempt to rule Nigeria without the involvement of and/or active participation of the native traditional institutions (Tibenderana, 1988). In one such counsel by on-the ground officer, Taubman Goldie, the man in-charge of the affairs of Royal Niger Company (the company that was not only operating imperial business activities in the area, but negotiated treaties with the traditional rulers on behalf of the British imperial authorities), declared that: “If the welfare of the native races is to be considered, if dangerous revolts are to be obviated, the general policy of ruling on the African principles through the native rulers must be followed for the present” (Vandeleur, 1988, p. xxii; Tibenderana, pp. 48, 79).

Close working relationship with Goldie, and personal experiences in East Africa, further convinced Lugard, and by extension the British imperial authorities, that indirect rule would not only be a useful tool of collaborating with the local aristocracies, but will reduce them to vanguards of the regime, thus assisting to secure the enterprise with every available means at their disposal. It was hardly surprising, therefore, that no sooner had the indirect rule system been established, than indigenous African traditional rulers became reduced to unconscious collaborators with the British invaders. In Sokoto Emirate, for instance, following the establishment of the administration, and the stake allowed the local aristocracies in the colonial scheme of things, the erstwhile temporary submission to the British domination by the local aristocracies, metamorphosed into strong bond of friendship between the two interest groups. Having a thorough understanding of this paradox is important in analyzing the role of traditional leadership institutions in not only the provision of security in the emirate, but also in safeguarding the colonial regime during its early period of consolidation, as well as prolonging its life span in the emirates and other parts of Nigeria (Sifawa, 2016).

In line with their primary responsibility of safeguarding the security of the British officers in their domains, the Sokoto Emirate aristocracy faithfully cooperated with the colonial officers to eliminate any potential threat to the administration. As earlier observed, ideology more than any other factor determined the response of the people of the emirates towards the British colonial domination (Sifawa, 2012). Little wonder therefore that some *Ulama'a* (Islamic scholars) spearheaded the early stage of militant resistance movements against colonial domination in Sokoto Emirate. In aid of their mobilization campaign, the *Ulama'a* exploited the already popular *Mahdist* tradition in West Africa. Muslim communities in West Africa believed in the prophecy which foretold that Allah will send a reformer at the end of every century to revive faith, and ensure the pure practice of Islam. Moreover, towards the end of time, when the world is in disarray and confusion, arising from non-observance of religious injunctions, Allah will send a *Mahdi*, who will fight un-belief, evils, injustice, and

tyranny, and restore the ideal order dictated and designed by Allah. For many centuries, this tradition has gained popularity in West Africa, hence the peoples' expectation, as well as the dramatic appearance of individuals parading themselves as *Mahdi*, in different parts of West Africa (Usman, 1988). Early in the 19th century, Sheikh Usmanu Danfodiyo himself was considered to be a *Mahdi*, as a result of his Islamic Reform activities, before he personally explained otherwise to the public (Usman, 1988). The turmoil lack of certainty and disaffection which followed the British conquest would require little efforts to mobilize people into believing in the appearance of the *Mahdi*. Consequently, many people at different times and places, both in Sokoto and other parts of the emirates of northern Nigeria, rose after the British conquest, proclaiming themselves *Mahdi*, and mobilizing people to fight the British infidels (Adeleye, 1972). Lugard lamented that, every year, during the early years of the administration, many people rose and proclaimed themselves as Mahdi, mobilizing people to take arms against the British (Adeleye, 1972).

