

The Scope and Type of Political Corruption in Mongolia (Analysis of Expert Evaluation)

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Democratic culture is a matter of establishing rule of law and protecting human rights, as well as good governance, effective administration of state resources, proper use of power, and conflict of interest. Therefore, democracy is not only a manifestation of the globalization process, but also the pursuit of perfect democratic mechanisms and mechanisms in many democracies and the opportunity to fully monitor the integrity of governmental institutions and to strengthen their governance power. We aim to base this research paper on facts and the following aspects. It clarifies that the following approaches to: (i) the degree of corruption in the political sphere; (ii) the nature of political corruption, its status, and prospects, as well as the changes that have occurred in it, based on the analysis of the results of long-term research of expert opinions. The article based on the comparative analysis with experts and other research sources. It is series of article which is verifying the conditions and state of corruption types, spheres, relationship between political bodies and business groups and reasons and conditionality. The first chapter of the series of article attempted to underline the corruption sphere and corruption of types. The second chapter commenced the relationship with socio-political and politic-business groups and reasons for the conditionality of the corruption in Mongolia.

Keywords: experts, democratic mechanism, justice, integrity, fairness, accountability, grand corruption

Introduction

In a democracy, the balance of power depends on the acceptance and respect by the majority of democratic principles, ethics, and individual rights, since there is no magic solution for natural harmony. This may be caused by differences and somewhat contradictory interests of social groups in the standard of living. In fact, the fact that people have a clear or rational idea of the problems they face is a prime example of how democracy works to express and validate their views. On the other hand, it is a sign that they have chosen their representatives and tried to resolve the doubts of the classical theory that we still adhere to. In a certain sense, universally recognized democratic values can be characterized as a conditional model of the national model of democracy with a preconceived idea of the life and activities of the people, the state of implementation in real socio-political practice, or the period of implementation. In this sense, it is important to conclude (Fukuyama, 1995, pp. 59-61) that honesty, reliability, the ability to work together, and a sense of responsibility to others are fundamental to the formation of social and personal virtues. The third wave of democracy led to the collapse of

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the communist dictatorship and the emergence of electoral democracy (Fukuyama, 2011, pp. 510-512), when the rule of law protects the rights of the individual. Consequently, democracy cannot flourish without creating basic conditions for human security and civil political culture that guarantee the rule of law and fundamental freedoms. Therefore, issues of national security, citizenship, and a favorable regional and international climate are important. If democracy fails, it will not be able to achieve its goals of maintaining peace, security, public welfare, and economic growth. The biggest challenge and contributing factor to this failure is corruption. Corruption is a phenomenon that undermines the quality and value of democracy. This is exactly what we wanted to emphasize in our research work. The presented article consists of a series of articles consisting of an introductory part and a subsection. In the first part of the article, (i) the scope of corruption in the political sphere; (ii) the form of corruption in the political sphere considers its state and perspective.

Identifying the Root of the Problem

As you know, a healthy democracy largely depends on the development of civic culture. However, the culture refers not to the art, literature, or development, but it occurs such meaning of *customs, practices, procedures, and norms* that determine people's ability to govern themselves. Consequently, since democracy is not just a set of rules and regulations, any dictatorial political system avoids encouraging inaction and weakness. While such regimes seek to create obedient civilians, the civic culture of a democratic society is the result of the free choice of individuals and groups. In fact, citizens of a free society have the opportunity to express their interests, exercise their rights, and take responsibility for their lives.

They also make their own decisions about where to work, where to live, whether to join a political party, or what to study, so they make their own decisions, not political ones. It shows that human desires are boundless and sometimes contradict each other. People want to be safe and secure, but they also dream of adventure. Individuals value freedom, but they also demand social equality. Similarly, it should not be hidden that in a democratic society there are such conflicts and paradoxes. If people think of democracy as an ensemble that demands only its own demands, society will collapse. Consequently, this is the first form of political accountability, consisting of legislation passed by Parliament, which is elected by a minority with the right to vote, and, most importantly, based on the rule of law. In his book *The Origins of Political Order*, Francis Fukuyama (2011, pp. 401-402) emphasizes that there should be accountability to traditional laws and oligarchic legislation expressing public consensus, not to the people. According to him, the democracy renaissance and the renaissance of the rule of law are inextricably linked. In particular, it is true that the rule of law will continue to be accessible to an increasing number of citizens. This dissemination is not only an essential element of democracy, but the author also took this issue as the theoretical and methodological basis of his article.

According to Transparency International's "Corruption Perception Index" for 2020, Mongolia ranks¹ 111th out of 180 countries. This is the same as last year, but five positions lower. In other words, a slight change in the country's place in this list of countries in the Corruption Perception Index does not mean anything, since the number of countries surveyed varies from year to year. It is important to pay attention (Khatanbold, 2010, p. 114) to how the contents of the pointer change. In other words, Mongolia's Corruption

¹ See details on <https://www.transparency.org/en/news/cpi-2020-asia-pacific>.

Perception Index² (CPI) has averaged 38-40 points over the past 13 years, ranking 111-115 in the world. This means that two-thirds of the countries surveyed scored less than 50 points, an average of 43 points, which means “more corrupt”.

2008		2009		2010		2011		2012		2013		2014	
score	rank	score	rank	score	rank	score	rank	score	rank	score	rank	score	rank
↑ 3	102/180	↓ 2.7	120/130	↓ 2.7	127/178	↓ 2.7	120/183	↑ 36	94/176 (+2)	↑ 38	83/177 (+1)	↑ 39	80/175
2015		2016		2017		Corruption Perception Index		2018		2019		2020	
score	rank	score	rank	score	rank			score	rank	score	rank	score	rank
↑ 39	72/168 (-1)	↑ 38	87/176 (-1)	↓ 36	103/180 (-2)			↓ 37	93/180 (+1)	↓ 35	106/180 (-2)	↓ 35	111/180

Figure 1. Average corruption perception index in Mongolia (2008-2020). Source: Transparency International (<https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2020/index/mng>).

