

The Rehabilitation of Rhetoric in Gadamer's Philosophical Hermeneutics

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The interrelation of rhetoric and hermeneutics is rooted in our existential historicity and linguisticity. Rhetorical competence and education are integral approaches to a better understanding of being-in-the-world. Inspired by Platonic dialectic and Aristotle's phronesis, Gadamer has redefined true rhetoric and revived the epistemological and ethical dimensions in rhetoric in his philosophical hermeneutics. This article investigates four aspects in Gadamer's rehabilitation of rhetoric. First, rhetoric as ethics. Rhetoric transcends the dualism of self-other, subject-object through its dialogical structure, and is composed of understanding and application as a whole in hermeneutic experience. Second, rhetoric as discursive knowledge. Rhetoric is oriented to *eine Sache* (reality) itself, and is endowed with primitive experience of truth. Its own validity as discursive knowledge is not confined to scientific methodology, and is essential for natural and human sciences. Third, rhetoric as component of linguisticity. The ubiquity of rhetoric makes it an integral component of linguisticity. The capacity to use metaphors, symbols, allegory is an important aspect of our linguisticity, revealing the rhetorical quality in language. Lastly, hermeneutic theories inspired by rhetoric. Gadamer's rehabilitation of rhetoric is beneficial for the development of philosophical hermeneutics and humanist education in modern world.

Keywords: rhetoric, Gadamer, rehabilitation, philosophical hermeneutics, ethics

Introduction

The ancient history of rhetoric construes from pre-Socratic logos philosophy to the humanist tradition in Renaissance, with its fullest manifestation in Plato's dialectics and Aristotle's phronesis. Gadamer has reorganized ancient philosophical-rhetorical landscape in a way that highlights the kinship between rhetoric and hermeneutics in *Truth and Method* (1989). Rhetoric, for Gadamer, is omnipresent and inseparable with hermeneutics since both belong to the possibilities of humanity. Being able to speak, like being able to understand, is a natural human capacity that develops to the full without the conscious application of rules (Gadamer, 1997, p. 49). The ability to speak has the same breadth and universality as the ability to understand and interpret (Gadamer, 1981, p. 119). Gadamer explores the intrinsic relation among language, being, and truth. Rhetoric is revived as kind of counterpart to hermeneutics in human communication, and dialogue is regarded as an inherent human mode of understanding. The equivalence of rhetoric and hermeneutic lies in the fact that both share the same paradigm of truth and both reflect the essential status of being-in-the-world. Compared with logics, rhetoric and hermeneutics are featured with openness, innovation, and practical

mechanism. More importantly, Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics is derived from ancient rhetoric in terms of theoretical construction. In *Truth and Method*, Gadamer illustrated the educative function of rhetoric defended by Vico, and disclosed the ubiquity of rhetoric through Melanchthon's effort. Also, Gadamer positioned the development of hermeneutics as a continuation of rhetorical tradition. Rhetoric is not merely an art of speaking, and it is the universal form of human communication, which even today determines our social life in an incomparably more profound fashion than science does (Gadamer, 1986, p. 17). Inspired by Plato and humanist tradition, Gadamer views rhetoric as the fundamental capacity through which one knows to compose and engage in authentic communication, which allows for mutual understanding. In his late years of scholarship, Gadamer has developed a radically comprehensive view of rhetoric, revealing its epistemological and ethical nature.