The central and critical role performed by the traditional rulers in arresting and/or suppressing the *Mahdist* uprisings in Sokoto Emirate was the key issue at stake, in this conversation. Undoubtedly, the organized and hierarchical chain of leadership and command actually facilitated the fight against militant religious activities throughout the period of British administration of Sokoto Emirate. The ward heads and village heads were the main foot soldiers in terms of community policing, which more than any other thing, was the secret behind the success of the war against militant religious activities, during the period under review. In this connection, whenever they noticed any strange religious campaign or activity, they either stopped it, or quickly reported it to the district heads. Similarly, the district heads would deploy the available means at their disposal, either through superior counsel, and or reprimand, to ensure the quenching of any potential burning brand, considered to be capable of igniting the flame of militancy in their domains. More so, at many occasions, the native police force (*Dogarai/Yandoka*) had to be deployed to intimidate and or suppressed any perceived seditious activity (Maishau & Sifawa, 2018). Moreover, issues of higher magnitude are always reported to the Sultanate for the attention of the native authority. Accordingly, sweep and appropriate actions were always taken by the Sultanate to address any potential *Mahdist* or pseudo-religious activity in the emirate. The traditional rulers never show disinterest, or treat with levity, any potential security threat in their domains. Therefore, the surveillance conducted by the native chiefs on individuals and group of people, whose activities were considered subversive to the establishment, were very central in the service of peace and security in Sokoto Emirate. For instance, when the Sultan received a report of one, Malam Mailayu (the scholar with charms), proclaiming himself a *Mahdi* around Rabah, moving through Gundumi areas to mobilize people to joined him in establishing an Islamic community, he quickly ordered for his arrest. Mailayu was accordingly arrested and confined by the Sultan on alleged seditious activities (Usman, 1988)<sup>4</sup>.

Prompt responses to seditious activities at their infancy stage were actually the major feature of the role played by the traditional rulers in addressing militant religious activities in Sokoto Emirate during the period under review. In the foregoing, the role played by the Sokoto Sultanate, to address problems leading to the Satiru revolt of 1906, was another good example. The Satiru revolt of 1906, it should be noted, was the most serious *Mahdist* movement that shook the British colonial administration to its very foundation (Lawal, 1982). Of the large volume of literature on the Satiru revolt of 1906, Adeleye's contribution stands out to be concise and cogent narrative, of the revolt (Lawal, 1982; Umar 2007; Adeleye, 1972). Satiru had been a center of strong

---

<sup>4</sup> NAK, Sokprof, 86/1907, Sokoto provincial report 1906, p. 11.

anti-European sentiment since the establishment of the British rule. The community successfully defied the payment of taxation to the British. The full-blown *Mahdist* movement manifested itself as far back as 1904 when the headman of the village proclaimed himself a *Mahdi*, and his son, Isa, as (Isah *Alaihis Salam*) Jesus Christ, in line with belief among the Muslims that towards the end of the world, *Mahdi* will appear, to be reinforced by Jesus, and he (*Mahdi*), or the two, would slain the Dajjal (anti-Christ) and restore the world to proper religious order (Adeleye, 1972). Upon the receipt of the report of his activities by the Sultan, the village headman was arrested and detained at Sokoto, before he eventually died in detention. After his death, his son, Isa, who succeeded him was summoned by the Sultan, interrogated and made to swear that he would not involve himself in any *Mahdist* activity (Sifawa, 2012). However, by 1906, the *Mahdist* sentiment had already grown to a considerable proportion, with Isa leading the movement. For non-acceptance of the ideology, a nearby community, Tsomau, was attacked and where the leader of the community together with some of his men were killed. Not long after the Tsomau incidence, another fugitive *Mahdi*, Malam Shu'aibu Dan Makafo from French territory in Niger, arrived and joined Malam Isa at Satiru. The appropriateness or otherwise of the decision of H. R. P. Hillary, the acting resident, to mobilize men and confronted the Satirawa (people of Satiru) with the aim of intimidating them into embracing peace, is not what matters here. In any case, the overzealous Satirawa considered his action as a declaration of war, thus leading to the first encounter between the Satirawa and the British forces on 14th February, 1906. Ironically, within 20 minutes, the Satirawa rebels succeeded in routing the British forces, killing Mr. Hillary, the acting resident; Lt. Blackwood, the commander of the army; Mr. Scott, and 27 other men were all killed. Dr. Ellis, the medical doctor and several others were severely wounded (Maishau & Sifawa, 2018; Adeleye, 1972). It was a very sad and disgraceful moment for the British. Indeed, when the Sokoto Aristocracy mobilized 3,000 soldiers under Marafa Maiturare on 17th February, the Army was equally defeated by the Satirawa. Realizing the danger of the psychological implication of their defeat by the Satirawa, among the subject people, and its implication for the security of their rule, the British mobilized men across different military formations in West Africa and embarked on what one of the colonial officers described as imperialist method of barbarity. The village was destroyed and people annihilated on the 10th of March, 1906 (Maishau & Sifawa, 2018; Adeleye, 1972; Junaid, 1956)<sup>5</sup>.

