

# Political Satire in the Chinese Blogosphere: The Case of Wang Xiaofeng

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## Abstract

This paper is built on the study of one key blog—Wang Xiaofeng’s No Guess (2006-2011) to explore how a Chinese intellectual uses his satirical skills in the blogosphere, how his blog reshapes the form of political culture, and how the blogosphere through such interventions proceeds in the development of political communications in China. Two key issues are addressed in the paper. Firstly, drawing on the concept of “blogging culture”, the author argues that blogging has potentially reconfigured political information around people’s everyday lives, offering alternative modes of “public talk”. The case of Wang Xiaofeng shows that satire can be used to make fun of the state, policies, and established ideologies, improving a previously restricted communicative environment toward more open. Secondly, the rise in the value placed on individualism in China, and the rise of peer-to-peer media mean that bloggers who pursue self-expression simultaneously through such self-expression. In other words, Wang Xiaofeng’s No Guess blog demonstrates that individual opinions across the blogosphere have implicitly challenged political discourse; however, they always have to struggle with an ongoing censorship, negotiate an unstable discursive space and thus, can only enjoy a limited success.

## Keywords

Blogging, China, satirical blog, political expression, established ideologies

In this paper, the author sets out to explore the following questions: What are features of satirical blogs? To what extent have satirical blogs transformed the ways in which political communications are conducted in China? To answer these questions, the author will take a popular blogger Wang Xiaofeng, who uses the pseudonym *Dai Sange Biao* (Wearing Three Watches) and names his blog “*Buxu Lianxiang*” (No Guess<sup>1</sup>) as an example. The author sees Wang’s No Guess as a distinctive model of satirical blog, as it merges irony with disrespect, showing the changing horizons of freedom of expression in China.

The author’s argument in this paper is that Wang Xiaofeng’s blog in its various forms has resulted in a popularity ensuring that satire is a “safety measure” (e.g., tolerance/regulation of free speech, allowance

for/suppression of free speech, within not beyond the limitations of free speech) in political criticism. In other words, she treats Wang’s satire as an attitude of a blogger’s indirect critique and denial, to borrow from Hans Steinmüller (2011: 25), “to say... something, and to mean something else, and possibly the opposite”. The author also argues that the growth of satirical bloggers has mobilized support in practicing political expression; it remains the case that

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this expression is capped within what is seen as acceptable limits under state authoritarianism. Take the No Guess blog, its use of implicit or coded meaning for satirizing is not aimed at seeking political changes, nor is it intent to explicitly attack or undermine the existing political system. It is indeed, though, used to avoid political risks.

The setup of this paper is as follows. The author will firstly outline a theoretical framework, which makes a comparison between the Western perspectives of satire and the Chinese one. Considered in terms of how it functions in the hands of political commentators, and in terms of how it is distributed among different media forms, it can be said that satire has moved from its Western “aggressive origins” (Rawson 1984: 5) to become a form of entertainment in contemporary China.

Secondly, the author will give a short introduction to the author of *Buxu Lianxiang*—Wang Xiaofeng. Thirdly, she will raise specific questions about *Buxu Lianxiang* and provide methodological steps. As Wang’s blogging contains various forms, analysis of blogging samples becomes the fourth step as well as a core focus in this paper. The aim, apart from illustrating how the blogger expresses his viewpoints, is basically to explore how Wang Xiaofeng makes fun of Chinese authority. In other words, satire offered by Wang Xiaofeng is proven as an alternative approach for freer expression. However, as she will argue in this paper, Wang’s satire is connected with his passive attitude that only tends to play with rather than breakdown established ideologies. He is not willing to build something that is politically new.

## **SATIRE: ITS HISTORY AND ITS POLITICAL FUNCTION IN CHINA**

Satire can be defined as “the use of humour, irony, exaggeration, or ridicule to expose and criticize people’s stupidity or vices, particularly in the context of contemporary politics and other topical issues”

(Cited in Oxford Dictionaries<sup>2</sup>). It covers a wide range of historical functions and transformations that connect the term with “humour”, “critique”, and “politics”. In the eighteenth century Europe, satire was commonly classified as Juvenalian<sup>3</sup> (e.g., William Gifford, Charles Churchill) and Horatian<sup>4</sup> (e.g., William Combe, Christopher Anstey). The two forms of satire contain humorous material that makes people laugh.

Authors of Horatian satires are likely to laugh at errors and fool people in their speech (Duff 1964: 3; Dyer 1997: 57). However, their laughs and fools, as Maria Plaza argues, are serious ironies they tend to claim.

Trusting the speaker in... satires—the satiric persona—many critics have taken... statements at face value and, as a consequence, see humour as a separable, “entertaining” ingredient, which the leader would have to see through in order to grasp the serious kernel of the satire. (Plaza 2006: 1)

The Juvenalian satire is a type of “true satire”, if borrowing from Dyer (1997: 57), ridicule with pessimism. Comparatively, the Horatian satire aims at “milder attack” (Dyer 1997: 57), with playful critique.

In a sense, satire is recognized by its ironic attitude. A well-known example of irony is from Shakespeare’s satiric drama *Julius Caesar* (1599), when Mark Anthony says “Brutus is an honorable man”, he actually means the opposite.

In addition to irony, satire can also be achieved through the use of sarcasm. It requires satire, to borrow from Charles Knight (2004: 201), “able to... offend”, or radical (Dyer 1997).

So far as satire appeared under different definitions in literature history in the West, it is in large part a mixture of irony and multi-voiced presentation. The latter considers satire as “a discursive practice” (Simpson 2003: 8), performing discourse as an essential context for bringing about broad implications, especially for promoting the changing landscape of politics.

In the modern era, satire continues to have a role in Western media productions. Cartoons (i.e., *The Simpsons*), TV shows (i.e., *The Daily Show With Jon Stewart* and *The Colbert Report*, see Holbert et al. 2011; *Have I Got News for You*, Hislop, cited in Goncalves, September 12, 2011) and comedies, all offer rich satirical potential. Particularly, each form possesses a variety of political subjects, increasingly turns to satire as a vehicle for political information, and is recognized as having some power. Stephen Wagg (1998: 256) notes that the American liberal comedians' satirizing political leaders have "challenged the political and cultural constraints" of the mainstream news media.

The jokes the new comedians cracked therefore, simultaneously, raised questions outside of their immediate subject matter. Thus, for example, Bruce and Barr's reference to the assassination of President Kennedy, beside being a comment on politics or class or the social experience of women or whatever, is also an assertion of the right to freedom of speech (Wagg 1998: 260).

In a sense, either conveys its themes or its values, the sketch of the use of satire and the politics of style in the West means as well, a variety of criticism with sharp sarcasm, irony and ridicule, preserving its joke, humour and comedy is on one side, accompanying a deep serious thinking about human society, is on the other.

Similar to the West, China also has a long history of satire. Back in the mid-eighteenth century, Wu Jingzi's ironic *Rulin Waishi* (The Unofficial History of Scholars<sup>5</sup>) criticized a highly arbitrary examination system that rewarded candidates (e.g., Fan Jin, Ma Chunshang) who are infatuated with exams and a desire for titles (Shang 2003; Slupski 1989). In Wu's work, satire was directed toward a series of "reputations" such as "career, fame, wealth, and rank", to borrow from Timothy Wong (2003: 161). These "reputations" were deeply rooted in the Confucian-based ritual ideology. However, to

maintain a purity of reward is difficult as it is tightly tied to ritual acts (Epstein 2005: 179), seemly in a satirical commentary. Thus, Wu became an early satirical writer in Chinese history.

During the New Culture Movement<sup>6</sup> period (1917-1923), Lu Xun (1881-1936) appeared as a remarkable representative of satirists. Lu's realist fiction and topical essays exposed the ills, impotence, and inhumanity of an old Chinese society, operating as "a mirror of Chinese people's defective selves and the nation they constituted" (Chow 2007: 423), thus, the purpose of satire in Lu Xun's writing is to seek "a way to open up a new space not only for reshaping, retrieving the past but also, more critically, for engaging the present" (Tang 1992: 1232).

The Chinese literary satire of pre-modern and early modern times is closer to the Juvenalian tradition in the West. Though it poked fun at institutions or individuals, its tones were dark, and used metaphors as a style—Wu Jingzi's satire being a case in point. He began with ritual ideology as a symbol of the resistance to the Qing Dynasty officials. Lu Xun's satire addressed sarcasm. He drew largely at the level of individual experience, creating characters that appeared as ridiculous on face value yet implicating them as specific national. Embodied in the satirical spirit of the two writers is an indication of an attitude of the "resistance" of both the ideology and the regime, along with a helpless emotion. They have become legendary among Chinese intellectuals.