Rhetoric as Ethics

Rhetoric is revived as ethics and the root of *phronesis* by Gadamer for mainly three reasons. Firstly, true rhetoric transcends polarizations of self-other through its dialogic structure, replacing the subject-object dualism with genuine hermeneutic understanding of human finitude. While human understanding is always embedded with its own historicity and sociality, to understand is to establish a Gadamerian's I-Thou relationship through dialogue or conversation, which is facilitated and regulated by rhetoric. Gadamer argues that the respect for the other constitutes precisely the defining feature of genuine dialogue, which is the basis of ethics (Gadamer, 2006a, p. 55). Different from scientific monologue, genuine dialogue makes it possible that the speaker and listener are equal participants in language game. They respect each other, empathize with each other, and are ready to challenge themselves. The dialogic structure of rhetoric, along with its logic of question and answer, promotes to a consensus between participants where individual and community illuminate their being at the same time. Gadamer claimed that all understanding, including historical understanding, is dialogic in character (Mootz III & Taylor, 2011, p. 90). In this perspective, dialogic character is prominent in both rhetoric and hermeneutics, and it also reveals the ethical dimension in rhetoric. Secondly, true rhetoric is composed of understanding and application as a whole, and they operate in hermeneutic experience rather than in a temporal sequence. Intrinsic to rhetoric is the elements of affection, passion, desire, and disposition, which constitute both the limits and power of our rhetorical acts. Human emotion is a necessity for knowledge acquisition. It defines who we are and what we can be; in other words, it is the basic mode of life itself. As a communicative event, rhetoric discloses the pragmatic, sociological, and cultural differentiations in our understanding, which have great impact on our daily performance. These rhetorical components are in accordance with presuppositions, prejudices, and fore-understanding in Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics, which he labels as the very condition of understanding. Lastly, rhetoric focuses on the possibilities and the contingent, rather than the provable and ahistorical, and the domain of rhetoric (conversation) constitute the basis for meaningful consensus in human interactions. To be in a conversation, however, means to be beyond oneself, to think with the other and to come back to oneself as if to another (Michelfelder & Palmer, 1989, p. 110). In an ethical sense, rhetoric is pursued for the sake of itself, and it is consistent with Gadamer's hermeneutic turn to Platonic dialectics. Genuine conversation is a fundamental way of being with another, in which qualities of authenticity, openness, and sincerity is most important for hermeneutic understanding.

Instead of power imposition, rhetoric makes it possible that we approach others with genuine openness, and that we voluntarily respect and listen to the otherness. More importantly, rhetoric leads to an outcome

which neither participant has anticipated, and they do not remain where they were after the conversation. From this perspective, it is educible that rhetoric functions in Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutic as an internal stimuli for suspicious and critical attitudes towards others. Accordingly, the prominent rhetorical character of Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics does not confine him to the ideal of a flattening consensus. In hermeneutics, the dialogical ideal is always incomplete and ongoing, but the commitment to such an ideal is not an illusion. In response to Habermas's argumentation, Gadamer claims that only a narrow view of rhetoric sees it as mere technique or even a mere instrument for social manipulation. It is in truth an essential aspect of all reasonable behavior (Gadamer, 2004, p. 571). It is suggested that practice or application is inseparable from rhetoric, because any reasonable behavior is always a rhetoric event. The intimacy between rhetoric and practice renders Gadamer's hermeneutics into a practical philosophy. When we speak, we tend to persuade others into certain actions; when we understand, we adjust our behaviors in different situations. Thus, rhetoric is not only about speaking, but also about doing. In Gadamer's point of view, rhetoric is not the synonym for ideological domination. Rhetoric, as well as understanding, is regarded as the human mode of existence. Rhetoric is the starting point. The whole of ethics is rhetoric, and the idea that *phronesis* is rhetoric already occurs in Aristotle (Gadamer, 2006a, p. 53). Hermeneutic understanding, accompanied by "fusion of horizons", is not an identifiable, repeatable result, but only maintains itself in ongoing dialogues. As John Arthos put it, Gadamer understood the key insight of ancient rhetoric to be that reason is embodied, that *logos* is thinking and speaking, and that rhetoric is the locus of social discursivity (Arthos, 2007, pp. 7-8). The whole of human interaction is founded and progressed in rhetoric. Moreover, Gadamer argues that rhetoric has the ethic potential to develop "*sensus communis*", which is of decisive significance for living. What is most enlightening about the rhetoric-ethic argument is that rhetoric is capable of reconciling the tension between individual and community, and establishing reciprocal relation in any specific situation.