There are three immediate take-homes from the Satiru rebellion in the context of this paper. The first, of course, the most important, was that since at the early stage of the appearance of Militant *Mahdist* religious activity at Satiru, having realized the seriousness and commitment of the key actors beyond the local district authority, the matter was promptly reported to the Sultan. On his part, the Sultan immediately took appropriate steps by arresting and detaining the pseudo-Mahdi. In this case, the traditional leadership institutions have done their expected role. Again, it demonstrated the level of surveillance and community policing taking place in the emirate.

Secondly, when the problem manifested itself again in 1906, the Sultanate Council drew the attention of the colonial authority to the existence of the problem, so that in the event that strong force was required, then the colonial government would intervene. Sadly, the misguided approach taken by Hillary, as observed by Adeleye, turned the potential riot into the disaster it were<sup>6</sup>.

Still, while the British was in the agony of the humiliation it suffered from Satiru, the traditional leadership institutions responded in defense of the administration, by mobilizing men to protect the remaining

---

<sup>5</sup> Dabt al-multaqadat, op cit by Junaid, pp. 137-143.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., pp. 201-203.

Europeans at Sokoto, and later in sending expeditionary force of about 3,000 fighting men under Maiturare, to deal with the Satirawa. This was the third role played by the Sarkuna, in addressing the Satiru rebellion. More importantly, they distanced themselves from the militant movement embarked upon by Satirawa, and mobilized the masses in defiance to the movement. Both Burdon and Temple saluted the cooperation and role of the traditional leadership institution in ending the Satiru rebellion, otherwise it would have ended not only in what Burdon described as the annihilation of the entire Europeans in Sokoto (Adeleye, 1972), but a temporary, if not permanent reversal of British occupation of the Caliphate. It is not the appropriate place to discuss the basis of the Sarkuna's attitude during the Satiru revolt in Islamic Shariah. What is apparently clear was that they settled on the lesser of the two evils. The same reasons that made them submit to the British domination were perhaps why they decided not to side with the rebels. The superiority of British might was not in doubt, and that not minding the success or otherwise, a rebellion of such scale would definitely have resulted into large scale massacres and destructions which the leaders considered too grave to invite.

The author delves relatively much on this area because it is fundamentally the major aspect of the role of traditional rulers in addressing security challenges which is virtually missing in the contemporary Nigeria, and which if properly harnessed, it will go a long way in checkmating, not only militant religious activities, but other related challenges of banditry, cattle rustling, armed robbery and other forms of organized crimes, particularly in the rural areas.

### **The Role of Traditional Rulers vis-à-vis Native Authority (NA) Police in Addressing Security Challenges in Sokoto Emirate**

It has been noted in the early part of this article that the pre-colonial Caliphate authority developed an elaborate Police structure and other related security establishments in order to ensure the security of the Caliphate. The fact that the indirect rule system was based on the existing traditional leadership structure meant that all the existing instruments of the traditional administration would have to be re-organized to suit the need and the criteria of the occupying power. Accordingly, the *Dogaraior Yandoka* (native police) were reorganized to successfully carryout policing activities in the emirate. Apart from the constabulary headed by the British police officers, under the direct command of the resident; the British police officers were also deployed in the training of the NA police (*Yandoka*) (Sifawa, 2012). Familiar with the terrain and local condition, the *Yandoka*, as they were mostly called in Sokoto, were not only deployed in the assessment and collection of tax, suppressing criminals, delivering summons and arresting offenders, but in guiding and facilitating tours and other operations of the British officers in the emirate. Despite the early prejudice and contradictory stance of the British officers over the NA police in refusing to pay them salaries, the *Yandoka* performed efficient policing activities in the emirate. In fact, the British officers would have to recognize the indispensable roles of the NA police in the native colonial establishment (Sifawa, 2012).