In view of this, it is reasonable to assume that the main reason for this decrease in the level of corruption is the increase in the level of political corruption. In fact, Mongolia's Millennium Development Goals, approved by Parliament Resolution No. 25 of April 21, 2005, were revised by Parliament Resolution No. 13 of January 31, 2008. The Resolution authorizes the Government and other relevant bodies, including the Anti-Corruption Agency, to improve the indicators and methodology of the development Goals, to evaluate and monitor their implementation, as well as to provide specialized and specialized databases with relevant information. In accordance with this commitment, IAAC has been conducting an annual “Corruption Perception Survey in Politics and Law Enforcement Agencies” since 2008. This research is important for identifying attitudes to corruption, jobs subject to corruption, positions, factors contributing to corruption, as well as planning and implementing anti-corruption measures. According to the latest report published in the study, the Perception index of corruption in the political sphere in 2019 was 4.08, an increase of 0.15 points compared to the previous year. Compared to the previous 12 years, the corruption perception index averaged 3.89 compared to 0.4-0.5 in 2008. However, with the exception of 2013-2016, steady fluctuations have been observed over the past three years with a high level of about four points in the period from 2008 to 2012. The problem is based on a detailed study of the circumstances, scale, factors, and causes of this. As mentioned above, we have analyzed the degree, form, causes, and degree of political corruption, as well as the level and degree of anti-corruption policies and activities.

The Extent of Corruption in the Political Sphere, Its Status, and Prospects

In this section, the author aims to provide an overview of corruption in terms of indicators other than the basic assessment of corruption in the political sphere. It compares the overall prospects and prevalence of corruption in Mongolia with the results of an expert survey conducted over the past 13 years. According to this comparison, the Perception index of corruption in the political sphere in 2020 was 3.98 (IAAC, 2020, p. 8), which is 0.10 points less than in the previous year (the 2019 index is 4.08). It is compared with the indicators of

²<https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2008>; <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2009>; https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/cpi2011_map.pdf; <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2014/index/mng>; <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2015/index/mng>; <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2016/index/mng>; <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2017/index/mng>; <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2018/index/mng>; <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2019/index/mng>.

expert perception surveys conducted in the past, the average of the Corruption Perception Index is 3.89 point. This is a decrease of 0.19 points compared to the initial survey results in 2008 (4.09) and the maximum in the last 13 years, the first year of the survey. The chart below (2008, 2010, 2011, and 2019) shows a trend towards higher ratings with a constant average of 3.58-3.98.

In other words, although any measures to reduce corruption at a high level have clearly been taken, this shows that the ethical, mental, and conscious motives of politicians and high-ranking government officials aimed at reducing the risk of its growth have not been revived. As a result, this can be seen as a sign of a serious lack of political will, courage, and leadership (Figure 2).



Figure 2. Level of corruption in the political sphere (2008-2020). Source: Khatanbold (2021, pp. 51-176).

Note. Average score: 1-5 points (5 very high, 4 high, 3 moderate, 2 low, 1 none).

According to the IAAC Study of Perceptions of Political and Law Enforcement Corruption in 2015, the perception assessment has been divided into two stages: (i) 2008-2013 and (ii) 2014 (2020). This category is probably not wrong. This is due to the fact that in 2013 the methodology of analytical assumptions was changed, and since 2014 research has been conducted using a new methodology. At the same time, from 2018, the study of corruption in the political sphere and the study of corruption in judicial and law enforcement agencies will be studied and reported separately.

As a result, the scale, forms, causes, and consequences of corruption over the past 13 years are shown in the definition of the nature of the “upper (high) level” of corruption within a political organization in Mongolia (Figure 3).

According to perception, the indicators for determining the nature of corruption in 2008-2020 range from 3.38 to 4.54 points in these years, and the average level of corruption is 3.84 or is gradually increasing. In the case of corruption type, it is estimated to be between 3.5 and 4.19 magnitude, with an average of 3.86 magnitude approaching a slight decrease. The causes and conditions of corruption ranged from 3.8 to 4.27, approaching an average of 4.07 points, which indicates a trend towards stabilization. However, the indicators of harm and consequences of corruption ranged from 3.93 or 3.58-4.18 and tended to slightly decrease. This indicator was estimated as a steady decline in 2013, 2014, and 2015, which, on the one hand, is a positive factor. On the contrary, since 2016 the figures have increased, not decreased. In view of this, if the indicators of corruption in the political sphere are averaged over the past thirteen years, it is quite likely that 3.93 points will not be considered a positive phenomenon, but it represents a potential problem. As is shown in Figure 4 below, the results of this survey have increased and decreased from 2008 to 2020 since the initial level of corruption in politics and law enforcement. For example, the perception of corruption in 2008 was 4.09, and in 2009 is 3.95, which is 0.14 points less than in the previous year. In 2009-2010, the results increased by +0.12 points.




Figure 3. Index of indicators of political corruption (2008-2020). Source: Khatanbold (2021, pp. 51-176).

Note. The average value is estimated on a scale from 1 to 5 (5 very high, 4 high, 3 moderate, 2 low, 1 none).

2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
↓ -0.14	↗ 0.12	↘ 0	↓ -0.14	↓ -0.25	↘ -0.10	↗ 0.07	↘ 0	↑ 0.32	↘ -0.04	↗ 0.15	↘ -0.10

Figure 4. Changes in the level of corruption in politics and law enforcement agencies (2008-2020). Source: Khatanbold (2021, pp. 51-176).

This shows that the overall assessment of corruption in political and law enforcement agencies decreased by an average of -0.13 points in 2011-2012, 2012-2013, 2013-2014, 2017-2018, and 2019-2020. However, in 2009-2010, 2014-2015, 2016-2017, and 2018-2019, this estimated indicator increased by an average of +0.17 points, and this situation began to stabilize. In addition, there were no fluctuations in 2010-2011 and 2015-2016, and they were assessed as the same. So, in 2008-2020, or over the past 13 years, there has been a steady fluctuation of around four points. It can be concluded that the level of corruption in the political sphere has not significantly decreased.