According to Gadamer, the logic of question and answer is not confined to the domain of spoken language; it extends to the width of hermeneutic experience. For Socrates and Plato, the logic of question and answer is the rhetorical manifestation in their pursuit of truth. Plato strongly rejects Sophists' monologue and endeavors to decriminalize true rhetoric on a philosophical basis. His attempt to combine rhetoric with dialectics has great impact on Gadamer's view of rhetoric. The logic of question and answer not only functions in language games among participants, but also regulates and promotes our understanding of historical heritages, such as literature and art. In Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics, the written words and their meanings are not objected or conceptualized from the readers; instead, they coexist in a broader network of common sense, beliefs, and emotions. The written work proposes certain question to the readers and at the same time it is always an answer to a prior question. In this way, the logic of question and answer contributes to the fuse of horizons. In his defense of "prejudices" as conditions of understanding, Gadamer actually revives the necessity and legitimacy of emotion in rhetoric. Emotion (or *pathos*) is one of the three components in Aristotle's rhetoric, and is inseparable from logic in Gadamer's opinion. Gadamer's explorations of "*bildung*", "*taste*", and "*sensus communis*" reveal a strong preference for emotion in the realm of understanding. As operation of human capacities, rhetoric responds inwardly to events and situations through emotion and reason. In Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics, rhetoric involves deliberation on particular and contingent means. It should be noted that rhetoric is not only about speaking well; it is also about doing well. The eloquent man deliberates on better means to an end, and the end itself is a practical good which can be obtained through speaking. The art of speaking well contains the quality of deliberation and prudence, which are integral to better understandings and

better practices. From this perspective, what a rhetorician needs to know is what a man of prudence needs to know. In the sphere of the possible, variable, and contingent, rhetoric deals with whether something should be or should not be, and whether something should be done in this way or that way. Taking into account the ethical dimension of rhetoric, Gadamer tends to construct rhetoric and hermeneutics as practical philosophy.

Rhetoric as Discursive Knowledge

Inspired by Perelman, Nietzsche, and Heidegger, Gadamer reestablished the legitimate and independent value of rhetorical truth as discursive knowledge. In Gadamer's point of view, rhetoric has its own epistemological dimension free of external criterion, and he denies explicitly that truth can be equated with objectivity or certainty. This paper investigates Gadamer's rhetorical knowledge in three aspects. Firstly, rhetorical exchange is oriented to *eine Sache* (the whole thing or reality) itself, generating understanding of being-in-the-world with its own validity. Compared with the truth we obtain in mathematics, rhetorical knowledge (or discursive knowledge) is historical, dynamic, and productive of critical insight, but such differences do not put them in an antagonistic position. Gadamer identifies two forms of knowledge, namely, scientific knowledge and rhetorical (discursive) knowledge:

Science, which is power and which claims to be able to control things, is only one form of knowledge. There is another form of knowing, however, and it is this that I would like to defend: [it is the capacity] to come up with the right word at the right moment, this kind of exactness itself. This was the ancient, honorable concept of rhetoric. (Gadamer, 2006b, p. 96)

It is suggested that rhetoric is an integral approach to understanding which is not only central in the realm of human sciences, but also important to natural science inquiries. These two forms of knowledge are not separable in a strict sense. Gadamer's defense of rhetorical knowledge is not intended to disparage or exclude science; instead, it emphasizes the limitation of scientific knowledge: How can science and methodology domination be justified in human affairs? The differences of these two forms of knowledge should not be reduced to that of logos and emotion, since rhetoric is not opposite to pure reason. Rhetoric is a logic of images and metaphors, a logic of invention and not deduction (Grassi, 2001, p. 99). The abstraction and instrumentalization in modern society is neither sufficient nor appropriate for revealing *eine Sache*. Misunderstanding is the result of misuse of knowledge, and the true blindness does not reside in this knowledge itself but in the fact that one regards it as the whole of knowledge (Gadamer, 2006b, p. 96). Our mode of existence is something that could be fully (not permanently) displayed in discursive knowledge, and it cannot be deduced.