Following the founding of the Chinese Communist Party (1921), *Manhua* (cartoons) were used as an alternative medium for distributing satirical material. During the first Civil Revolution period (1922-1927), cartoons were regularly used to create an anti-imperialist sentiment, while becoming "strong voice to support the Soviet (Union)" (Tian and Chen 2010) during the Second Civil Revolution period (1927-1935). Later, its satirical form was used to ridicule anyone believed to be harmful to "the people". Harm being guided and defined in part by Mao's 1942

“Mass Line” talks during the Yan’an Rectification Movement (1942-1944<sup>7</sup>).

Satirical cartoons during China’s revolutionary times illustrate a connection between satire and ideology. They function less metaphorically than the Wu Jingzi and Lu Xun literature and instead become a major strategy for political propaganda, to borrow from Fletcher (1987: 3), “between (the) dialogical and monological”.

Satire being deployed as propaganda becomes a recurring trend in the twentieth century China, constituting both restraint and control in Chinese history. During Mao’s most powerful years, satire based on cartoons gave way to *Dazibao* (big-character posters) (Leijonhufvud 1990), reaching its zenith during the Cultural Revolution Era (1966-1976) (see Figure 1).

*Dazibao* was aimed at showing support for Mao’s leadership and China’s socialist project, which included opposing bourgeois ideology, and preventing China from capitalist road. Officials or intellectuals who did not follow Mao’s guideline would immediately become the object of attack.

Satire within Mao’s governance can be loosely regarded as one of the formations of a discursive practice, however, this discursive formation is aimed at political fight. It is politically aggressive, usually employing, borrowing from Fletcher (1987: 8), “the use... of invective and mockery”. Its critical character remains, though; this critique is not used for individual expression, rather, it must be guided by “the correct political line”, to borrow from He Zhou (2009: 48) for achieving a series of political targets in different times.

While the Western perspective of political satire relies on its diverse political dimensions flexibly giving rise to the ways people judge values and post comments in matters of governance, the use of political satire and the masking of social critiques in China seem to be far from the Western styles. However, since the advent of the reform policies,

China has been gradually giving expression to individuals. Satire has been increasingly created in many places with forms such as *Liumang* (hooligan) literature, *Wenhua Shan* (cultural shirts), and the later on online *E Gao* (spoof), all of which greatly change the way of political communication in China. For the benefit of the reader, the author will briefly outline and define these three forms of contemporary Chinese satire.

### *Hooligan Literature*

The term hooligan in Chinese context translates as either *Pizi* or *Liumang*, as Liu Dongchao explains:

*Liumang* in Chinese directs to those goofs around, doing evil and searching for trouble. The hooligan culture, to some extent, represents a marginal culture, measured by anti-rules and anti-regulations, destroys legality, normality, and reasonability, and “harms” to official language (February 2002).

The beginnings of a contemporary hooligan literature can be marked by the publication of Wang Shuo’s writing in the late 1980s. Wang represented a new generation who spent their childhood “in (the) both chaotic and mendacious” Cultural Revolution Era only to then grow up in “the consumer culture of the reform age with a few of the ideological, intellectual, or emotional qualms experienced by older generations” (Barme 1992: 24-25).

Many of Wang’s works [e.g., *Wan Zhu* (The Operator), 1988, *Yidian Zhengjing Meiyou* (An Attitude), 1989, and *Qianwan Bie Ba Wo Dangren* (No-man’s Land), 1989] used “play” as core feature and were regarded as an inversion of official language. This playful attitude appeared in both the speaker and the audience, to borrow from Yao Yusheng (2004: 435), enabled Wang Shuo’s work to “defy all the authorities, to challenge and subvert the dominant discourse”, and to “have fun”.

### *Cultural Shirts*

*Wenhua Shan* (cultural shirts) appeared in Beijing in



**Figure 1.** An Example of *Dazibao* (Big-Character Poster).

the early 1990s. The designer Kong Yongqian is arguably the most famous producer at that moment. Kong's *Wenhua Shan* was designed with his handwritings, dressed in jeans and T-shirts, and sold in Beijing's street and clothing stalls. It had three features. The first was Kong's frequent usage of homophones. In one of Kong's designs, the term *Kong Long* (dinosaur) was written in its homophonous form *Kong Long*. The former is a surname of the Confucian clan (*Kong*), who is traditionally seen as the father of the philosophical school of Confucianism. The latter refers to Dragon (*Long*), symbolizing powers, along with strength and luck in Chinese culture. Here the *Kong Long* T-shirt implied a plural resistance: to get rid of Confucianism on one side, and to refuse to be a dragon on the other.

The second feature was Kong's creative quotation of slogans. For instance, Kong designed a T-shirt,

copying words from *Lei Feng's*<sup>8</sup> *Diary*, “*Geming Zhanshi Shi Kuai Zhuan, Nali Xuyao Naliban*” (A revolutionary soldier is a stone, wherever he is needed, he will get there) (cited in Zhao Zilong, December 28, 2011). The sentence serves to install the belief that a soldier of China's army should be an “absolute sacrifice of the individual in favor of an infallible Party and Chairman” (Sheehan 2013). The soldiers' unconditional “obedience” implied the success of Chinese leader's strong control (over the army, the propaganda system, and the public), and is opposed/rejected by Kong Youngqian.

The third feature was Kong's clever imitation of other satirists' words. For instance, Lu Xu's *Zhi Cha Yiwei* (one taste closer), used as a title when Kong posted a variety of names of Chinese medicine on his T-shirt. The design aimed at poking fun at the Chinese market, flooded with fake and poor-quality medications.

Satire in hooligan literature and cultural shirts shares more comic elements than tragic ones. Satire in hooligan literature uses the word “play” as a starting point, along with a deprecating tone. Satire in cultural shirts, however, takes a similar role to the Western tradition of “quiet satire” (Fletcher 1987: 15). They also claimed a sense of consciousness, as 1930’s literature had done, that self-expression becomes a need, and should rise to unprecedented forces in political culture in China.

The previous ways of using satire in both hooligan literature (i.e., the use of “play”) and cultural shirts (i.e., homonymic mockery) have now migrated to the internet. With an additional form of online satire—spoof, these categories depict a series of possibilities tied to the practice of self-expression.

### *E Gao*

“*E Gao*” originates from the online video *Yige Mantou Yinfa de Xuean* (The Bloody Case Over a Steamed Bun). The video was made by an ordinary netizen Hu Ge in 2006, and was produced to tease at Chen Kaige’s film *Wuji* (The Promise). In this video, Hu kept the name (characters) and the sequence of Chen’s movie, though, exchanging Chen’s love story to be his criminal one. As Yu Haiqing introduces:

The 20-minute long DV borrows video footage from the Promise but infuses it into the format of “China Legal Report”, a legal education programme by China Central Television (CCTV). It tells a story about the police investigating a murder case, using the format, style, and language of the CCTV legal program. (Yu 2007: 426)

Hu’s video was labeled as *E Gao* (spoof), an exaggerated form of satire, as Gong Haomin and Yang Xin suggest:

*E gao* emerged as a technology-enabled cultural intervention at a particular social-historical juncture in contemporary China. As an individualized comic parody, it plays with authority, deconstructs orthodox seriousness, and offers comic criticism as well as comic relief. It provides

imagined empowerment for the digital generation, exploring an alternative space for individual expression. (Gong and Yang 2010: 16)

By these accounts, online satire in its self-expression in China, has witnessed the development, to borrow from Elizabeth Perry (2007: 10), from a previous “hidden transcript” of “unobtrusive dissent” from the official voice, toward a current enjoyment of offering opinions and debates at an individual-based level.

As a result, the author argues that online satire has developed a new kind of hooliganism. This new hooliganism maintains a sense of irony, with comic criticism, and contributes to an attitude of satirists’ disrespect. This disrespect is driven by a desire on the part of the satirists to both resist and deny established ideologies, and to seek an individual sense of freedom of expression.

For those who enjoy making fun of society, culture, and politics, the Chinese blogosphere has served to develop a freer space for self-expression. This individualistic form, the author argues, represents a certain awareness of netizens taking a step toward fighting for basic rights (speech, expression, etc.) as a standpoint, and should be realistically seen as a moment, or a step in the process, in which the concept of “citizenship” can be said to begin to emerge in China.