Our next emphasized topic is the prevalence of corruption, changes in its level, and the scale of corruption in the sector. In other words, an attempt was made to clarify the level of corruption in certain types of activities and activities of the sector. In doing so, we tried to create a realistic picture by analyzing indicators for the period 2014-2020. For example, the average scale index decreased significantly in 2014 and 2016, but gradually increased and stabilized in 2017-2020. In particular, the annual estimates of these sub-indicators (2014-2020) range on average from 3.50 to 4.08, which indicates that the level of corruption is above average or decreasing. Fluctuations of 3.50-4.08 indicate that the level of corruption is above average or decreasing. However, from 2008 to 2013, when the study of corruption in Mongolia was first launched, experts' assessment of corruption in Mongolia's political and law enforcement agencies was 3.68 in 2013, which is 0.25 points less than in 2012.

In fact, of the six institutions included in the assessment of the prevalence of corruption in Mongolia's political institutions at that time, the prevalence of corruption in political parties, governments, ministries, and agencies was relatively high. This indicates that the average prevalence of corruption in all political institutions surveyed has gradually decreased over the period from 2008 to 2013. The scale of corruption is increasing from year to year, as evidenced by the results of expert assessments such as conducted during the survey (Figure 5). For

example, the school of political corruption tends to fluctuate by an average of 3.84 points when determining the scale of political corruption within only five sub-indicators.

Years	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
The prevalence of political corruption	3.87	4.5	4.5	3.82	3.5	4.02	3.58	4.02	4.05	4.18	4.34	4.32	4.28
Changes in the level of political corruption	3.62	3.1	4.17	3.82	3.3	3.26	3.13	3.26	3.58	3.59	3.56	3.69	3.75
The degree of spread in the political corruption in the sector	4.07	3.9	3.71	3.85	3.5	3.2	3.16	3.52	3.39	3.99	3.93	3.92	4.01
The level of corruption in some areas of government activity	4.04	4.1	4.34	4.43	4.2	3.74	3.47	3.64	3.47	3.93	4.17	4.37	4.34
Political corruption in the sector and activities	4.03	4.2	4.07	4.16	4	3.64	3.23	3.74	3.72	3.92	3.97	4.12	4.01
Average index of the Corruption perception	3.93	4	4.16	4.02	3.7	3.57	3.38	3.63	3.53	3.94	3.69	4.13	4.08

Figure 5. The scale of political corruption in comparison and on average (2008-2020). Source: Khatanbold (2021, pp. 51-176).

Note. The average value is estimated on a scale from 1 to 5 (5 very high, 4 high, 3 moderate, 2 low, 1 none).

Figure 5 above summarizes the assessment of each indicator of the criteria included in the sphere of political corruption as follows. In particular, it shows the level of corruption in the political sphere and the situation that arises because of this. For example, in the period from 2014 to 2020, the analysts surveyed found that on average 32.7 percent said “very high” and 41.4 percent said “high” the prevalence of political corruption. However, on average, 14 percent of experts said that corruption was “moderate”, 4.3 percent “insignificant”, and 6.7 percent “did not know how to react”, indicating that Mongolia is “highly corrupted” at this time. According to the analysis of experts interviewed during this period (2014-2020), 74.18% note a high level of corruption in the political sphere, as well as the prevalence of corruption in political organizations of Mongolian society (Figure 6).

As shown in the figure below (Figure 6), the following changes occurred in 2008-2020, when the average value was measured on a scale from 1 to 5. Therefore, it should be noted that there were no “completely not” and “few” answers to corruption in Mongolia as a result of the study period. This is directly related to the fact that a certain level of corruption in political organizations still exists, and political parties and forces do not take concrete measures to eliminate it and do not see this as a challenge for their parties and forces.

Years	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Very much	42.0	30.5	24.6	32.3	45.5	54.5	24.2
Much	23.0	50.8	55.7	43.5	37.9	28.8	53.2
Moderate	21.0	8.5	19.7	16.1	7.6	7.6	14.5
Somewhat	9.0	10.2	0.0	3.2	3.0	7.6	3.2
Don't know	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.8	6.1	1.5	4.8
Average	3.77	4.02	4.05	4.18	4.34	4.32	4.1

Figure 6. Comparison of the prevalence of corruption in Mongolia, 2014-2020 (percentage). Source: Khatanbold (2021, pp. 51-176).

	The prevalence of political corruption 2008-2009: (+0.67); 2009-2010: (-0.04); 2010-2011: (-0.68); 2011-2012: (-0.30); 2012-2013: (+0.50); 2013-2014: (-0.44); 2014-2015: (+0.44); 2015-2016: (+0.03); 2016-2017: (+0.13); 2017-2018: (+0.16); 2018-2019: (-0.02); 2019-2020: (-0.04);
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Figure 7. The prevalence of political corruption. Source: Khatanbold (2021, pp. 51-176).

As for the changes in the level of political corruption, the experts in this survey assessed the changes in the level of political corruption individually and clarified the participants' opinion on how much corruption in political organizations in Mongolia has changed compared to the previous year. For example, over the past seven years (2014-2020), in 2014 the level of corruption in the political sphere was the highest—42.4 percent, and in 2015 it decreased by 12.4 percent to 30 percent. However, it grew rapidly from 2016 to 2018 and declined to 31.8 percent in 2019, but increased again to 33.9 percent in 2020. This leads to the fact that, on average, 36.28 percent of all political analysts surveyed over the past seven years say that the level of corruption of that involved experts has not changed.

Table 1

Changes in the Level of Corruption in the Political Sphere 2014-2020 (Percentage)

No.	Quantity	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
1	Don't know	6.1	-	-	7.9	4.5	3.0	3.2
2	Very decreased	-	5.0	-	1.5	1.5	-	-
3	Decreased	24.2	18.0	6.7	-	7.6	9.1	4.8
4	No changes	42.4	30.0	38.3	39.7	37.9	31.8	33.9
5	Increased	18.2	40.0	45.0	36.5	33.3	36.4	38.7
6	Very increased	19.4	7.0	10.0	11.1	15.2	19.7	19.4

Khatanbold O. *Analysis of the situation with corruption in Mongolian politics.*

Policy research findings. KAS, NUM. UB, 2021. pp. 51-176.