Regular training was given to the NA police and was later provided with barracks and offices, like their counterparts in the constabulary.<sup>7</sup> Because of the important roles being played by the *Yandoka*, and their position in the colonial scheme of things, men of noble background were later recruited and started to rise to occupy varying command and supervisory roles within the NA police, a status hitherto left in the hands of slaves and men of humble background. In Sokoto Emirate, like other parts of northern Nigeria, not only were

---

<sup>7</sup> NAK, Sokprof, 4079, annual report 1935 Sokoto Division. Mr. G.D. Rt Cairn, district officer.

the sons of important men recruited into the NA police, but even the members of the aristocracy, including the sons of the Sultans who were to serve in varying positions within the NA police. Apart from men, like Bunu, and his brother Abdu Sardauna, who occupied the leadership of the NA police in 1928 and 1929, respectively, people, such as Abdu Jatau and Abubakar (later Sultan Abubakar III) have all served the NA police at certain capacities. For instance, Sardauna Abubakar (later Sultan) was made the councilor in-charge with supervisory role of the NA police administration, prisons warders, and other related security matters (Rotimi, 2007).

As a result of the coordinated efforts by the Sarakuna and *Yandoka* (NA police), thieves, bandits, and armed robbers were significantly eliminated in the emirate.<sup>8</sup> Whereas the traditional rulers, particularly hamlet/wards and village heads, provided the regular on the spot-intelligence report, on the movement of criminals, and general security situation in their domains the NA police, knowing the local personalities always respond, immediately, to security challenges (Sifawa, 2012). Therefore, the close cooperation between the traditional rulers and the police, accounted largely for the successes recorded in eliminating criminals and ensuring peace in the emirate. It is interesting to note that in addition to regular training and provision of facilities, including housing the police, colonial authorities accorded necessary attention to security architecture in the emirate. The office of *Wikilin Doka* (an officer in-charge of the native police forces in Sokoto Province), became a very important position.<sup>9</sup> The discipline of the NA police, significantly accounted for the reason why following the outbreak of the Second World War, many of them were mobilized into the Army, thus extending their services to the imperial state, beyond the Nigerian boundary. In 1942, alone, 106 men were taken away by the army. Although the enlistment of large number of the NA police (*Yandoka*), for the time being, affected the efficiency of their work, significant number of them were later rein-stated after the war.<sup>10</sup>

### **The Murder of Mr. Clement**

In addition to tackling the problems of theft, robbery and other related challenges, the traditional rulers responded to, and tackled, the problems of notorious robbers and high profile criminals. In 1928, a European officer, Mr. Clement, was killed at Kurya, near Kaura Namoda. Although, there were many perspectives among the local people regarding the personalities and circumstances leading to the murder of Mr. Clement, the responses of traditional rulers to the challenge is the issue at stake (Sharwood Smith, 1974, p. 8)<sup>11</sup>.

It is interesting to note that the traditional leadership authorities were never carried away by the initial misrepresentation, surrounding the murder of Mr. Clement. According to Sharwood Smith (1974, p. 8), when Mr. Clement was killed, the initial public presentation among the European officers was that “Muslims killed Mr. Clements at Kurya”. Thus, the incidence was given religious coloration (Sharwood Smith, 1974). However, Mr. Sharwood Smith received his initial shock, when upon arrival at Kaura Namoda, the district headquarter, he already met the native chief fully prepared, with his local forces, offering the initial response to the

---

<sup>8</sup> NAK, Sokprof, 3934, Provincial Annual Report and Returns—1920-1921, paragraph, hereafter, (Prg.) 97-98. See also: SNP17, Vol I, 21303, Sokoto Province annual report, 1933, Prg. 29; and NAK, Sokprof. 4472, annual report, Sokoto Division, 1936. Part III, Native Administration Affairs, p. 9.

<sup>9</sup> NAK, Sokprof, 4727, annual report Sokoto Division 1937, p. 34. See also: *Northern Region of Nigeria Provincial Annual Reports*, 1958. Kaduna, Government Printer, pp. 135-136.

<sup>10</sup> NAK, Sokprof, 4727, annual report Sokoto Division, 1937, p. 34. See also: NAK, Sokprof, 6014, provincial annual report 1942 (includes annual notes for Sokoto Division), p. 16; and NAK, Sokprof. 6319<sup>B</sup>, Sokoto division annual report 1945 (Sokoto Division: Half year report—Sardauna for Sultan of Sokoto), p. 10.