The blogosphere has fostered a genre of bloggers who have become “a new wave of columnists”, to borrow from Mark Poster (2001: 4). However, in comparison with the Western attitude of use, where it is often deployed as “an instrument of aggression” (Rawson 1984: 5), the Chinese form of online satire can be considered as an instrument of entertainment (Wang 2007), a kind of continuity with the eighteenth century literature (comic criticism), and radical sarcasm literature in 1930s as well as previous satires in hooligan literature and cultural shirts.

The entertainment factor, whether in forms of

online *E Gao* and homonymic mockery, or satirical expressions, which the author is going to analyse, diverts satire's humorous nature, to make a point, by using vague and coded phrases, and in doing so, enables it to escape from having to submit to certain political restraints. As a result, the label of "entertainment" means that the satirical blog is impressive, appealing, and promoting changes. However, it is in fact politically impotent in China. It plays or is playful about certain established ideologies, rather than directly undermining them. Wang Xiaofeng and his blogging on *Buxu Lianxiang* form the author's key case in point.

### BLOGGER WANG XIAOFENG

The author of *Buxu Lianxiang* Wang Xiaofeng was born in 1967. He graduated from China University of Political Science and Law (Beijing) in 1990 and began his writing career working on music reviews for Chinese magazines while at university (1989). In 2003, Wang Xiaofeng began working for *Lifeweek*<sup>9</sup>, where he became a popular culture journalist in China.

In May 2006, Wang established his individual site ([www.wangxiaofeng.net](http://www.wangxiaofeng.net)) by creating a blog as *Buxu Lianxiang* (No Guess) on Wordpress.org. On his "No Guess", Wang Xiaofeng names himself *Dai Sange Biao* (Wearing Three Watches). The "*Sange Biao*" (Three Watches) that Wang wears implicitly point to Jiang Zemin's political slogan *Sange Daibiao* (Three Represents<sup>10</sup>). This homonym (watches—represents) manifests Wang's disrespect—whatever they (the established ideologies) are, he does not really honour them.

The use of irony and disrespect is key features of Wang's blog, as commented on *Times*: "(He is) the most respected blogger in China", though, "precisely because he respects almost nothing" (cited in Lev Grossman 2006).

These comments refer to the forms of satire which Wang Xiaofeng utilizes in order to transform his role

from one of traditional media reporter toward that of a satirical blogger. In the next part, the author is going to focus on research questions and introduce detailed methods used in this paper.

### RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGICAL STEPS

In the case of Wang Xiaofeng, the author asks that how does Wang Xiaofeng perform satire in his work? In terms of critique on cultural or social issues, what department/whom does Wang Xiaofeng frequently disrespect? And does Wang Xiaofeng's satirical style associate his societal and cultural criticism on the *Buxu Lianxiang* with a specific political ideology or movement?

To answer these questions, or to provide detailed information on how much political influence the No Guess blog has in the Chinese blogosphere, both content analysis and discourse analysis will be used.

In the first approach—searching representative samples, her aim is to find the angles/factors from which Wang Xiaofeng discusses, criticizes, and satirizes events and issues. The search is framed by particular terms. Within the second approach—discourse analyses, her aim is to examine how Wang Xiaofeng's blogging content leads to a challenge to established ideologies. This analysis is framed by particular tones, and skills and forms that Wang has applied to No Guess blog.

The timeframe for the two analyses is a five-year period from 2006, when Wang Xiaofeng started blogging on *Buxu Lianxiang*, to 2011. In this respect, this case study has provided much larger data set for analysis and has permeated Chinese society more deeply through all these years.

#### *Searching Frequent Used Terms*

The author's analysis will focus on the four columns, as on his No Guess (2,771 posts in total) blog, Wang's satire (the form of online *E Gao*, homonymic mockery

with comic criticism or radical sarcasm, and disrespect attitude) is more or less inserted in his *Waili Xieshuo* (Absurdities and Fallacies) (24), *Shuo Shu* (Introduction to Books) (81), *Xianche* (Gossip) (914), and *Za Tan* (By Talk) (1,091) (2,110 posts in total).

To find out what terms Wang Xiaofeng is likely to mention on his blog, the author takes two steps. She first takes all his blog posts of the four columns (2,110 posts). This is to get a general sense of what Wang is writing about No Guess. In order to collect more specific data for frequent used terms, she then lists three satirized targets: in terms of specific actions, phenomenon, or events, in terms of specific people (e.g., celebrities, netizens) and, in terms of specific government-based department. This is to find out what types of objects that Wang aims to satire. She eventually selects 187 posts (see the appendix).

Among the 187 posts she finds that, from 2006 to 2011, Wang Xiaofeng retains his interest in focusing his satire on two targets: public authorities (e.g., CCTV, Ministry of Culture, and Law) and dominant ideologies (e.g., *Sange Daibiao*, harmony, and patriot). The targets also construct three significant segments that Wang has much to offer, in terms of common words such as *Guo* (country) and *Zhongguoren* (people of China), in terms of proper names such as *Chunwan* (the Spring Festival Gala), CCTV (China Central Television), *Wenhuabu* (The Ministry of Culture), *Xinwen* (news/journalism), *Zuqiu* (football), and *Falv* (Law), and in terms of Chinese political terms such as *Hexie* (harmony), *Gongzheng* (justice), and *Yanlun Ziyou* (freedom of expression).

However, in opposition to the surface value of these terms either understood by ordinary Chinese, or used by authorities, in what ways has Wang Xiaofeng used these topics and terms in diverse and subversive ways in his writing? In other words, how does he define their implicit meanings? In addition, by challenging both official language and literature language, Wang Xiaofeng outspokenly posts *Zanghua* (dirty words) on his blog: *Shabi* (idiot), *Naocan*

(mental disability), *Zhuangbi* (pretending to be nobility), etc. The use of the dirty words, the author defines as one of Wang Xiaofeng's hooligan-based characters, as well as one of his playful attitudes. The question is: How do these dirty words help Wang expose hypocrisy, reveal issues, and provide satire on No Guess?

To answer these questions, the author picks up Wang Xiaofeng's "Country", "Chinese People", "Media", "Harmony", and "Freedom of Expression", including those dirty words as his frequently used terms, as the author thinks that these terms vary from their original meanings, and can offer implications in a political sense. In order to examine how Wang Xiaofeng looks at these terms in a variety of satirical ways (tongues), and to understand the ways how Wang Xiaofeng satirically presents the terms (skills and forms), a critical discourse analysis (Paltridge 2006: 178-198) will be used in the following sections. Barbara Johnstone (2008: 30) points out that "the end goal of discourse analysis is... social critique", the analysis of frequently used terms aims to result in explanations of how Wang Xiaofeng shapes his satirical style (both tone and attitude), and how the satire effectively associates with his questions about power and established ideologies.

### *Analysis of the Frequent Used Terms*

*Country.* The Chinese term *Guo* means country/nation in English. On his No Guess, Wang Xiaofeng gives *Guo* several meanings. Besides commonly considered as *Zhongguo* (China)/*Guo Jia* (country/nation), *Guo* is mentioned by Wang Xiaofeng as *Daguo* (big country/nation), *Guiguo* (your honorable/sincere country), and *Qiangguo* (strong nation). What are the implications of these terms?

A post entitled *Gui Guo* (Your Honorable/Sincere Country), Wang Xiaofeng's topic is about "an expensive (*Gui*) China".

Recently, he is always questioned by some people with *Naocan* (mental disabilities) on why he is likely

to use the term “*Gui* (expensive) *Guo* (country)” [*Dai Sange Biao* (Wearing Three Watches) 2009a].

In Wang’s description, the original meaning of *Gui Guo* (Your Honorable/Sincere Country<sup>11</sup>) is replaced by a negative meaning expensive country, and mentioned via specific examples.

This country is very *Gui* (expensive): in terms of housing, petrol, and privilege [*Dai Sange Biao* (Wearing Three Watches) 2009a].

From the above explanation, we can see that Wang Xiaofeng complains about an expensive China which, according to his post, details China from people’s living expenses (e.g., high prices of housing and petrol) toward the *Quan Gui* (state power/official’s privileges).

*Chinese people.* Here Wang’s *Lun Ting Ni* (Talking About Supporting You) is taken as an example. In this post, Wang Xiaofeng defines some people as “puppets”, with less “independent thought and abilities” (November 30, 2011). He then uses a popular net phrase *Ting* (support) to explain what the puppet likes to do.

“*Ting Ni*” on internet means “I support you”. Specifically, no matter you were criticized, or you had done a right thing, some people would stand up and say, they are always on your side [*Dai Sange Biao* (Wearing Three Watches) 2011].