On the contrary, 18.2% of analysts rated the level of corruption in the political sphere as “growing” in 2014, rising rapidly to 40% in 2015 and 45% in 2016, and it seems to have decreased slightly (-8.5%) since 2017, but remains relatively stable. It is expected that the assessment of the level of corruption in the political sphere will increase again in the 2020 assessment. In other words, 35.44 percent reported an increase in corruption in the political sphere, if the total number of experts surveyed during this period is averaged. According to an average survey conducted between 2008 and 2013, corruption was most prevalent at the government level, followed by political parties and local authorities in this list of corrupted areas (IAAC, 2014, p. 135).

Table 2

Corruption Risks for the Formal Officials 2008-2013 (Quantitative Assessment)

No.	Formal officials	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
1	At the managerial level of public administration (Minister, Deputy Minister, State secretary)	4.53	3.50	3.58	4.08	4.17	3.85
2	Middle-level civil servants (heads of the departments, and divisions at the level of line ministries and its agencies)	4.21	3.91	3.58	4.23	3.46	3.69
3	Executive officials/servants of the public administration	4.0	4.50	4.23	3.58	2.77	3.0
4	Civil servants	4.04	4.09	4.08	3.38	2.83	3.0

Source: Khatanbold (2021, pp. 51-176).

According to the assessment of corruption risks at the level of senior civil servants (2008-2013), the risk of corruption among civil servants at the managerial level of public administration was estimated in 2008 as 4.53. However, it shows that the number was consistently high, and then decreased in 2013 to 3.85 points or by -0.68 points. The highest risk assessments for mid-level civil servants were in 2011, 2008 and 2009. However, in 2012 it decreased, and in 2013 it increased again due to the relatively stable risk of corruption at this level, which does not increase the genuine desire to fight corruption in the social psyche. The risk of corruption among the public sector managers was high in 2009 and 2010, but has steadily decreased since 2011, then decreased significantly in 2012 and slightly increased in 2013. Comparative indicators show that the assessment of corruption by all analysts as “elevated” in the political sphere has been steadily increasing over the same period, although each indicator fluctuates, but the overall decline is not enough. This corresponds to the fact that the IAAC, the judiciary, and the judiciary have cracked down on high-ranking leaders of political parties, high-ranking government officials, and other high-profile corruption scandals. It is worth noting here that the experts emphasized the connection. On the other hand, the extent of political corruption in the sector or in public institutions has changed over the past 13 years. In 2020, 48.4 percent of all experts will report to the Government (ministries and departments), 41.9 percent to aimags, capitals, somons, and districts, 40.3 percent to local governments, 35.5 percent to the presidential administration, and 32.3 percent believe that corruption is widespread in the Mongolian Parliament. It also believes that corruption is widespread (IAAC, 2020, p. 13) in the Mongolian parliament. Compared with the average value of the forecast studies conducted by experts in the period 2008-2020 for the above-mentioned state institutions, the actual results are shown in Table 2. For an instance, the first stage of this targeted perceptual survey (2008-2013), the prevalence of corruption in the political sector and institutions ranged from 0.05-0.75 points. As a result, changes in these indicators showed a gradual decline. According to the forecast for 2020, the prevalence of political corruption in public institutions alone averaged 3.33, which is 0.58 points less than in previous years (Table 3).

Table 3

Corruption Distributions in the Sectors and Spheres (Public Institutions, 2008-2020)

Sectors/spheres	2008	2009	Changes	2010	2011	Changes	2012	2013	Changes	2014	2015	Changes	2016	2017	Changes	2018	2019	Changes	2020	Changes
Parliament of Mongolia	3.71	4.46	-0.75	4.00	3.75	-0.25	3.27	3.67	+0.4	3.62	3.80	+0.18	3.71	4.25	+0.54	3.87	4.04	+0.17	3.98	-0.06
Government (<i>line ministries, agencies</i>)	4.38	4.29	-0.09	4.40	4.00	-0.40	4.25	4.08	-0.17	3.80	3.96	+0.16	4.03	4.27	+0.23	4.23	4.22	-0.01	4.18	-0.04
Spheres of Presidential governance	-	2.91	-	3.75	3.27	-0.48	2.18	2.36	+0.18	2.71	3.45	+0.74	3.35	3.90	+0.56	3.57	3.75	+0.18	3.74	-0.01
Local authorities (<i>aimag, city, soum, district Citizens' Repr.Kural</i>)	3.77	3.62	-0.15	3.25	3.55	+0.30	3.67	3.54	-0.13	3.67	3.41	-0.26	3.55	3.89	+0.34	3.75	3.56	-0.19	3.95	+0.39
Governor (<i>aimag, city, soum, district</i>) Governors' Administrative Office	4.14	4.23	-0.09	3.83	4.08	+0.24	4.08	3.69	-0.39	3.88	3.64	-0.24	3.70	3.93	+0.23	3.97	3.85	-0.12	4.15	+0.3
Political parties	4.36	3.92	-0.44	4.0	4.27	+0.27	3.69	4.09	+0.4	3.74	3.91	+0.17	4.36	4.48	+0.13	4.21	4.08	-0.13	-	-4.08
Corruption prevalence index	4.07	3.90	-0.17	3.87	3.82	-0.05	3.52	3.57	+0.05	3.57	3.69	+0.12	3.78	4.12	+0.34	3.93	3.91	-0.02	3.33	-0.58

Note. The average value is estimated on a scale from 1 to 5. (5 very high, 4 high, 3 moderate, 2 low, 1 none)

Source: Khatanbold (2021, pp. 51-176).

From the above comparative table (Table 3) it can be seen that the prevalence index of political corruption in public institutions in 2018 was 3.93, and in 2019 was 3.91. In particular, the prevalence of corruption in the presidential administration and in Parliament, the government, and its ministries and departments is -0.06; and slightly decreased by 0.04 points. However, the assessment of the Governors from the aimag/capital, sum/district and his office or local government increased by +0.3 points in 2019 and 2020; it also increased by +0.39 points, which is the opposite of last year's indicator. In conclusion, the degree of prevalence of political corruption in industry or government institutions, and the Government, its branches, parliament, political parties, and local self-government bodies (aimags, metropolitan and sum Citizens' Representatives' Hural) are still the most common sources of corruption, such remains the most widespread institution of corruption. These indicators, especially in 2017, fluctuated between (+0.13)–(+0.56), and then increased by 2.03 percent, which suggests that there is a reason for this. However, after the 7th Regular Parliamentary Elections in Mongolia in 2016 (as well as local elections), the annual dismissal of civil servants by party affiliation led to an increase in corruption. The growing political influence of the political parties and forces that won the elections has led to an increase in corruption at all levels.