<sup>11</sup> Hafsi Yar'gigala (nene), 121 years, Oral interview at Kaura Namoda, 08/02/2014. Also: Alhaji Muhammadu Mamuda, Madaron Kurya, 59 years, oral interview, 09/02/2014. See also: Yankin Sokoto, n.d., Kaduna, Government Printer, p. 65.

challenge. Therefore, the native chief swiftly responded to the challenge (Sharwood Smith, 1974). Thus, Mr. Sharwood Smith joined hands with the traditional rulers to address the crisis.

The first step taken by the traditional rulers, together with Mr. Smith was that of tracing the people responsible for the murder. The Emir of Katsina, who shared boundary with Zamfara was informed, who in turn, mobilized his subordinate traditional rulers, particularly the ones living around Zamfara-Katsina boundary, to help in fishing out the culprits. While native chiefs of Kaura and her neighbours mobilized their men into action, the Emir of Katsina equally did the same from the other side of the territory. Rugu Forest (between Kaura/Zurmi and Katsina) was particularly condoned by the joint operatives of the Native and colonial police forces. With the help of systematic local intelligence gathering, the murderer, one Mamman Eha, who was also a notorious armed robber, was within few days, arrested and prosecuted (Sharwood Smith, 1974). The murder and response there from of Mr. Clement was a very important example of the role of traditional rulers in addressing security challenges in Sokoto Emirate. Rather than being carried away by journalistic media/official misrepresentation of the incidence, the native authorities moved practically and investigated the causes and actors involved in the incidence. No doubt, systematic intelligence gathering from the local communities and leaders, as well as close working relation with the police, was the secret behind the success of the mission, as well as the promotion of overall security of the emirate and other parts of northern Nigeria.

### **Response of Traditional Rulers and the NA Police to the Breakdown of Social Order**

Apart from theft, banditry, robbery, and other related security challenges, the response of traditional rulers to the breakdown of social order is another theme, worthy of note. One such landmark example occurred in 1937 in Sokoto city. It has been the tradition in Sokoto, that the Sultan issued from time to time, exhortation calling on Muslims to shun evil acts and live a life of righteousness. Strikingly, in 1937, the Sultan made two such proclamations. One, there was the outbreak of cerebra-spinal meningitis. In line with belief among the Muslims, that violation of Allah's injunctions and indulging in sinful acts attracts His wrath, which is manifested in disasters, such as epidemics, famine, drought, etc. Thus, the outbreak of meningitis, that year was attributed to satanic acts which became common among the populace. Conversely, the Sultan issued a proclamation, exhorting people to shun evil acts and live a life of righteousness. Secondly, in June, the same year, there was shortage of rain in Sokoto and its outlying districts. The Sultan, notable scholars and the citizens embarked on regular prayers, seeking for Allah's favour and resumption of rain. After one such prayer, at Eid ground, the Sultan admonishes Muslims to improve their manner of living. They should give up gambling, consorting with harlots and other acts condemned by Islam. On the contrary, they should observe the tenets of Islam and live a life of righteousness.<sup>12</sup> Although, the prayers and exhortations were performed in perfect order and decorum, as reported by the acting resident, some youth in the city decided to visit brothels and send prostitutes away. In the process, riot broke out in the city.<sup>13</sup>

Immediately upon the outbreak of the riot, the Sokoto Sultanate Council swiftly responded to the crisis. The Waziri quickly directed the Sardauna, who was the councilor in-charge of security matters, to take appropriate action. Consequently, the Sardauna quickly rushed to the NA police barrack, where in close cooperation with the Wakilin Doka, alarm bell was sounded and a force of 40 NA police men was quickly mobilized. The NA police quickly suppressed the riots, and about 73 people who were armed with sticks,

<sup>12</sup> NAK, SNP17, 28, 131, Sokoto-disturbance in pp. 1-3.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., pp. 1-2.

cudgels and other weapons were arrested. Together with additional people arrested, the following day, who were all prosecuted at the Chief Alkali's court. They were sentenced to terms of imprisonment, including the payment of associated damages.<sup>14</sup>

Prompt responses to crises apart, the Sultanate Council ensured that whoever was found to be involved in the crises was punished, accordingly. Therefore, the fact that whoever was caught instigating or involved in civil disturbances was punished, accounted largely for the peace and prevalence of law and order in the emirate, and serves as one of the most useful legacies the contemporary Nigerian State needs to learn from the colonial state.