In this post, Wang voices a number of tools (wall, blog, twitter, etc.) for *Pai Dui* (following the queue) during different time period to explain its function, and its attitude toward *Ting*.

During the Cultural Revolution, *Qiang* (wall) was used to follow the queue and determine the direction... Today’s forum, blog, and twitter act as the previous wall, though, you can follow the queue and post “I support you” online. [*Dai Sange Biao* (Wearing Three Watches) 2011]

Both *Pai Dui* and the tools for *Pai Dui* offer implicit meanings. *Pai Dui* (to follow the queue) implies to follow the party line. Wall implies big-character posters during the Cultural Revolution.

These posters functioned as similar as the blog and the twitter for people to “determine the direction”.

In this sense, *Ting* (support), according to Wang Xiaofeng, seems to easily bring forces about both “giving up judgment” and “following the common sense” [*Dai Sange Biao* (Wearing Three Watches) 2011] to imply what people cannot say.

*Harmony.* The Chinese term *Hexie* (harmony) is divided into two characters *He* and *Xie*. The former can be translated as the peaceful ideas of gentleness, mildness, and calmness. The latter relates to the notions of balance and peace. The term “harmony” mentioned on Wang Xiaofeng’s *Hexie Yu Bu Hexie* (Harmony and Improperly Fitting Shoes), however, offers a different definition from the above. In this post, Wang comments on the shoe accident on Premier Wen Jiabao’s visiting in the UK—when Wen was “attacked” by shoe in earlier 2009, Wang compared him with the previous US President George Bush.

Unlike Western leaders are used to the speech under the fire; our leaders are accustomed to sweet languages. When they stand on the same stage, the difference is displayed. Look at Teacher Bush, who would have followed anything, from a shoe toward a scud. In contrast, Premier Wen’s reaction seemed to be stuck at a Cold War mentality level, with a prediction in advance that class enemy would come to sabotage. [*Dai Sange Biao* (Wearing Three Watches) 2009b]

With comparative comments, this post does not give Wen Jiabao, a Premier in China, highly acclaimed words, as can be seen by Wang’s usage of the terms such as “uncomfortable”, “a Cold War mentality level”, and “class enemy”. This in turn illustrates a funny image that China has showed the world a powerful transformation after the reform, though, Chinese leaders still frozen them in Cold War or Cultural Revolution Era.

Wang’s description of Wen Jiabao shows his denial of a “harmonized” China, as Wang argues on his *Hexie Yu Bu Hexie*:

From a philosophical perspective, harmony is the unity of opposites... However, harmony in China is defined as a contradiction without opposite side... Our leaders... should learn to stay at the level of harmonious conversation when they face... more pairs of leather shoes with a parabolic trajectory... This could be called harmony as well. [*Dai Sange Biao* (Wearing Three Watches) 2009b]

At this point, “harmony” becomes a means of satire which Wang Xiaofeng uses to laugh at an actually repressive-led “peaceful” society. His laughing, along with his argument in opposition to a harmonized China is also given to his playful attitude to top leaders (“Teacher<sup>12</sup> Bush”, for instance), and homonymic mockery—*Hexie* (fitting shoes) versus *Hexie* (harmony) at a repressed harmony inside China in comparison with a subversive reaction of harmony outside China, all of which demonstrate Wang Xiaofeng’s further level of satire.

*Media/News/Journalism.* In China, media have dramatically changed their discourse in recent years. Lots of news reports are becoming radical and critical. They aim to challenge to the role of the propaganda machine, therefore, to maximize public interests (Huang 2007; Sun 2007; Xin 2006). However, the Chinese media maintain the dilemma of issues such as the power relations still influencing the media, media still employing systems of self-censorship to minimize political risks, and the credibility of the news report is still in question.

Wang Xiaofeng sees these issues. Lots of his posts are satirical, and are given to the domain of the mainstream media organizations and popular commercial internet portals such as CCTV and Sina.com.cn. Written on *Women Dou Kan Xinwen Lianbo* (We All Watch News Broadcast), for instance, Wang Xiaofeng comments that the CCTV takes the role of “an education tool for Chinese” [*Dai Sange Biao* (Wearing Three Watches) 2008a].

The meaning of “education”, as Wang quotes from netizens, refers to the CCTV News Broadcast Programme “never reports on an unimportant meeting”

and “never gives an unimportant speech”, as well as the metaphor for the state’s image: “decisions are always right”, “leaders always smile”, “achievements are always great”, and “the future is always bright” [*Dai Sange Biao* (Wearing Three Watches) 2008a].

As a result of these quotations, Wang lends his disrespect to the News Broadcast Programme of the CCTV, which belongs to the Party-State, and which acts as a compulsory educator. In this sense, “an education tool” becomes a coded meaning of “propaganda mechanism”, implying that “censorship on CCTV always works” and “people who watch News Broadcast are always cheated” [*Dai Sange Biao* (Wearing Three Watches) 2008a].

*Freedom of expression.* Freedom of expression in China never fails to fascinate the media and its audiences at both the domestic and international level. If we look at freedom of expression through the lens of quantitative increase, China owns the largest number of traditional and new media users in the world, the people of China may enjoy sufficient chances for expression. However, the government’s blocking of interactive sites such as Facebook, Youtube, and Twitter has indeed decreased China’s degree of speech freedom in the world.

With whichever arguments, freedom of expression is a natural right, as Alan Knight (2004: 4) argues, “which exists through practice”. Though the notion of freedom has not flourished in China, the discourse on freedom of expression has been greatly interpreted by Chinese netizens. Through lots of his posts, Wang Xiaofeng reveals in this part, the Chinese ideas/characteristics of the freedom of expression, and his attitude to it.

An entry titled *Zhidao de Taiduo Buhao* (It Is Not Good for You to Know too Much), Wang notes that “critiques on football demonstrate the highest level of freedom expression in this country” [*Dai Sange Biao* (Wearing Three Watches) 2010b].

In Wang’s opinion, the position of football in China, “is lower than volleyball, Olympics and gold

medal, all of which represent a series of positive national images, and they are called politics". Wang also notes, the authority allowing his people to have free talks on football, to some extent, is to "encourage people to ignore severe social issues such as the rising market prices, frequent traffic incidents, and the gap between the rich and the poor". Wang further satirically "suggests", "Free talks on football is an alternative way to show the Westerners, that the environment in China in terms of critique is much freer than the one they blame their presidents" (September 19, 2010).

This post, through Wang Xiaofeng's ironic tone, reveals a sensitive relationship among freedom, expression, and politics. In Wang's narrative, a sport representing the national image is "political" in nature. The point in turn implies that expression refers to freedom should be apolitical (i.e., football), less important and less conflict with established ideologies. His "critique... is much freer" than the Westerners again embodies an opposite meaning, and is understood by readers that it could hardly happen in reality.

In the analyses of the above five frequent used terms, the author has listed various discourse samples, with specific objects (events, people, politician, and government-related organizations). He argues that satire employed by Wang Xiaofeng's *Buxu Lianxiang* has negated established ideologies (e.g., the "Three Representatives", harmony, and freedom of expression) while constructing critics characterized by resistance and denial. He then reserves the No Guess blog for three types of themes: airing views that implicitly critique and dissent from established ideologies, revealing systematic issues, and capturing ugly images of Chinese society. In addition, he finds that Wang Xiaofeng's satirical expression always combines particular tones, to borrow from two Chinese idioms, refers to *Zhenhua Fanshuo* (speaking truth the opposite way), and *Shengdong Jixi* (making a sound to the east but attacking in the west) [Esarey

and Xiao 2008; *Dai Sange Biao* (Wearing Three Watches) 2009c; *Dai Sange Biao* (Wearing Three Watches) 2010a].

As the author has mentioned at the beginning of this paper, Wang Xiaofeng's satire merges irony with disrespect. The irony is primarily in connection with his two tones, and the disrespect, combines his comic critique with his playful attitude. This playfulness, which the author will exemplify in the following pages, is his hooligan expression.

### ANALYSES OF DISCOURSE SAMPLES OF HOOLIGAN EXPRESSION

The hooligan character in No Guess blog is not only Wang's sarcastic language, but also digital performance thereupon. Part of Wang Xiaofeng's hooligan expression follows Wang Shuo's style of entertaining, as Yao Yusheng (2004: 435) points out, not only of being "playfulness", but also of fighting for "power and freedom". The author categorizes Wang's hooligan expression into three types: homonymic mockery, online spoof, and dirty words.