Secondly, rhetoric is endowed with primitive experience of truth, and it justifies philosophical hermeneutics as a self-critical, truth-oriented enterprise. In spite of the controversy over rhetoric's epistemic status, Gadamer treats discursive (or rhetorical) knowledge as primitive, irreducible, and unanticipated truth, and his conceptions of "illumination" "meaning" function as immanent criterion for this kind of truth. Gadamer is not alone in proposing rhetorical truth and many other rhetoricians and hermeneutists have expressed the same view. Perelman asserts that rhetoric is reason; John Angus Campbell views rhetoric as synonym for practical reason; Cicero criticizes the separation of speech from thought, and he considers it absurd to differentiate the ability of thinking wisely and speaking gracefully (Cicero, 1970, p. 209); Nietzsche argues that knowledge is social and intersubjectivist; Brummett contends that truth which is rhetorically made encourages choice and awareness of alternative realities (Brummett, 1976, p. 40); Foucault believes that a discursive

formation is the consistent pattern of discursive use that creates knowledge, or truth, for a culture (Borchers, 2011, p. 285). In the view of practical philosophy, rhetoric resembles a lot with practical knowledge. For one thing, they both have a reflective form; that is, knowing something is simultaneously knowing oneself. For another, they are both internalized. This kind of knowledge has the power to shape passions and mould desires. In this way, the knowledge mastered becomes component of our personality structure. To some extent, Gadamer is open-minded towards multiple truths in rhetoric. For him, truth, scientific, or rhetoric, is always a finitely grasped truth. This argument can also be seen in his rehabilitation of "tradition" and "prejudice" in *Truth and Method*. In the epistemological sense, tradition and prejudice do not necessarily fall into subjectivism, and they contribute to a better self-understanding. Also, scientific knowledge underemphasizes individuality. What we obtain in rhetorical knowledge is only a partial truth, but a truth about eine Sache nevertheless. In consistent with the rhetoric-ethics identification, Gadamer views the Aristotelian notion of phronesis as a model of hermeneutic rationality, which suggests that rhetoric functions as both the medium and manifestation of discursive knowledge. In Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics, rhetorical knowledge can also be regarded as a matter of interpretation, which is to be worked out concretely in different contexts. Discursive knowledge is not restricted or verified by method, and it is not completely within the control of rhetorical participants.

Lastly, rhetorical communication is an exchange of words, emotions, and thoughts at the same time, and more importantly, it tends to shape us as intercultural collaborators. In this way, the discursive knowledge generated in rhetoric is a knowledge that takes full advantage of our own limitations and particularities. This is what is lacking today and what Gadamer defends against the monological situation in modern world. Rhetorical communication here is not confined to human interactions, but includes the Gadamerian I-Thou interaction between an interpreter and a text, an art work or ordinary events. Rhetoric means the whole of worldly knowledge, with all its contents, that are stated in language and interpreted in a language community (Gadamer, 2000, p. 24). In Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics, rhetorical or discursive knowledge also serves for his anti-foundationalist argument. The truth of a judgment in rhetoric is always susceptible to changes and possibilities. Hence, we can and do make definite judgments, but there can be no decontextualized way of doing so. In this regard, we cannot verify our beliefs on any transcendental or metaphysical entities. This argument challenges the absoluteness of premise in pure logic, and brings up reasonable suspect towards the limitation of scientific knowledge. Gadamer explains his perspective on the true sense of Platonic-Aristotelian rhetoric: It's really a matter of our actually being able to speak to others, and this means that we must appeal to their emotions and their passions in order to reveal what we ourselves are persuaded by and what otherwise (through the usual methods of proof) could not appear as such (Arthos, 2008, p. 177). Cicero claims that a speaker's understanding of the subject generates new words and ideas, linking style to knowledge. Human emotion is not adverse to knowledge (rhetorical and scientific), because they cannot be separated from each other and they cannot be separated from the speaker. Kenneth Burke regards rhetoric as identification; Michel Foucault sees rhetoric as discursive practice, which includes the discursive form of knowledge; Ernesto Grassi argues that rhetoric logic is superior to rational logic because the former conveys meanings with their human connotation. Gadamer also indicates the inventive nature of rhetoric, and the paradigm of rhetoric in his philosophical hermeneutics discloses our beliefs and practices by means of narratives, tropes, and examples. Moreover, by uncovering one's desires, rhetoric could also give rise to self-knowledge as participants reflect on what persuades them to action.