Up to the 1950s, the NA police were playing a very important role in the service of peace and security in Sokoto Emirate. However, with the commencement of active Party Politics in Northern Nigeria, and the resultant power play between the old and new guards, i.e., the *Sarakuna* and the western educated elites (politicians) on one hand, and the outcry on both the rot and inefficiency of the NA police by the politicians and other similar interest groups, on the other, the NA police underwent series and consequential re-organization throughout the remaining part of the colonial administration. The investigative panels on the operations of the NAs not only resulted in the re-organization of the NA Police, but reduction of the overall powers of the emirs (traditional institutions) (Mohammed, 2007). Rotimi, observed that, the Native Authority Law (1954); the Native Authority (Police Declarations) Order in Council (1955); and the Native Authority Police Force Rules (1959), were the series of legislations during the era of party politics which led to the gradual withering of the powers and relevance of the NA police in Sokoto Emirate and other parts of Nigeria (Rotimi, 2007). Thus, at independence, through the remaining part of the first Republic, 1966, the NA police were rendered ineffective as a result of the centralization of police affairs at the regional level (Rotimi, 2007; Mohammed, 2007).

It is equally important to note that, the successive military regimes, particularly after the tragic Nigerian Civil War, ensured the centralization of police affairs at the federal level of government, thus, finally nailing the coffin of the NA police in Nigeria. The return of successive civilian administrations could not change the situation, either. The so-called reforms introduced by the successive military and civilian administrations took the hands of traditional institutions off, not only the police, prisons and other business of security, but every other aspects of the local government administration (Rotimi, 2007; Mohammed, 2007). Save the meagre stipends given to traditional rulers, left at the mercy of the benevolence or otherwise of the successive, and largely, dis-interested states and local government administrators, the traditional rulers in Nigeria are not provided with any responsible stake in governance. They are reduced to ceremonial traditional figures, mostly invited to preach and propagate peace during the breakdown of social orders. This sad situation no doubt affected not only their powers, but the enthusiasm and commitment to tackle security related challenges in their domains. In fact, the neglect suffered by traditional institutions subjected many of them into untold hardship, in meeting the day to day needs of their selves, families and dependants. Ironically, though for good, many would have to engage into active businesses, at the expense of adequate supervision of their domains. On the other hand, there are speculations that in some areas affected by insecurity challenges, accusation fingers are pointed to some occupants of traditional positions. A onetime security chief in Nigeria admitted that the post-independence security challenges in Nigeria are not un-connected with the neglect of traditional institutions in the service of peace and security (Mohammed, 2007).

---

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., pp. 1-8.

### Conclusion

Despite the negative prejudice against African culture and institutions during the period of European colonization, pursuant to myth of superiority of European culture and civilization, traditional institutions were provided with clearly defined roles in both provision of security and overall local government administration in Sokoto Emirate and other parts of Nigeria. The exigencies of the indirect rule system apart, the colonial state realized the critical role traditional institutions could perform in ensuring the security and harmony of any society. So far, the traditional institutions, with their presence at every level and strata of the society, they are the best compliment of government security agencies. They can always provide daily report up dates, and on the spot assessment of every emerging social or security situation.

Besides, with the help of traditional institutions, the in-flow and out-flow of immigrants, as well as movement of goods and persons, could be monitored, assessed, and regulated. Similarly, local criminal *personae* and activities could not only be scouted for and monitored, but drastically checkmated, with the active involvement of traditional leadership institutions at all levels and strata of the society. Some scholars are of the opinion that, not only traditional rulers, but also the heads of various religious groups and organizations, guilds, crafts, and other socio-economic groups and organizations are supposed to be provided with one role or the other, by the state, in the service of peace and security in Nigeria (Albasu, 2007). What exists today is a mere rhetoric and conversation, but not a serious practical government provision or policy as regards the role of traditional institutions in security services and overall local government administration.