As for 2020, 10 months after the 8th Parliamentary Elections, the following situation will give a clear answer to the question about the degree of the above grounds. In particular, the analysis of the potential of the civil service presented by the World Bank in February 2021 over the past 10 years allowed us to draw the following conclusions. It is 34 percent more than the number of civil servants over the past decade, but the issue of personnel is still a problem, and continued illegal appointments after the elections have significantly weakened it, in accordance with studies tells. In particular, after the 2012 and 2016 elections, the turnover of civil servants increased, and before the new Law on Civil Service came into force in 2019, 149 civil servants were appointed without any selection, according to a survey by the Civil Service Council. The following specific reasons, such as appointments based on acquaintances and interests, led to staff turnover in the civil service, increased politicization and regular restructuring of ministries and departments, which reduced the opportunities (World Bank, 2021) for hiring highly qualified specialists. In addition, the study emphasizes that all these factors hinder the strengthening of public service, which confirms our conclusion.

On the other hand, the main purpose of this article is to clarify the extent of corruption in the political sphere of public activity, the level of corruption in public institutions, and the level of corruption in the public service. First of all, it should be noted that the spread in this area has increased. In particular, analysts' perception of serious corruption in tenders, public procurement, all types of licenses, and land ownership has remained high since the beginning of the study. In fact, corruption in the middle-level government is widespread. It is important to note that this situation may escalate and pose a serious risk if significant actions are not taken at this stage. The extent of corruption in state organizations was assessed by experts interviewed in six specific areas. It is alarming that the average value of these indicators ranges from 3.85 up to 4.34, and the prevalence of corruption is increasing. This is not only a cause for concern, but also a sign of the country's development and the fact that a high level of corruption will increase in the future, which obscures any measures aimed at reducing corruption. On the other hand, the biggest problem is the use of public administration for personal purposes and the undermining of the system of social inequality and justice for personal purposes (Table 4).

Table 4

Level of Corruption in the Activities of Public Service (Public Organization) 2008-2020

Indicators/ assessment	2008	2009	Changes	2010	2011	Changes	2012	2013	Changes	2014	2015	Changes	2016	2017	Changes	2018	2019	Changes
Procurement, operations and tenders	4.80	4.54	-0.26	4.75	4.54	-0.21	4.69	4.23	+0.46	4.26	4.30	+0.04	4.26	4.29	+0.03	4.36	4.49	+0.13
Appointment to the official positions	4.53	4.46	-0.04	4.50	4.31	-0.19	4.38	3.92	-0.46	4.00	4.14	+0.14	4.30	4.43	+0.13	4.56	4.66	+0.10
Licensing, renewal and revocation of licenses	4.80	4.69	-0.11	4.83	4.46	-0.37	4.31	4.00	-0.31	3.95	4.02	+0.07	4.11	4.17	+0.06	4.23	4.34	+0.11
Implementing the projects and programs	4.13	4.08	-0.05	4.25	3.85	-0.04	4.25	4.15	-0.10	3.63	3.95	+0.32	3.81	4.18	+0.37	4.02	4.10	+0.08
Budget expenditures	4.27	4.38	+0.11	4.42	3.67	-0.75	4.58	4.42	-0.16	3.63	3.70	+0.07	3.59	4.02	+0.43	3.96	4.20	+0.24
Index of the prevalence of political corruption in public affairs										3.67	3.85	+0.18	3.92	3.98	+0.06	3.91	4.42	+0.05
Privatization	3.87	3.82	-0.05	4.50	4.00	-0.50	4.00	4.15	+0.15									
Index of the prevalence of political corruption in public affairs	4.40	4.32	-0.08	4.54	4.13	-0.4	4.36	4.14	-0.22	3.85	3.99	+0.14	3.99	4.17	+0.18	4.17	4.36	+0.19

Note. The average value is estimated on a scale from 1 to 5 (5 very high, 4 high, 3 moderate, 2 low, 1 none). Source: Khatanbold (2021, pp. 51-176).

From the above comparison, it can be concluded that as the level of corruption in the political sphere increases, its harm and consequences penetrate into all layers of society and become the main factor influencing the growth of inequality in society. On the other hand, the changes in indicators shown above do not pass the test of fairness (MDG 9 Project, 2009, p. 111) in reducing the level of corruption. For example, there is an opaque system that leads to the creation of undemocratic and uncontrolled mechanisms, such as the use of public services by politicians, obtaining and renewing licenses, interference in the work of judicial and law enforcement agencies.

This is confirmed by the results of other studies. For an instance, according to the Governance Matters from the World Bank Institute, the Mongolia's performance between 2010³-2019 was based on six internationally recognized governance indicators (Table 5). According to this management indicator, the level of corruption in Mongolia decreased from -0.74 in 2010 to -0.44 in 2019, to 37.50 percent, indicating a weak perception of corruption in the country. The fight against corruption is not only a matter of departmental level, but also political culture, awareness, and political aspirations of all citizens and leaders of political and public services at all levels of government.

³ See details on <https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Reports>;
<http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Documents#wgiDataSources>.