Rhetoric as Component of Linguisticity

In Gadamer's hermeneutic experience, rhetoric is not merely viewed as interactions between participants; it genuinely revolves around language and its referent objects. For Gadamer, *eine Sache* (the thing itself) is finitely disclosed through the lens of linguistically mediated dialogue, and rhetorical-hermeneutical activity is conversational in nature. The ubiquity and mechanism of rhetoric make it an integral component of linguisticity as well as an essential characteristic of language. Rhetoric allows participants to truly fall into the language game, and promotes their understanding in an unexpected manner. In truth hermeneutic experience extends as far as reasonable beings' openness to dialogue does (Gadamer, 2004, p. 570). Gadamer's "linguistic turn" in his philosophical hermeneutics challenges the instrumentalization of language, and finds in language an ontological dimension. To some extent, we do not use language, rather language uses us; we do not own language, rather we are always encompassed by language. Gadamer argues that language is the real medium of human being and common understanding, and the rhetorical components in every language enable one to present something as it is and as it is becoming. In this way, the rhetorical character of language is what makes language function in the first place. We are already biased in our language through its linguistic interpretation of the world, and rhetoric is not limited to the syntactic or semantic aspects of language; it is something language comes up with in its true presentation. Language is rhetorical in essence. Rhetoric words reveal beings as it is and present truth in an unfiltered manner. Gadamer's language view is coherent with that of Socrates and Plato in terms of its function. In *Phaedo*, word is regarded as the medium between perceptible things and intangible truth, which protects human souls from the blinding light of truth. Socrates's philosophical turn to logos highlights the priority of words, especially spoken words. For him, logos consists of idea (thought) and word, which are interdependent on each other. Nietzsche also believes that language is the production of rhetorical art, and he identifies language with rhetoric. In the act of saying, we bring into life a particular formulation of thought, of one's self. It is original, created in the instant of expression. We experience another's ideas as linguistic forms, and these forms direct our awareness of particular network of ideas. Language carries fore-meanings that shape us, but we can still question the fore-knowledge through the rhetorical nature of language. In his late years of scholarship, Gadamer believes everything that we translate into language is rhetoric, and he opposes the idea of "metaphysical language" since language could never be isolated from its rhetorical situation.

Gadamer argues that language is the basic mode of human existence, and the most productive use of language is rhetoric. It is clear that communication is based on linguisticity, and communication is only a potentiality until it is given intelligible, concrete shape in rhetoric: as particular names, metaphors, images, reasoning and narrative structures, etc. Gadamer views language as the most telling form of givenness in human life, and the givenness quality of language manifests in dialogue and conversation. In terms of Saussure's distinction, Gadamer emphasizes the element of parole rather than langue, and he defines parole as the speaking word in function. Moreover, in his philosophical hermeneutics, Gadamer discussed in detail the linguistic functions of "allegory", "symbol", "metaphor" in spoken language, which initially belongs to the sphere of talk, of formal rhetoric. As a rhetorical figure, "allegory" displays something subtle through tangible words, and in such a way that the intended meaning is understood. This rhetorical character of language contributes to the fact that language is always revealing and concealing something at the same time. "Symbol" is conceptualized by Gadamer as meaningful, illuminating relation between two objects, and the relation is not based on causation.

As for “metaphor”, Gadamer argues that it functions as the basis of the life of language and its logical productivity (Gadamer, 2004, p. 466), which enables language to uncover things in their similarities and differences. In Gadamer’s phenomenological orientation, language is not a reproduction of given meanings, but a coming to the language of matter itself. Metaphor is far more than a rhetorical figure; it is also a judgment or statement. Metaphors connect words with insights and perspectives, which are embedded in life situations. For Gadamer, hermeneutic power of metaphor comes from imagination and its creative ability. Metaphor has the potential to turn existing meanings into new meanings. Also, metaphor has the potential to create a new view on language and a new mode of existence for human beings. This is exactly what Gadamer calls the fundamental metaphoricity of language: to regard the metaphorical use of a word as not its real sense is the prejudice of a theory of logic that is alien to language (Gadamer, 1989, p. 429). In a sense, language is never free of metaphors, and the capacity to use metaphors is an important aspect of our linguisticity. The “givenness” quality of language lies in its “actuality”, and the “actuality” means we must engage ourselves in exchange of speech (oral and written), which is the true sense of Socratic-Platonic rhetoric revived by Gadamer.