This article therefore argues for a genuine discourse and dialogue of scholars, security experts and other interest groups in Nigeria and other countries with similar narrative, to clearly fashion out the specific practical roles required of traditional institutions in the service of peace and security. Unless something is done, even the true nature and dimensions of the myriad of security challenges in Nigeria could not be adequately understood, let alone addressed. This dialogue is necessary because, though it may not be practically possible to reproduce the security architecture of the colonial state, there are certain provisions which could adequately fit the present challenges, with amendments. More so, there are new issues and realities that require their participation, depending on the nature and dimension of the challenges on the one hand, and the level and capacity of the institutions, on the other hand.

### References

- Abubakar, S. (1979). Aspects of an urban phenomenon: Sokoto and its hinterland to C.1850s. In Y. B. Usman (Ed.), *Studies in the history of the Sokoto Caliphate: The Sokoto seminar papers*. Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University for the Sokoto State History Bureau.
- Abubakar, S. (1982). Birnin Shehu, the city of Sokoto: A social and political history, C.1809-1903 (Ph.D. thesis, Ahmadu Bello University [ABU], 1982).
- Adamu, M. (1982). *The economy of a Hausa capital: Zaria in the 18th and 19th centuries*. Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press.
- Adeleye, R. A. (1968). The dilemma of the Waziri: The place of the Risalat al-Wazir 'ila ahl al-'ilm wa'l-tadabbur in the History of the Sokoto Caliphate. *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, 4(2), 285-311.
- Adeleye, R. A. (1971). *Power and diplomacy in Northern Nigeria 1804-1903: The Sokoto Caliphate and its Enemies*. London: Longman.
- Adeleye, R. A. (1972). Mahdist triumph and British revenge in Northern Nigeria: Satiru 190. *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, 6(2), 193-214.
- Albasu, B. A. (2007). The role and responsibilities of community leadership in national security. In A. U. Adamu (Ed.), *Chieftaincy and security in Nigeria: Past, present, and the future* (pp. 384-386). Kana Telletes Consulting Company Limited. Retrieved from <https://nairametrics.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/chieftaincy-in-Nigeria.pdf>