Table 5

Comparative results of Mongolia's Governance Indicators for 2010-2019

Governance indicators	Years	Percent (0-100)	Assessment (-2.5~+2.5)	Standard deviation	Sources of governance data used
Voice and Accountability (VA) (Citizen's participation, freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media)	2010	51.66	+0.09	0.13	14
	2012	52.11	+0.07	0.12	15
	2014	56.65	+0.24	0.13	11
	2016	56.65	+0.33	0.13	13
	2018	57.14	+0.26	0.13	13
	2019	59.11	+0.35	0.12	12
Political Stability and Absence of Violence (PV) (Unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism)	2010	66.35	+0.60	0.24	7
	2012	62.09	+0.47	0.22	8
	2014	73.33	+0.79	0.20	8
	2016	73.33	+0.80	0.20	9
	2018	73.33	+0.84	0.21	9
	2019	68.57	+0.64	0.23	8
Government Effectiveness (GE) (Independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation, and implementation)	2010	34.93	-0.57	0.19	11
	2012	30.81	-0.64	0.20	11
	2014	37.02	-0.44	0.21	10
	2016	50.48	-0.10	0.19	11
	2018	46.67	-0.23	0.20	11
	2019	42.31	-0.19	0.20	11
Regulatory Quality (RQ) (The government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development)	2010	44.02	-0.24	0.15	12
	2012	45.50	-0.21	0.16	13
	2014	44.71	-0.27	0.18	12
	2016	52.40	-0.08	0.17	13
	2018	56.25	0.03	0.17	12
	2019	53.85	-0.01	0.17	12
Rule of Law (RL) (The quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts)	2010	43.60	-0.36	0.14	16
	2012	43.66	-0.38	0.14	17
	2014	42.31	-0.34	0.15	14
	2016	45.67	-0.22	0.16	14
	2018	44.23	-0.27	0.14	14
	2019	45.67	-0.47	0.15	14
Control of Corruption (CC) (Perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain)	2010	25.24	-0.74	0.15	14
	2012	35.55	-0.54	0.14	15
	2014	37.02	-0.47	0.14	13
	2016	36.54	-0.49	0.13	14
	2018	39.90	-0.43	0.13	14
	2019	37.50	-0.44*	0.14	13

Notes: Governance indicators are based on the results of expert surveys on the quality of governance conducted by the private sector, citizens and developing countries, research institutes, NGOs and international organizations, and statistics of their responses. This does not reflect the official position of the World Bank.

* Governance performance efficiency varies from about -2.5 (weak) to +2.5 (strong).

The table above shows that the political stability index was 66.35% (+0.60) in 2010, and about ten years later, in 2019, it was 68.57% (+0.64), which should be paid attention to. This is due to the fact that, as far as we

know, political stability is not sufficiently developed in practice, which means that in the long term it has become a threat to the state.

The author is trying to figure out what caused this. Thus, the influence of the government or the quality of public services was estimated at 34.93 percent or (-0.57) in 2010 and 42.31 percent or (-0.19) in 2019. This suggests that a significant deterioration in the potential is the main factor in the failure of the government. In addition, the table above (Table 5) shows that the role of citizens and independent media is insufficient to express their views and opinions. As a result, there is a need to analyze how corruption in the political sphere of Mongolia affects the sector and operations, and identify changes and differences in this process. At the same time, the comparison of corruption in the political sphere is divided into two stages: 2008-2013 and 2014-2020. However, according to the analysis of experts involved in this period, the direction of corruption in the political sphere and its index are different (Table 6).

From the above comparison, the average rating of activities aimed at combating corruption in the political sphere decreased by 0.13 points (IAAC of Mongolia, 2019, pp. 72, 76, 139, 140) compared to the previous year to 3.40 in 2011, and the same result in 2013 increased by +0.57 points compared to 2012. In particular, corruption has increased in the mass media such called as fourth governance in the sector of the fourth estate. In addition, the growth of corruption in the legislature and decision-making by half a percent indicates that political corruption prevails in this area. However, these changes (Table 6) show that the assessment of corruption in the infrastructure and agricultural sectors has decreased slightly. Significant changes in the indicators of 2014-2015 occurred mainly in international organizations, industry, business or the private sector, the media, the civil service, foreign investment, the legislature, decision-making, mining, minerals, and law enforcement agencies, increased by 0.28-0.53 points or an average of +0.38 points. Corruption in the judicial system, infrastructure, and construction decreased by 0.12 percentage points. This does not mean that there is no corruption in these sectors, but in recent years, according to experts, political corruption has been observed in these sectors.

Table 6

Trends and Index of Political Corruption in Mongolia (2008-2013)

Trends	2009	2010	Changes	2011	2012	Changes	2013	Changes
Establishment of power in the party	4.55	4.42	-0.13	4.33	4.20	-0.13	4.33	+0.13
Privatization	3.73	4.10	+0.37	4.20	4.00	-0.20	4.08	+0.08
Farming crop	3.60	3.00	-0.06	3.25	3.40	+0.15	3.09	-0.31
Business and private sector	4.27	4.45	+0.18	3.92	4.18	-0.26	4.36	+0.18
Mass media	4.38	4.27	-0.11	4.54	3.67	-0.87	4.08	+0.41
Court	3.49	3.46	-0.03	3.62	2.89	-0.73	3.00	+0.11
Infrastructure	4.50	4.17	-0.33	4.30	4.45	-0.15	4.31	-0.14
Foreign investment	3.82	3.92	+0.10	4.17	4.00	-0.17	3.91	-0.09
Legislative processes and decision-making processes	3.64	3.75	+0.11	3.92	3.55	-0.37	4.08	+0.53
Mining and mineral	4.67	4.42	-0.25	4.54	4.33	-0.21	4.38	+0.05
Construction	4.08	3.92	-0.16	4.23	4.08	-0.15	4.15	+0.07
Index of the impact of political corruption	4.18	4.07	-0.11	3.53	3.40	-0.13	3.97	-0.07

Note. The average value is estimated on a scale from 1 to 5 (5 very high, 4 high, 3 moderate, 2 low, 1 none). Source: Khatabold (2021, pp. 51-176).

In addition, this table (Table 6) shows a significant increase in 2019 (2018-2019), which can be seen by the change in the average rating. For example, the number of indicators in the judicial system, infrastructure, legislation, and decision-making, law enforcement agencies and the media has increased significantly. The public service, construction, and foreign investment sectors grew slightly, while the industrial and business-private sectors declined, while the mining sector remained small or insignificant. However, the corruption impact index in this sector in 2014 was 3.57 points, but it is expected that it will increase from year to year (IAAC of Mongolia, 2019, p. 243). Basically, the corruption and official crimes related to mining have increased significantly, not to mention in recent years. In particular, it is important to note that the court still has cases of crimes related to abuse of official position by high-ranking government officials and self-interest through their interested representatives. For example, last year (2020) the overall index of political corruption was 4.09, which is 0.03 points less than in the previous year. Analysis of changes in the direction of the industry and activity shows that the level of corruption in international organizations and industry has increased significantly. In other words, as of 2020, all but the three mentioned sectors decreased by 0.022-0.28 points (Table 7).