In contrast to scientific monologue, rhetoric corresponds to human linguisticity in that it deals with the production, reception, and interpretation of discourses. In light of human finitude, rhetoric is inherent in our speaking with others and in mutual understanding. Gadamer also acknowledges the validity of non-linguistic understanding by gestures, since language in words is only one concretion of human linguisticity. Gadamer’s hermeneutic model for understanding is dialogue, a dialogue between the self and the otherness in various forms. In *Truth and Method*, Gadamer establishes an ontological dimension of hermeneutics in his discussion of universal linguisticity. The linguisticity here is referred to as inner conversation which is approximate to Platonic rhetoric. Hermeneutic universality is extended to rhetoric since it also depends upon the universality of linguisticity. It is through rhetoric that the illocutionary and perlocutionary dimensions of language are brought to light. The inseparability between language and rhetoric in Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics is evident to other scholars. The rhetoric character of language is closely connected to human historicity and linguisticity. Taking this into consideration, Gadamer rejects a simple dualism between linguistically mediated knowledge and a non-linguistic reality. Here, once again, it reveals the unjustified dualism between logos and emotion, rhetoric and logic. In this view, rhetoric functions as a limit and a condition for human understanding. Gadamer regards linguistic accounts as containing ideal reality within themselves in such a way that language is not a mere sign of a secondary instrumental status, but the very forum of intelligence and thought. According to Gadamer, the real task of thought is to find the structure of intelligible reality in speech itself (Gadamer, 1946, p. 94). For him, reason is inherently linguistic and language is inherently rational. This view largely attributes to the rhetoric character of language and rhetorical knowledge. Gadamer claims that each plausible linguistic view contains all other “true” linguistic views (even if they are contrary to each other), and this is not merely an metaphoric expression; it brings up the common domain of rhetoric and hermeneutics, that is, the domain of the just and unjust, the proper and improper, the worthy and unworthy. In his career of philosophical hermeneutics, Gadamer has gradually shifted his attention from interpretation of written texts to that of spoken discourses. In this shift, he finally claims the unlimited ubiquity of rhetoric and language. Conceptualization depends on rhetoric, and so does understanding. Thus, both forms of knowledge rely on rhetoric to be perceived. For Gadamer, human linguisticity includes words, gestures, and other forms which have in common the expression of desire, emotion, and fore-knowledge. In all these forms of linguisticity,

rhetoric is of vital importance, and it is non-neutral in nature.