#### *Homonymic Mockery*

In the Chinese context, a homonym is one of a group of words that share the same pronunciation but have different meanings. In the No Guess blog, Wang Xiaofeng offers a large space for homonym. For instance, he uses *Zhongguo Yidong* (China Mobile) to entitle *Zhongguo Yi Budong* (China No Mobile). He transfers *Guangdian Zongju* (The State Administration of Radio Film and Television of China) into *Guangdian Zong Ji* (The State Administration of Radio Film and Television of China Is Always So Worried). And he changes *Wenhuabu* (The Ministry of Culture) to be *Wenhua Bu* (Culture No).

The author thinks China's Ministry of Culture should be renamed as Culture No. By "No" he means, we say No to Chinese culture, or No culture in China [Dai Sange Biao (Wearing Three Watches) 2006].

### Online Spoof

The online spoof in Chinese context is called *E Gao*. It is, to quote from *China Daily* (cited in Huang Qing 2006): “The two characters, ‘*E*’ means ‘evil’ and ‘*Gao*’ refers to ‘work’... combine to describe a subculture that is characterized by humor, revelry, subversion... defiance of authority”.

One of Wang Xiaofeng’s *E Gao* works is entitled *E Gao* (spoof), posted in 2008.

The pictures below were made by Citroen Company (see Figure 2 and Figure 3). The advertisement is impressive, however, it led to a national protest in China, and the Citroen had to apologize to the Chinese Government later. The reason is simple: Chairman Mao is so respectful in China that nobody can amuse him [*Dai Sange Biao* (Wearing Three Watches) 2008b].

From his writing, we can see that Wang Xiaofeng’s *E Gao* refers to mention that messing with official content in a “harmful” way is very serious in China. However, the post along with the spoofed pictures again shows Wang’s hooligan style and his disrespect to Chinese Government. Yet Wang is also familiar with the rules of the “party line”. On his *E Gao*, by carefully selecting politicians, he chooses to laugh at a previous president, and this attitude does little to threaten the current Party leaders.

### Dirty Words

Dirty words are frequently used by Wang Xiaofeng, not only in his posts, but on titles: *Shabi* (Idiot), *Shier Bi* (Drama Queen), *Tubie* No. 1 (Fool No. 1), *Naocan* (Mental Disabilities), etc.

*Zanghua yu Zanghua Wenhua Shi* (*Dirty Words and Cultural History of Dirty Words*) is a book that Wang prefers to introduce to his readers. But his post is written for those who complain about the abuse of dirty words on his blog.

I wouldn’t have judged those people as *Shabi* (idiot) if

they do have a serious *Naocan* (mental disability)... Anyway, I do like linguistic violence, because I strongly feel that such a language can directly express my emotion... So, *Quni Made* (Screw You)! I’m not going to say anything sweet. [*Dai Sange Biao* (Wearing Three Watches) 2008b]

Though, the post does not indicate by names of who are regarded as *Shabi* or *Naocan*, it gives an idea that Wang Xiaofeng is in the habit of using dirty words in defense of his viewpoints as well as in resistance with his opponents.

The above posts represent Wang Xiaofeng’s three hooligan modes as an expansion of his satire. There are stylistic as well as narrative differences between these texts. Loosely, homonymic mockery emphasizes comic criticism. Online spoof lays particular stress on exaggeration and distortion. And dirty words constitute a new sort of frame for Wang’s acid sarcasm. They are flexibly inserted to exhibit Wang Xiaofeng’s style of satire—resistant with disrespect, and critical with playfulness.

### CONCLUSIONS

The popularity of Wang Xiaofeng’s *Buxu Lianxiang*, as the author has argued in this paper, is because of his sophisticated usage of the satire. This has helped him achieve an independent thinking as well as a sense of cultural satisfaction.

Firstly, Wang’s satire has been attractive as indeed has the Qing Dynasty (comic criticism) and the New Culture Movement (Lu Xun’s radical sarcasm) literatures. His hooligan-based satires combine Wang Shuo’s “playfulness” and Kong Yongqian’s “homophone”, but develops them with digital technologies (*E Gao*). The blog content shows Wang Xiaofeng’s basic “anti-” attitude, building up both a sign of resistance of the political regime and denial of the established ideologies.

Secondly, dissent that enters *Buxu Lianxiang* on issues, mainly of society and culture, directly argues




Figure 2. E Gao Photo.



Figure 3. E Gao Photo.

with certain contents from mainstream media and political slogans. By using a personalized space, Wang has greatly made fun of the state, party leaders, and their policies. At this point, Wang Xiaofeng's satirical blog stands for the perspective of fighting for, to borrow from Raymond Williams (1991: 408), "setting limits" on issues of speech freedom. His dissent gradually develops an open space for news and political commentary, albeit with caution.

Thirdly, instead of inserting direct critiques that would result in censorship and control, satire represents a kind of safety value that benefits Wang Xiaofeng by allowing his dissent to be published and delivered, as Brook Larmer (2011) argues:

To slip past censors, Chinese bloggers have become masters of comic subterfuge, cloaking their messages in protective layers of irony and satire. This is not a new concept, but it has erupted so powerfully that it now defines the ethos of the internet in China. Coded language has become part of mainstream culture, with the most contagious memes tapping into widely shared feelings about issues that cannot be openly discussed, from corruption and economic inequality to censorship itself. (Larmer 2011)

However, the commentary explosion in the blogosphere is an intelligible adaptation to an environment which is intensively manipulated by political elites. In other words, political expression in China seems to be a compromise between what bloggers can possibly express and what the regime allows them to do.

In the case of *Buxu Lianxiang*, Wang Xiaofeng's satirical writings feature no matter "speaking truth the opposite way", and "making a feint to the east but attacking in the west", or otherwise homonym, spoof, and dirty words offer evidence that a complex set of satirical tones and forms playing a significant role, as they are more than humorous critiques, to some extent, they can be seen as Wang's political reactions, or conscious political responses to state policies, though,

they guarantee a certain self-control and restraint which appear as playfulness rather than aggression, and critique rather than attack presented on the No Guess blog. Their shaping a kind of mild form of dissent, which the political authorities being able to accommodate is on one hand, and Wang's readers' understanding the meaning behind his facades in resistance with and denial of established ideologies is on the other hand.

As a result of Wang Xiaofeng's No Guess that uses satire, the author has noticed the fact that Wang's critiques frequently point to the field in terms of society and culture, and these have offered Wang an advantage in exploring problems of China, as well as an ability to criticise Chinese society, Chinese authorities, and Chinese culture from the inside. To a large degree, his viewpoints may arouse the consciousness among Chinese rational intellectuals to think about, whether blogging can also be used to achieve something outside of the blogosphere (more democracy not less, besides expression) (Dean 2012). Yet Wang Xiaofeng's political criticism is limited in specific ministries/departments (e.g., CCTV, Culture Ministry), and his words have barely offended the central government. This partially because Wang is not willing to take any risk to be a "political dissident", meanwhile he is pessimistic on democratic progress (e.g., the discussion of speech freedom) in China. In this sense, Wang Xiaofeng's satirical *Buxu Lianxiang* is limited in its ability to affect a political dialogue, as he realises both difficulty and impossible free expression of and open criticism with political issues in the Chinese blogosphere, and thus his series of satire cannot be considered as a truly satire blog, but a blog that uses satire.

