The Theory of Executive Emergency Power: Competing Thoughts and Models Supporting Extraordinary Executive Power in Times of Crisis

In this article, I examine and analyze the reasons and justifications for executive emergency power. The research analyzes the theory of executive emergency power across a wide breadth of philosophical thinkers, from Ancient Greek, Renaissance, through modern American political thought. The analysis of the empirical data indicates that in political philosophy, two models exist for determining and using executive emergency power: an unfettered executive prerogative or a constitutional dictatorship. Liberal democratic thinkers support powerful executives in order to preserve the political, social, and economic system. The thinkers do expect a ruler to limit his power by his own constraint, and they expect the ruler to relinquish power after the crisis has passed. The thinkers agree that the law may be an impediment in time of crisis, therefore rulers may go beyond the scope of law, and even may invent the law in order to combat the crisis. The findings do cause concern for those who expect the law to always matter, or expect democratic republics to maintain republican tenets at all times. Preserving the state may mean violating the law, absolutely. If power corrupts absolutely, then we should be very mindful of rulers during crisis because they have extraordinary power.