Hermeneutic Theories Inspired by Rhetoric

Gadamer insists on the original relation in the nature of rhetoric and hermeneutics, for both are human beings' natural competence and they are developed without reflective consciousness. Gadamer maintains that rhetoric has laid great foundation for the generation of hermeneutics, and advocates the historical and theoretical consistency between rhetoric and hermeneutics. Beginning with the Sophists, rhetoric has provided to the living world persuasion, and more importantly, reasonable judgment and practical wisdom. Rhetoric enables oneself to collaborative deliberation, and true rhetoric (in Plato's philosophical sense) shares great resemblance with dialectic. Rhetoric also strives for truth, although rhetorical truth is not measured by accuracy. In rhetoric, the speaker and the audience are not related in the subject-object way, rather, they are equally involved in the language game, and have the power to affect each other. Gadamer has claimed that Plato's rhetoric reveals the intrinsic relation among rhetoric, understanding and transition of knowledge, and the organic structure of rhetoric corresponds to hermeneutic circle. Plato in *Phaedrus* emphasized the anatomy of speech, which revives the principle of *dispositio* in traditional rhetoric. Moreover, it is the direct inspiration of part-whole hermeneutic circle. Our understanding is always focused on a certain topic, and the topic is only acceptable when it is organized in a meaningful unity. Meanings put into play by self-interpreting speakers and actors find their fulfillment in a reference to a life-world (Jost & Hyde, 1997, p. 135). Hermeneutic circle unfolds itself not only in part-whole structure of speech, but also in the circulation of historicity between the interpreter and the text. The interpreter has to listen what the text tells him/her, and at the same time, the interpreter has the freedom to choose one of the possibilities in the meaning domain based on his/her prejudices. The relationship between the interpreter and the text is much like that of the speaker and the audience, in a way that both the interpreter and the audience are engaged and called into meaning construction. They are not passive receivers of messages, but active participants in speaking and doing. Topics in rhetoric are mostly about things which could present themselves in other ways, that is to say, things of probability or plausibility. Topics in hermeneutic understanding convert into "topoi" or "copia", and they provide legal places (which change with specific circumstances) for horizon-fusion. In listening and speaking, one could change his/her vision about oneself, about others, about life-world, and understands more properly about his/her position in life-world. Gadamer also speaks highly of Aristotle's rhetoric, who defines rhetoric as a competence rather than a technique. Gadamer believes that hermeneutics becomes urgent through Aristotle's rhetoric, and his division of knowledge bears logical starting points for philosophical hermeneutics.

Hermeneutic situation and the temporal structure of understanding correspond to the rhetoric concept of "kairos", which cannot be simply reduced to some principles or regulations. Kairos in rhetoric is only productive in concrete speaking practices; in other words, it works best in hermeneutic situations. Kairos is not shown in the speaker's conscious reactions to rhetorical situations (judgment, evaluation, and adaption); instead, it is more of a spontaneous force based on intuition. Considering Gadamer's critique for subjectivity, it is reasonable to infer that he views the speaker and the audience, the interpreter and the text (author) as equal participants in language game, and each should have good will towards one another. We can only create a sense of "kairos" when interacting with other people or historical heritages, and it refuses any unconditional process of knowledge into abstraction or generalization. In kairos, rhetoric invokes a suspicion about absolute knowledge and reveals other possible forms of knowledge. Compared with speaking, reading and writing is

characterized by the temporal distance between the participants, but it does not obstruct understanding. The reader and the writer have become more aware of each other's existence, and they tend to raise more meaningful questions with the absence of the other part. Rhetoric allows for different persuasive styles and techniques, which may receive different reactions even from the same audience. In the same way, different understandings about the same topic could be all reasonable and co-existent in life-world, so one of rhetoric and hermeneutic tasks is to improve the openness, tolerance, and solidarity in human interactions. Since people with different understandings should not necessarily be considered stupid or insincere, Gadamer has in a sense revived the concept of "kairos" or prudence in hermeneutics. And this is one of the reasons why Gadamer strives for different understandings instead of better understandings. From this perspective, the unity or integrity of understanding Gadamer proposes should not be seen as some metaphysical ideal, and it is the unity where each individual's personality can be recognized and put into historical effect. Inspired by classic rhetoric, Gadamer in his later years views philosophical hermeneutics as practical philosophy. Also, the appeal for emotion in rhetoric indicates practical transition from the speaker to the audience, and it conforms with Heidegger and Gadamer's calling for conscience. Apart from kairos, the doctrine of "imitatio" represents the intersection between the production of persuasive arguments and the understanding of texts. Imitatio is not the mere repetition or logical reproduction of something in the text; instead, it should be grasped as a dynamic process which allows historical heritages to serve as common grounds for future rhetorical production. Other rhetoric proprieties work together to develop a faculty for judging when, where, and how to apply a strategy appropriately into practical cases. So it is no wonder that Gadamer views understanding as the same process of explanation and application.