## APPENDIX

Headlines of blogging on the "No Guess" (187 posts).

| Year               | Events   | People   | Government departments   |
|--------------------|--|--|--|
| 2006<br>(54 posts) |  |  | <i>Zhongguo Yibudong</i> (China No Mobile, May 4, 2006)  |
|                    |  |  | <i>Gegongsongde Yeyao Jingye Yidian</i> (To Praise or Eulogize Should Also Be Professional, May 4, 2006)                             |
|                    |  | <i>Chuzu Siji de Bangyang</i> (A Model for Taxi Drivers, May 6, 2006)  |  |
|                    | <i>Guo Qi</i> (Flag, May 14, 2006)   |  |  |
|                    | <i>Haixia Liangan Xuerou Xianglian</i> (Cross Strait Is as Close as Flesh and Blood, May 20, 2006) |  | <i>Tong Gao</i> (Formatted News, May 20, 2006)   |
|                    |  |  | <i>Qiu</i> (Ball, June 12, 2006)   |
|                    | <i>Guanyu Hexie</i> (About Harmony, June 13, 2006)   |  |  |
|                    | <i>Shanghai Fenghui</i> (Shanghai Submit Meeting, June 14, 2006)                                   |  |  |
|                    |  |  | <i>Gongyi Guanggao</i> (Charity Advertisement, June 18, 2006)  |
|                    | <i>Tiaodong Qunzhong Dou Qunzhong</i> (To Play Up Conflicts With the Public, June 22, 2006)        |  |  |
|                    | <i>Buyu zhi Ming</i> (Dishonor, June 24, 2006)   |  |  |
|                    | <i>Yixiang Buneng Qingyuan</i> (One's Own Thinking Cannot Be a Wishful Thinking, June 26, 2006)    |  |  |
|                    |  | <i>Huang Jianxiang Fenge</i> (Huang Jianxiang Is Crazy, June 27, 2006) |  |
|                    |  |  | <i>Zai FalvMianqian Youxieren Gengjia Pingdeng</i> (In Front of the Law Some People Own Much Equality, June 30, 2006)                |
|                    | <i>Daochu Doushi Yaoyan</i> (Rumors, July 1, 2006)   |  |  |
|                    |  |  | <i>Dizheng Suan Tufashijian ma</i> (Is Earthquake a Breaking News? July 4, 2006)   |
|                    |  |  | <i>Youganyu Xinlang Jintian Fadong Qunzhong dou Qunzhong</i> (Comment on Playing Up Conflicts With the Public by Sina, July 5, 2006) |
|                    |  |  | <i>Daoban</i> (Pirated Copy, July 19, 2006)  |
|                    |  |  | <i>Wenhua Bu</i> (Culture No, July 25, 2006)   |
|                    | <i>Shanqing Tangshan</i> (Dramatized Tangshan, July 26, 2006)                                      |  |  |
|                    | <i>Luxun zhi Si</i> (The Death of Luxun, July 28, 2006)  |  | <i>Xinwen Sheying Yexing PS</i> (PS Is Also Popularly Applied to Photography, July 28, 2006)   |

|  |   |  |   |
|--|---|--|---|
|  |   | <i>Qishi Zhongguoren he Yidaliren Henxiang Bujinjin shi Zuqiu shang de Chouwen</i> (Just Like Italy, Football Is Not the Only Scandal in China, July 28, 2006) |   |
|  | <i>Beijing Daodi Youmeiyou Wenhua</i> (Is There Any Culture in Beijing, July 31, 2006)                |  |   |
|  | <i>Beijingren Daodi Youmeiyou Suzhi</i> (Do Beijing People Have Personal Qualities? August 14, 2006)  |  |   |
|  |   |  | <i>Guangdian Zong Ji</i> (The State Administration of Radio Film and Television of China Is Always So Worried, August 15, 2006) |
|  | <i>Hongse Jingji Moshi</i> (The Red Economy Mode, August 22, 2006)                                    |  |   |
|  |   |  | <i>Zhongguo Zuqiu Yinggai Zheme Ti</i> (Football in China Should be Played Like This, September 6, 2006)                        |
|  |   |  | <i>Zhengmian Baodao</i> (Positive Report, September 6, 2006)  |
|  | <i>Mingan</i> (Sensitive, September 8, 2006)  |  |   |
|  | <i>Huashuo Zanghua</i> (About Dirty Words, September 10, 2006)  |  |   |
|  | <i>Mei Wenhua</i> (Uncivilized, September 18, 2006)   |  |   |
|  |   |  | <i>Pan Changjiang Xinwenjiang Houxuan Zuopin Tuijie</i> (Selected Works From Pan Changjiang News Awards, September 19, 2006)    |
|  |   | <i>Guanyu Xinpusen</i> (About the Simpson's, September 30, 2006)   |   |
|  |   | <i>Mingren Fensi Dabuquan</i> (Celebrities and Their Fans, October 7, 2006)  |   |
|  |   |  | <i>Boke Shimingzhi de Beilun</i> (Debate on the Real Name Registration on Blogs, October 24, 2006)                              |
|  | <i>Weishengzhi Shijian</i> (The Event of Toilet Tissues, October 26, 2006)                            |  |   |
|  | <i>Zai Shanghai Kanbudao Zhongnanhai</i> (You Will Not See Zhongnanhai in Shanghai, November 6, 2006) |  |   |
|  |   |  | <i>Jizhe Jie</i> (Journalist's Festival, November 8, 2006)  |
|  |   |  | <i>Zhongguo Nide Diku Diule</i> (China, You Have Lost Your Underpants, November 20, 2006)                                       |

|                    |   |  |   |
|--------------------|---|--|---|
|                    |   |  | <i>Shajiao Hexiequan</i> (What Is the Right of Harmony, November 23, 2006)  |
|                    | <i>Qianwan Bieba Ziji Dangren</i> (Don't Treat Yourself as a Human Being, November 25, 2006)          |  |   |
|                    |   |  | <i>Shuo Jiju Wenhua de Huaihua</i> (Say Some Bad Words to the Ministry of Culture, November 26, 2006)                         |
|                    | <i>Gushi de Jieju Zongshi Youdian Chuhuyiliao</i> (The Result Is Always Unexpected, December 2, 2006) |  |   |
|                    |   |  | <i>Wenhua de Luoji</i> (The Logic of the Ministry of Culture, December 3, 2006)   |
|                    | <i>Daguo Buneng Jueqi</i> (Great China Is Not Rising, December 7, 2006)                               |  |   |
|                    |   |  | <i>Jia Xinwen Yinggai Zheme Bian</i> (Fake News Should be Edited Like This, December 8, 2006)                                 |
|                    |   |  | <i>Fuxing Nvzu</i> (Re-strength Women's Football, December 11, 2006)  |
|                    |   |  | <i>Buxu Fazhan Wenhua de Wenhua Bu</i> (A Ministry of Culture Where Culture Is Restricted to Be Developed, December 13, 2006) |
|                    |   | <i>Zuoge You Wenhua de Mingxing</i> (To Be an Educated Superstar, December 14, 2006) |   |
|                    | <i>Zeren yu Yiwu</i> (Responsibilities and Obligations, December 18, 2006)                            |  |   |
|                    | <i>Mengxiang Zaojian Xianshi</i> (Dreams Murder Reality, December 21, 2006)                           |  |   |
|                    | <i>Wenuan de Zhongguo</i> (A Warm China, December 29, 2006)   |  |   |
| 2007<br>(46 posts) |   |  | <i>Quanli</i> (The Right, January 3, 2007)  |
|                    |   |  | <i>Hexie Xinwen Xiezuo Zhinan</i> (Guidelines of Writing Harmonious News, January 6, 2007)                                    |
|                    |   |  | <i>Shajiao Sifa Hexie</i> (What Is Judicial Harmony, January 7, 2007)   |
|                    | <i>Liuxing Yu</i> (Popular Terms, January 13, 2007)   |  |   |
|                    | <i>Kouxiangtang Shijian</i> (The Chewing Gum Event, January 16, 2007)                                 |  |   |

|  |  |   |   |
|--|--|---|---|
|  | <i>Zhongguo Jueqi</i> (The Rise of China, January 24, 2007)            |   |   |
|  |  | <i>Xingbake yu Rentong Wenhua</i> (Starbucks and Cultural Identity, January 27, 2007) |   |
|  |  | <i>Shabi</i> (Idiot, January 28, 2007)  |   |
|  |  | " <i>Ni ye tui Aoyun le</i> " ("You Are Very Olympics", January 31, 2007)             |   |
|  |  | <i>Jingyingmen de Tuoyiwu</i> (The Elites' Striptease, February 8, 2007)              |   |
|  |  | <i>Mingren Mingyan</i> (Quotes From Celebrities, February 21, 2007)                   |   |
|  |  |   | <i>Chunwan: Shuiyao Zheyang de Mianzi Gongchen</i> (The Spring Festival Gala: Who Wants Such a Face Project, February 22, 2007) |
|  | <i>Hexie Kouwu Jiemi</i> (Harmony Misunderstanding, February 24, 2007) |   |   |
|  |  |   | <i>Wo jiu Buxihuan 3.15 Wanhui</i> (I Don't Like 3.15 Programme, March 18, 2007)  |
|  |  |   | <i>Gongping</i> (Justice, March 26, 2007)   |
|  | <i>Aoyun Shangxiang</i> (Olympics Imaginations, March 27, 2007)        |   |   |
|  |  |   | <i>Zhenyi: Yi Liangjiafunv huo Ji de Mingyi</i> (Justice, On Behalf of Good Wives or Prostitutes, April 4, 2007)                |
|  | <i>Er</i> (Two, April 6, 2007)   |   |   |
|  |  |   | <i>Yangshi de Wenhua</i> (The CCTV Culture, April 21, 2007)   |
|  | <i>Mingan Ciju</i> (Sensitive Phrases, April 27, 2007)                 |   |   |
|  |  |   | <i>Zhongguo Xinwen Heibanbao</i> (Chinese News Blackboard, May 13, 2007)  |
|  | <i>Hexie Ziyaner</i> (The Phase of Harmony, May14, 2007)               |   |   |
|  | <i>Ni de Dipan</i> (Your Territorial, June 3, 2007)                    |   |   |
|  | <i>Lishi</i> (History, June 6, 2007)                                   |   | <i>Wane de Gaokao</i> (The Wicked Gaokao, June 6, 2007)   |
|  | <i>Qian Guize</i> (Hidden Rules, July 6, 2007)                         |   |   |
|  |  |   | <i>Du Renmingribao Pinglun Wenzhang Yougan</i> (Comments on Articles of People's Daily, July 11, 2007)                          |