Table 7

Trends and Index of Political Corruption in Mongolia (2014-2020)

Trends	2014	2015	changes	2016	2017	changes	2018	2019	changes	2020	changes
1. International organizations	2.64	2.95	+0.31	0	0	0	0	0	0	4.00	+4.00
2. Industry	3.26	3.71	+0.45	3.50	3.70	+0.20	4.11	3.72	-0.39	3.86	+0.14
3. Business & Private sector	3.17	3.56	+0.39	3.07	3.31	+0.24	3.38	3.20	-0.18	3.26	+0.06
4. Mass media	3.75	4.14	+0.39	3.67	3.89	+0.22	3.81	4.03	+0.22	3.74	-0.29
5. Court	3.23	3.11	-0.12	3.39	3.92	+0.53	3.97	4.38	+0.41	4.10	-0.28
6. Infrastructure	4.03	3.91	-0.12	4.19	4.07	-0.12	4.1	4.43	+0.33	4.19	-0.24
7. Civil Service	3.56	3.92	+0.36	3.82	4.05	+0.23	4.14	4.32	+0.18	4.17	-0.15
8. Foreign investment	3.29	3.82	+0.53	3.90	3.84	-0.06	3.96	4.08	+0.12	3.93	-0.15
9. Legislative process & decision-making process	3.58	3.97	+0.39	3.52	3.90	+0.38	3.81	4.12	+0.31	3.98	-0.14
10. Mining and minerals	3.95	4.23	+0.28	4.27	4.31	+0.04	4.57	4.61	+0.04	4.55	-0.06
11. Construction	4.06	3.93	-0.13	4.08	4.02	-0.06	4.02	4.19	+0.17	4.15	-0.04
12. Law enforcement agencies	3.24	3.63	+0.39	3.40	3.88	+0.48	3.84	4.11	+0.27	4.09	-0.02
Index of the impact of political corruption	3.57	3.74	+0.17	3.72	3.92	+0.20	3.97	4.12	+0.15	4.09	-0.03

Note. The average value is estimated on a scale from 1 to 5.
(5 very high, 4 high, 3 moderate, 2 low, 1 none)

Source: Khatanbold (2021, pp. 51-176).

This suggests that the majority of analysts surveyed rate the following sectors as the most corrupt in their sector.

In conclusion, in most cases we need to focus on long-term efforts and trends rather than short-term changes such mentioned indicators. In other words, there has been no significant improvement in the quality of governance in Mongolia over the past decade, and there is also a lack of political will and determination to improve it. It is also necessary to improve the quality of public services for political parties and high-ranking government officials, especially among middle and lower-level civil servants. In addition, there is a loss of accountability, accountability, and government continuity. In addition, the scale of corruption in the political sphere and its prevalence in all sectors and activities have made it a priority to easily resolve any issue through

irresponsibility and bribery at all levels. In fact, selfishness and immorality eventually undermined basic social values and shook the very foundations of society. In other words, the network of triads of politics-business, political-legal, legal-judicial, and political-legal-control-business under the influence of political parties undermines the basic principles of public and civil service. In addition, the political detachment and bureaucracy have become commonplace at all levels of social relations. Moreover, the lack of knowledge and skills of employees, as well as moral and ethical shortcomings weakens the political culture. On the other hand, this was not enough to bring the sector's anti-corruption efforts to an effective and practical level.

	The most corrupt sectors 1. Mining and minerals 2. Construction 3. Court 4. International NGOs 5. Infrastructure 6. Civil Service 7. Law enforcement agencies
Moderately corrupt sectors 1. Legislative process, decision-making process 2. Foreign investment 3. Industry	 To a lesser extent, corrupt sectors 1. Mass media 2. Business, private sector

Figure 8. The scale of corruption in the political sphere and its prevalence in all sectors. Source: Khatanbold (2021, pp. 51-176).

Recently, under the influence of political parties, low-skilled civil servants have been appointed to the middle, higher, and primary levels of government. It is worth noting that this has led to an increased tendency to irresponsibility in work and duties, to the creation of bureaucracy, humiliation of people, and unfair treatment of others in the performance of their official duties. It is concluded that this is the basis for establishing corrupt relations between the state and business and other improper relations through corruption, official misconduct, and obtaining official benefits.

Forms and State of Corruption in the Political Sphere

The next issue we present is the form of political corruption and its assessment. Types of political corruption are determined by a total of five sub-indicators, which are evaluated over the past thirteen years by affiliation to political parties and business groups, political corruption, forms of influence, forms of bribery, and methods of bribery. The following interesting pattern was observed (Table 8). For example, bribery in the political sphere grew steadily from 2008 to 2012 and reached its peak in 2012. This means that the highest form of corruption is lobbying for selfish decision-making.

Since 2013, the index of this type of assessment has significantly decreased (-0.63 points from the previous assessment in 2012) and then steadily declined until 2016 (in 2013-2014 it increased by -0.35 points, in 2014-2015 it increased by +0.10 points, and in 2015-2016 it increased by -0.06 points). Then, since 2017, the form of bribery tends to increase again. In particular, in 2018-2019 it increased by +0.25 points, in 2017-2018 it decreased by -0.9 points, in 2019-2020 it decreased by 0.16 points. Although, on the one hand, it seems that it has decreased, the most worrying thing is that the comparative assessment of forms of bribery does not show a trend below the average value of the evaluation index. If we consider the prevalence of corruption in the political sphere, listing it by growth and decline indicators, and limit ourselves to the last three years of analysts' estimates, then the corruption estimate in 2020 was 3.89 and decreased by -0.15 points compared to the previous year. However, the indicator of political corruption in 2018 decreased by 0.23 points from 3.81. It shows that the assessment of bribery in the political sphere decreased by 3.67 points or -0.16 points from last

year's estimate of 3.84 and increased by +0.08 points from an estimate of 3.59 in 2018. This indicates the need to make clear changes to them.

