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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License
Article
Analysis of Categories and Effects of Countermeasures in International Law
Author(s)
YANG Yueyi
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DOI:10.17265/1548-6605/2025.04.003
Affiliation(s)
University of International Business and Economics, Beijing, China
ABSTRACT
To safeguard national
sovereignty and interests, as well as to protect the lawful rights and
interests of entities within their jurisdiction from the adverse impact of
sanctions, numerous countries and regions have enacted anti-sanctions
legislation or adopted corresponding countermeasures. These measures aim to
block and counteract the improper extraterritorial application of sanctions
laws. In the realm of contemporary international law, such countermeasures are
generally categorized into blocking measures and confrontational measures.
Blocking measures are designed to neutralize or preclude the application and
effects of foreign sanctions laws through domestic legal frameworks. In
contrast, confrontational measures escalate the response by imposing reciprocal
sanctions on foreign entities. This article primarily examines the blocking
measures typified by the European Union (EU)and the confrontational
measures exemplified by Russia, providing a detailed analysis of the
implementation effectiveness and practical challenges associated with both
categories. The efficacy of countermeasures is intrinsically linked to a
nation’s overall comprehensive strength. When devising anti-sanction
strategies, it is imperative to align these measures with the nation’s unique
circumstances and diplomatic objectives. Striking an appropriate balance
between the intensity and scope of blocking and confrontational measures is
crucial to ensuring their effectiveness and achieving the intended policy
outcomes.
KEYWORDS
countermeasures, effects doctrine, blocking statutes, anti-sanctions
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