|                   |   |   |  |
|-------------------|---|---|--|
|                   | <i>Kan Zhonguo de Jiaoyu Dique Haisiren</i> (The Education System Murders the People of China, July 12, 2007) |   |  |
|                   |   |   | <i>Guanyu Zhurou de Sikao</i> (Thinking About the Pork, August 7, 2007)                      |
|                   |   | <i>Tigao Boke Zhimingdu</i> (Be Famous in the Blogosphere, August 12, 2007)               | <i>Wenti Jingji Xue</i> (Problems in Economy Theories, August 12, 2007)                      |
|                   | <i>Ruguo Er</i> (If Two, August 21, 2007)   |   |  |
|                   |   | <i>Yu Mou Tiyu Bianji Duihua</i> (Dialogue With a Sports Journalist, September 4, 2007)   |  |
|                   |   |   | <i>Yule Zhengzhi</i> (Entertainment Politics, September 6, 2007)                             |
|                   |   | <i>Wenren Aoyun</i> (Intellectual Olympics, September 8, 2007)                            |  |
|                   | <i>Kexue Zhiguo</i> (Use Science to Rule the Country, October 24, 2007)                                       |   |  |
|                   | <i>Shier Bi</i> (Drama Queen, November 4, 2007)   |   |  |
|                   | <i>Hu Jia Who Wei</i> (The Tiger Borrows Whose Ferocity? November 19, 2007)                                   |   |  |
|                   |   |   | <i>Jigou Shezhi</i> (Constructions of the System, November 22, 2007)                         |
|                   |   | <i>Huananhu Jingshen</i> (The Spirit of Huanan Tiger, November 25, 2007)                  |  |
|                   | <i>Hexie Guolan</i> (Harmony Fruit Hamper, November 30, 2007)   |   |  |
|                   | <i>Yuren Wei Shan</i> (Pretending to Helping Others, December 7, 2007)  | <i>Zhichi Yixia Lian Yue Laoshi</i> (Support Lian Yue, December 7, 2007)                  |  |
|                   |   | <i>Zhao Benshan yu Chunwan</i> (Zhao Benshan and Spring Festival Gala, December 14, 2007) |  |
|                   |   |   | <i>Hexie Shiwulian</i> (Harmony Food Chain, December 16, 2007)                               |
|                   | <i>Niaochao</i> (Beijing National Stadium, December 26, 2007)   |   |  |
| 2008<br>(27posts) |   |   | <i>Women Douaikan Xinwenlianbo</i> (We All Like to Watch News Broadcasting, January 2, 2008) |
|                   |   | <i>Laoshi</i> (Teacher, January 10, 2008)   |  |

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|--|---|--|--|
|  | <i>Da Guo</i> (Great Nation, January 13, 2008)  |  |  |
|  |   |  | <i>Daodi Sile Duoshao Ren</i> (How Many People Are Dead? February 3, 2008)   |
|  | <i>Mingan Tidaici</i> (Synonymy of Sensitive, March 6, 2008)  |  |  |
|  |   |  | <i>Guangdian Weishenme Zongji</i> (Why Is the State of Administration of Radio Film and Television of China Always So Worried? March 12, 2008) |
|  |   |  | <i>Naocan Jizhe</i> (Journalists With Mental Disability, March 21, 2008)   |
|  | <i>Piyao Daguo</i> (A Great Nation With the Ability of Denying Rumors, March 29, 2008)                  |  |  |
|  | <i>Zanghua yu Zanghua Wenhushi</i> (Dirty Words and the Cultural History of Dirty Words, April 3, 2008) |  |  |
|  | <i>Dizhi</i> (Resistance, April 15, 2008)   |  | <i>Minhang Zong Ji</i> (Civial Aviation Administration of China Always Worries About Something, April 23, 2008)                                |
|  |   |  | <i>Yi Zhengyi de Mingyi</i> (On Behalf of the Justice, April 26, 2008)   |
|  | <i>Lun Zhuangbi</i> (About Pretending to Be Nobility, May 8, 2008)                                      |  |  |
|  |   | <i>Jiucheng Wangmin Wuyiyu CCTV</i> (90% of the Netizens Are the Same as CCTV, May 26, 2008) |  |
|  | <i>Zhengzhi Sixiang Gongzuo Huibao</i> (Report of Ideological and Political Work, June 3, 2008)         |  |  |
|  |   | <i>Tubie No. 1</i> (Fool No. 1, June 11, 2008)   |  |
|  |   | <i>Muyu de Juxian</i> (Restrictions of Mother Language, June 21, 2008)                       |  |
|  |   |  | <i>Ruhe Xie Tiyu Huabian Xinwen</i> (How to Write Tidbits on Sports, August 6, 2008)   |
|  |   |  | <i>Zuo Sohu de Wangbian Zhen Rongyi</i> (It Seems that Online News Editor Is an Easy Job in Sohu.com, August 12, 2008)                         |

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|                    |  | <i>Wangluo Naocan Linchuang Zhengzhuang</i> (The Symptom of Online Mental Disabilities, August 25, 2008)                                       |  |
|                    | <i>Jinpai Daguo Budengyu Tiyu Daguo</i> (A Nation Leading in Gold Medals Doesn't Mean It Is a Sports Giant, August 27, 2008) |  |  |
|                    |  | <i>Naocan Zhijian</i> (Broken in Brain but Firm in Spirit, September 1, 2008)  |  |
|                    |  |  | <i>Guanyu Xianzhi Shipin</i> (About the Restriction of Posting Videos, September 6, 2008)                                      |
|                    |  |  | <i>Wo Weishenme Buxihuan Falv</i> (Why I Don't Like Law? September 10, 2008)   |
|                    | <i>Beijing Ning Huilai le</i> (Beijing You Come Back, September 23, 2008)  |  |  |
|                    |  | <i>Buneng Yinwei Nishi Lingdao jiu Keyi ba Kucha Tuodiao</i> (You Cannot Take off Your Underpants Even if You Are a Leader, November 18, 2008) |  |
|                    |  |  | <i>Hongqi Xiade Dan</i> (The Egg Is Laid by Red Flag, December 1, 2008)  |
| 2009<br>(30 posts) |  |  | <i>Mima Baohu: Women Dou Shenghuo zai Hanwendai</i> (Password Protection: We All Live in Cool Temperate Zone, January 5, 2009) |
|                    | <i>Hexie yu Bu Hexie</i> (Harmony and Improperly Fitting Shoes, February 3, 2009)  |  |  |
|                    |  |  | <i>Yangshi Daodi gen shui Youchou</i> (Who Is Exactly Hated by CCTV? February 10, 2009)  |
|                    |  |  | <i>Pi Chunwan</i> (Criticize Spring Festival Gala, February 11, 2009)  |
|                    |  | <i>Shuode Duo Chengken A</i> (What A Sincere Speech, February 15, 2009)  |  |
|                    | <i>Gui Guo</i> (Your Sincere Country, February 22, 2009)   |  |  |
|                    |  |  | 315 (March 15, March 16, 2009)   |
|                    | <i>Nabuxing Bu Naer</i> (Where There is a Shortage, There Is a Fixing, March 26, 2009)                                       |  |  |
|                    | <i>Meitian Douguo Yurenjie</i> (Everyday Is April Fool Day, April 2, 2009)   |  |  |