Traditional rhetoric is divided into three stages in Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics: classic rhetoric, medieval rhetoric, and humanist rhetoric. Gadamer's studies in Plato and Aristotle have enabled him to see the long-neglected value of rhetoric and its conformity with hermeneutics. The rationality of rhetoric also provides the validity for hermeneutic truth, and plays an important role in critical function. Invention in rhetoric does not necessarily mean the discovery of new topics or things, but involves new understandings of historical heritage and its new meanings. In this way, rhetoric and hermeneutic are the converse process of the same existing form disclosed in our life-world. Rhetoric, in my opinion, has gone beyond methodological form and obtained an ontological dimension in Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. Ontological hermeneutics avoids every form of subjectivism, in which the interpreter and the author become effective collaborators in a certain situation. One is always aware of various contingencies at play in communication, and meaning is what the text tells us about a subject. Besides, the awakening of affects in classic rhetoric is fully recognized as a hermeneutic principle in Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics, and effect is revived as intrinsic to all discourse. When it goes to understanding, every reader or interpreter has to keep in mind the "scopus" or purpose of the whole text. The encounter with otherness is valued in rhetoric as much as in hermeneutics, for it constructs the concrete situation where anything can happen. Based on the relation between the speaker and the audience in rhetoric, Gadamer has established an I-You relation in hermeneutics. The I-You relation is kind of subject-subject structure rather than a logical subject-object relation, in which game players are in a moral partnership. For "I", "You" are not a tool to a purpose but the purpose itself. Also, rhetoric has the potential for invention, novelty, and creativity, and it supplements the emphasis placed on tradition in Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics, making a balance between the past and the future. In this way, Gadamer is confident to claim that hermeneutic understanding speaks from the past and calls for the future. Gadamer opposes methodology and its domination

in modern society, but he does not oppose method in its own sense. What Gadamer advocates is that we should better retreat from the abstract level of demonstrative logic and return to rhetoric, in which logos and pathos are both effective in the arrangement and orientation of our life-world.

Conclusion

Influenced by Aristotle and Heidegger, Gadamer sees logos as language to a large extent, and language here is referred to its full realization in dialogue or conversation. In this sense, logos is equivalent to the art of talking and understanding rather than pure reason. In Gadamer's viewpoints, speaking is doing at the same time; in other words, the act of choosing is the aim of choosing well itself. In hermeneutic understanding, we belong to the history and narratives of our choices. Rhetoric and hermeneutics would achieve their aims when they brought the partners in interaction to a different view, which is open to discussion. The fact that the interpreter must listen to what the text says indicates the premise that the text has knowledge of the subject, which is consistent with the definition of true rhetoric. Rhetoric as an art and philosophy has played a great role in Gadamer's ontological hermeneutics and practical philosophy. It not only provides theoretical foundations for the emergence of hermeneutics in a methodological level, but also reveals life experience and other forms (possibilities) of knowledge in rhetorical situation. The historical consistency in the development of rhetoric and hermeneutics indicates that they interact with each other in an essential way and should not be treated as opposites of dialectics. Beginning from Plato, the philosophy of rhetoric strives for truth, beauty, and goodness in comprehensive and dynamic language games, which is converted into hermeneutic situation and the temporal structure of understanding. Rhetoric and hermeneutic are natural human competence interdependent on each other, and they take into considerations what happened in the past, what is happening right now, and what is to be happen in the future. Gadamer's discussions about historical and aesthetic experience restored the ontology of the work of art and established reconstruction as hermeneutic task, which could be inferred from the inventive property of rhetoric.

In Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics, the point of rhetoric is to take human beings as ends in themselves and to reach a communal sense as far as possible. Gadamer's rehabilitation of rhetoric is inherently consistent with Socratic-Platonic rhetoric, Aristotle's practical philosophy, humanist tradition, Nietzsche's rhetoric theory, and Heidegger's hermeneutic ontology. Most of Gadamer's hermeneutic concepts are interdependent on his understanding of rhetoric, and the functions of rhetoric help justify hermeneutics as truth-searching, ethical-oriented enterprise. Gadamer's view of rhetoric lacks a sense of theoretical and systematic structure, but it still deserves further attention. In our modern world of scientific and methodological monologue, it is especially important to recognize the epistemological and ethical values of rhetoric. Rhetoric should not be reduced to an art of speaking; it is about understanding the self, the otherness, and how to be in the world.

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