- Backwell, H. F. (1969). *The occupation of Hausaland*. London: Frank Cass.
- Bello, A. (1962). *My life: The autobiography of Alhaji Sir Ahmadu*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bello, O. (n.d.). *Ulama'a and colonialism in Nigeria: Risalailal Mu'asirin*. Sokoto: Islamic Academy.
- Chafe, K. S. (1990). The transformation of socio-political policies of the leaders of the Sokoto Caliphate: A preliminary study of the impact of the socio-economic programmes and policies on political integration. In A. Khani & K. A. Gandhi (Eds.), *State and society in the Sokoto Caliphate*. Sokoto: Usmanu Danfodiyo University.
- Jumare, I. M. (1995). Land tenure in the Sokoto Sultanate of Nigeria (Ph.D. thesis, York University, Canada, 1995).
- Junaid, M. (1956). *Tarihin Fulani*. Zaria: Northern Nigeria Publishing Company.
- Kani, A. M. (1985). *The intellectual origin of the Sokoto jihad*. Ibadan: Tauhid Publications.
- Kani, A. M. (1986). The Role of the Intellectuals in Sokoto Caliphate, with special reference to Abd-Al-Qadir B' Al-Mustapha (A paper presented at the international seminar on the role of the Ulama in the Sakkwato Caliphate, C.I.S., University of Sokoto, 1986).
- Kirk-Greene, A. H. M. (1965). *The principles of native administration in Nigeria: Selected documents 1900-1947*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Last, M. (1967). *The Sokoto Caliphate*. London: Longman.
- Lawal, S. U. (1982). Lugard, traditional rulers and the subject-peasantry: The Satiru revolt of 1906 (M.A. thesis, University of London, 1982).
- Lugard, F. (1965). *The dual mandate in British tropical Africa*. London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd.
- Lugard, F. (1970). *Political memoranda* (3rd ed.). London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd.
- Maishanu, H. M. (2007). *Five centuries of historical writings in Hausaland and Borno, 1500-200 A.D.* Ibadan: Macmillan Nigeria Publishers Ltd.
- Maishau H. M., & Sifawa, A. A. (2018). Satiru factor in the socio-political history of colonial and post-colonial Sokoto. *Lafia Journal of Arts*, 1, 160-172.
- Mohammed, A. (2007). Chieftaincy and security in Nigeria: The role of traditional institutions. In A. U. Adamu (Ed.), *Chieftaincy and security in Nigeria: Past, present, and the future* (pp. 8-9). Kana Telletes Consulting Company Limited. Retrieved from <https://nairametrics.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/chieftaincy-in-Nigeria.pdf>
- Mufet, D. J. M. (1954). *Concerning brave captains*. London: Andre Deutsch.
- Muffet, D. J. M. (1971). Nigeria-Sokoto Caliphate. In M. Crowder (Eds.), *West African resistance: The military response to colonial occupation*. London: Hutchinson & Co. Publishers Ltd.
- Mukhtar, T. M. (2015). A history of Mazalim court system in the administration of justice in Metropolitan Sokoto, 1809-1903 (Ph.D. thesis, Usmanu Danfodiyo University, Sokoto, 2015).
- Nadama, G. (1977). The rise and collapse of a Hausa state: A social and political history of Zamfara (Ph.D. thesis, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, 1977).
- Obaro, I. (1977). *The fall of Nigeria: The British Conquest*. London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd.
- Perham, M. (1937). *Native administration in Nigeria*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Perham, M. (1960). *Lugard: The years of authority, 1898-1945*. London: Collins-St. James Palace.
- Rotimi, K. (2007). The NA police and security in the northern and western regions of Nigeria. In A. U. Adamu (Ed.), *Chieftaincy and security in Nigeria: Past, present, and the future* (pp. 71-79). Kana Telletes Consulting Company Limited. Retrieved from <https://nairametrics.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/chieftaincy-in-Nigeria.pdf>
- Sharwood Smith, S. B. (1974). *But always a friends* (A. Imam, Trans.). Zaria: Northern Nigeria Publishing Company Ltd.
- Shea, P. J. (1983). How indirect was the indirect rule system: A documentary approach to an administrative problem (A public talk given to the student's historical society of Nigeria, BUK, 1983).
- Sifawa, A. (2012). The Sokoto Caliphate aristocracy and its contributions to the consolidation of colonialism in Sokoto Province, 1903-1960. In O. Adesina, O. Ogen, & N. E. Attah (Eds.), *Critical perspective on peace, conflict and warfare in Africa: Festschrift in honour of Professor Siyan Oyeweso* (pp. 165-169). Ile-Ife: Obafemi Awolowo University Press.
- Sifawa, A. A. (2011). Colonial infrastructure and social services in Sokoto Metropolis, 1903-1960 (M.A. dissertation, Usmanu Danfodiyo University, Sokoto, 2011).
- Sifawa, A. A. (2012). Theory and practice of the British anti-corruption campaign in Sokoto Province, 1903-1960: A re-assessment. A paper presented at the 57th Annual Congress of the Historical Society of Nigeria (HSN), 28th-31st October, IBB University Lapai, Niger State, Nigeria.
- Sifawa, A. A. (2016). British Administration of Sokoto Province, 1939-1960: Continuity and change (Ph.D. thesis, Usmanu Danfodiyo University, Sokoto, 2016).

- Tibenderana, P. K. (1988). *Sokoto Province under British Rule 1903-1939: A study in institutional adaptation and culturalization of a colonial society in northern Nigeria*. Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University (ABU) Press.
- Umar M. S. (2007). Islam and colonialism: Intellectual responses of Muslims of Northern Nigeria to British colonial rule. *Kano Studies New Series, D(3)*, 14-40.
- Usman, M. T. (1988). Intellectual tradition in Sokoto Emirate: 1903-1960 (Ph.D. thesis, Usmanu Danfodiyo University, Sokoto, 1988).
- Usman, Y. B. (1979). The Sokoto Caliphate and the transformation of political communities. In Y. B. Usman (Ed.), *Studies in the history of the Sokoto Caliphate: The Sokoto seminar papers*. Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University (ABU) Press.
- Vandeleur, S. (2010). *Campaigning on the upper Nile and Niger*. Methuen: BiblioLife