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|  |  |   | <i>Jia Xinwen</i> (Fake News, May 1, 2009)   |
|  |  |   | <i>Nanjing Datusha yu Wangluo Shimingzhi</i> (Nanjing Massacre and Online Real Name Registration, May 3, 2009) |
|  | <i>Cao</i> (Fuck, May 21, 2009)  |   |  |
|  |  |   | <i>Zhe Xinwen Xiede</i> (Such A News Report, June 7, 2009)   |
|  | <i>Shanzhai</i> (Cottage, June 11, 2009)   |   |  |
|  | <i>Lun Dixian</i> (About Bottom Lines, July 8, 2009)                               |   |  |
|  |  |   | <i>Caifang</i> (Interview, July 12, 2009)  |
|  |  |   | <i>Ruguo Fasheng zai Guiguo</i> (If This Happens in Your Sincere Country, July 24, 2009)                       |
|  | <i>Lishi shi Zuida de Xugou</i> (History is the Biggest Liar, July 25, 2009)       |   |  |
|  |  |   | <i>Guonei Xinwen</i> (Domestic News, August 18, 2009)  |
|  |  |   | <i>Yangshi Tiwen</i> (CCTV's Mode of Interview, August 18, 2009)   |
|  |  | <i>Naocan</i> (Mental Disabilities, September 8, 2009)                  |  |
|  |  | <i>Wenti Mingxing</i> (Sick Superstars, October 21, 2009)               |  |
|  | <i>Minganci Taiduo</i> (To Many Sensitive Words, October 23, 2009)                 |   |  |
|  | <i>Dazhong Daodexue</i> (Public Morality, November 9, 2009)                        |   |  |
|  | <i>Yulu de Zhongjie</i> (The End of Slogans, November 10, 2009)                    |   |  |
|  | <i>Bi Zanghua Gengzang de</i> (Dirtier Than Dirty Words, November 17, 2009)        |   | <i>Xinwen Jiaocai</i> (Journalism Textbooks, November 17, 2009)  |
|  | <i>Gui Guo</i> (Your Sincere Country, November 26, 2009)                           |   |  |
|  |  | <i>Mingxing Yao Zhongguo</i> (Superstars Shine China, December 1, 2009) |  |
|  | <i>Wo Danxin "Mama" Zhegeci</i> (I Worry About the Term "Mama", December 29, 2009) |   |  |

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| 2010<br>(13 posts) | <i>Youshihou Zhongguo hen 2012</i> (Sometimes China Is Very 2012, January 17, 2010)                                |   |   |
|                    |  | <i>Xingxiang Dashi</i> (Image Ambassador, February 7, 2010)   |   |
|                    | <i>Niaochao</i> (The National Stadium, February 20, 2010)  |   |   |
|                    |  | <i>Biena Jizhe Budang Ji</i> (Don't Exclude Journalists From Whores, May 25, 2010)  |   |
|                    | <i>Chaoxian Jingshen yu Zhongguo Jingshenbing</i> (The North Korean Spirit and Chinese Mental Ills, July 18, 2010) |   |   |
|                    |  | <i>Renmen Weishenme Taoyan bing Shengshengde Aizhe Shabi</i> (Why Do People Hate but Still Love Those Idiots? August 3, 2010) |   |
|                    | <i>Yazibibao</i> (An Eye for an Eye, and a Tooth for a Tooth, August 5, 2010)                                      |   |   |
|                    |  | <i>Wenhua Buzhang Tan Wenhua</i> (The Head of Ministry of Culture Talks About Culture, August 7, 2010)                        |   |
|                    |  | <i>Weishenme Xiangxin Mingren</i> (Why Do We Trust Celebrities, August 22, 2010)  |   |
|                    |  | <i>Zhidaode Taiduo Buhao</i> (It's Not Good for You to Know too Much, September 19, 2010)                                     |   |
|                    | <i>Aiguo Liangezi Hao Ganga</i> (The Term Patriotic Is so Embarrassing, October 18, 2010)                          |   |   |
|                    | <i>Huanying Asangqi lai Zhongguo</i> (Welcome Julian Assange to Come to China, December 5, 2010)                   |   |   |
|                    |  | <i>"Xiansheng Ni Hao Meng Ao"</i> ("Sir You Are Very Good", December 19, 2010)  |   |
| 2011<br>(17 posts) | <i>Tequan</i> (Privilege, January 11, 2011)  |   | <i>Yazhou Zuqiu</i> (Asian Football, January 11, 2011)              |
|                    |  |   | <i>Gongping</i> (Justice, January 17, 2011)                         |
|                    |  |   | <i>Guojia Xingxiang</i> (The Image of the Nation, January 26, 2011) |
|                    |  |   | <i>Chunwan</i> (Spring Festival Gala: A Dirge, February 15, 2011)   |

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|  |   | <i>Youni Guizhe Zhonguo Renming Congci Neng Zhanqilai Ma</i> (If You Keep Kneeling, How Can Chinese People Stand Up Ever Since? February 26, 2011) |  |
|  | <i>Zhe jiu Haoxiang Youren Yizhi Nazhe Qiang Zhizhe Ni Yiyang</i> (It Looks Like Somebody Is Pointing to You With a Gun, March 8, 2011) |  |  |
|  | <i>Zhuangbi de Yishu</i> (The Art of Play Pussy, March 12, 2011)  |  |  |
|  | <i>Maque Dagu</i> (A Big Country Full of Sparrow, March 18, 2011)   |  |  |
|  | <i>Zunzhong</i> (Respect, April 2, 2011)  |  |  |
|  |   | <i>Huogai</i> (You Deserve It, August 17, 2011)  |  |
|  |   | <i>Ma Weidu</i> ( <i>Ma Weidu</i> , September 11, 2011)  |  |
|  |   | <i>Erdai</i> (Second Generation, September 18, 2011)   |  |
|  | <i>Wenhua Qiangguo</i> (Strong Nation in Culture, November 2, 2011)   |  |  |
|  |   | <i>Gongguan</i> (Public Relations, November 22, 2011)  |  |
|  |   | <i>Lun Ting Ni</i> (Talking About Supporting You, November 30, 2011)   |  |
|  |   |  | <i>Jiaoyu Haizi</i> (To Educate Children, December 22, 2011) |

## Notes

1. See *Dai Sange Biao* (Wearing Three Watches) *Da Jizhe Wen* (1) [Interview (1)]. In this post, Wang Xiaofeng explains how to understand the meaning of *Lianxiang* (guess)—“Good guess means creation, but bad guess brings distortion. Good guess means fun, but bad guess implies disaster. My No Guess, to some extent, it can be irony, also, it can be justice—depends on the way you guess” (May 4, 2006). Retrieved from <http://www.wangxiaofeng.net/?m=200605&paged=6>. From Wang’s words, we can see that Wang Xiaofeng has never offered an answer to what his “guess” means, instead, he leaves his readers to answer the question, according to their own understanding. But generally his words imply that nothing he writes on his blog is serious, they are just jokes.
2. Please see *Oxford Dictionaries*. Retrieved from <http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/satire?q=satire>.
3. Juvenalian satire follows the tradition of Decimus Junius Juvenalis, known as Juvenal, who wrote in the last first and early second century.
4. Horatian satire follows the tradition of Quintus Horatius Flaccus (65-8 B.C.), known as Horace, the leading lyric poet in Augustan Age.
5. The author Wu Jingzi (1701-1754) is a late Qing satirical scholar who wrote about social criticism and cultural transformation during the eighteenth century China.
6. The New Culture Movement is a sign of Chinese literature replaced by vernacular in all areas. Major reformers are Lu Xun, Hu Shi (1891-1962), and Chen Duxiu (1880-1942).
7. In 1942 (during Sino-Japanese War period, 1937-1945), Mao

Zedong gave a series of lectures called *Zai Yan'an Wenyi Zuotanhui shang de Jianghua* (The Yan'an Talks on Literature and Art). The talks thus became the national guideline for culture studies after the establishment of People's Republic of China.

8. Lei Feng was a soldier of the People's Liberation Army in China. He was characterized as the most selflessness person in Communist Party by Mao Zedong.
9. *Sanlian Life Week* magazine is an influential Beijing-based weekly launched in 1995. The magazine is famous for its cultural articles, interviews with public figures (e.g., the column of "People in the News") and well-known columnists. Readers are mainly higher-educated intellectuals in China. Retrieved from <http://www.lifeweek.com.cn>.
10. Three Represents: The Chinese Communist Party represents the development trend of China's advanced productive forces, the orientation of China's advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people.
11. *Gui Guo* is a diplomatic term in Chinese, meaning Your Country. The term *Gui* (honorable/sincere) is used to show China's polite attitude to or manner of respecting other countries.
12. A teacher in China is not only an educator but also a mentor, and is respected by students. Wang's using "Teacher" to title Mr. Bush, his tongue is absolutely playful.

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