Table 8

Assessment of Forms of Political Corruption 2008-2020 (by Index)

The scope of political corruption	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
	Corruption as highly valued form (3.71-5.0)							Corruption as medium valued form (3.00-3.70)					
Forms of bribery	4.27	4.09	4.17	4.08	4.43	3.80	3.45	3.55	3.49	3.69	3.59	3.84	3.68
Forms of illegal influence	3.87	4.00	3.83	4.00	3.62	4.08	3.71	3.62	3.64	3.94	3.96	4.12	4.03
Dependence of political parties and business groups	4.79	3.17	3.67	3.07	3.02	3.12	3.31	3.40	3.44	3.88	3.74	3.96	3.81
Forms of political corruption	3.62	4.19	4.10	4.19	4.06	4.17	3.60	3.82	3.84	4.18	4.06	4.35	4.12
Methods of giving and receiving bribes in the political sphere	4.80	3.66	3.85	3.65	3.95	3.70	3.37	3.38	3.37	3.81	3.71	3.79	3.75
Index of forms of political corruption	4.27	3.82	3.92	3.79	3.81	3.77	3.50	3.58	3.58	3.92	3.81	4.04	3.89

Note. The average value is estimated on a scale from 1 to 5 (5 very high, 4 high, 3 moderate, 2 low, 1 none). Source: Khatanbold (2021, pp. 51-176).




Figure 9. The most frequently used forms in politics. Source: Khatanbold (2021, pp. 51-176).

From the above it can be seen that there is a significant increase of +0.05 points in debt repayment from the 13 most commonly used forms in the political sphere. Nevertheless, there was an increase of +0.09 points for cash disbursements and +0.10 points for appointments and inclusion in jobs and positions. Other forms of bribery range from -0.01 to -0.33. In order to study, it attempted to detail, the forms of bribery in the political sphere are considered as. At the same time, the average estimates of analysts interviewed in the most commonly used forms for making decisions beneficial to officials in the political sphere were analyzed (Table 9). Thus, the following forms and their manifestations are averaged, which are considered the most common among the many forms of political corruption. As can be seen from the table, 13 types are considered the most common.

These studies over the past 13 years have specifically looked at the average ranking of types of bribery through comparison. Thus, the list of the most common forms of bribery includes with the appointment to a job or position (4.30), Give and take cash (4.12), Share profits and income (4.06), Give expensive gifts (house/apartment, car, etc.) (3.88), Awards, titles and badges (3.84), Payment for foreign events (3.78), and Travel expenses (3.74). The forms of medium valued form of corruption include in paying for training (3.60), payment for treatment and care (3.42), pay off the debt (3.36), Open an account with a foreign bank (3.34), and giving shares (3.2). "Get discounts on jobs and services" (3.7) was rated "slightly lower" than the 13 listed. Of these, the lowest or "very low" form did not appear at that time. According to analysts, the average level of bribery over the past 13 years was 4.03. This indicates that the level of corruption in Mongolia is above average, not below average. On the other hand, the fact that most types of bribery fluctuate in the category of "very high"

indicates that it is not only a wake-up call, but also a threat to the state. However, we need not only to understand this, but also how to reduce it in the short term. The most important thing is the fair and adequate participation of the government, political parties, politicians, all levels of government, and civil servants, especially citizens' participation fully required as. We are trying to make this happen, but we will not hide that it turns into an empty "declaration". Moreover, a clear manifestation of this is the growing tendency of politicians, political parties, and groups to use the problem of corruption as a tool of "hunting and political intimidation".

Table 9

Average Forms of Bribery 2008-2020

Forms of bribery	Average rating of each year														Rank
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020		
Corruption as highly valued form (3.71-5.0)			Corruption as medium valued form (3.31 - 3.70)					Corruption is a low-value form (2.0 – 3.30)					Aver		
1. Appointment to a job or position	-	4.40	4.67	4.38	4.23	4.25	4.02	4.04	4.35	4.24	4.38	4.32	4.42	4.30	
2. Give and take cash	4.07	4.70	4.42	4.15	4.67	4.58	3.59	3.73	3.67	4.08	3.75	4.09	4.18	4.12	
3. Share profits and income	3.80	4.20	4.36	4.00	4.54	4.58	3.95	3.80	3.89	4.00	3.87	4.03	3.87	4.06	
4. Awards, titles and badges	-	3.80	4.36	4.25	3.50	3.60	3.47	3.54	3.83	3.76	3.98	4.25	3.85	3.84	
5. Give expensive gifts <i>(house/apartment, car etc.)</i>	3.73	4.30	4.11	3.83	4.33	4.09	3.31	3.82	3.75	3.98	3.61	3.96	3.66	3.88	
6. Open an account with a foreign bank	-	2.90	3.63	3.33	3.75	3.60	3.16	2.88	3.12	3.37	3.22	3.63	3.55	3.34	
7. Payment for foreign events	-	3.80	4.33	4.08	4.45	3.54	3.48	3.82	3.39	3.60	3.60	3.80	3.55	3.78	
8. Get discounts on jobs and services	4.40	3.36	4.27	3.50	4.33	3.50	3.19	3.54	3.41	3.74	3.63	3.69	3.54	3.7	
9. Pay for travel expenses	3.33	3.90	4.09	4.08	4.36	3.62	3.55	3.82	3.44	3.62	3.58	3.81	3.48	3.74	
10. Pay off the debt	-	2.80	3.45	3.22	4.00	4.11	3.31	3.05	3.00	3.29	3.22	3.43	3.48	3.36	
11. Pay for training	-	3.80	3.83	3.77	4.10	4.00	3.36	3.36	3.04	3.42	3.46	3.71	3.40	3.60	
12. Giving shares	-	2.70	3.33	3.36	3.67	3.70	2.82	2.89	3.02	2.92	3.11	3.49	3.39	3.2	
13. Payment for treatment and care	-	3.60	3.82	3.60	3.75	3.36	3.26	3.36	2.96	3.43	3.25	3.47	3.29	3.42	

Note. The average value is estimated on a scale from 1 to 5 (5 very high, 4 high, 3 moderate, 2 low, 1 none). Source: Khatanbold (2021, pp. 51-176).

The prevalence of bribery is directly related to the continuing illegal forms of influence in the political sphere. This is due to the fact that politicians and high-ranking officials often influence the activities of state organizations and officials for personal purposes. The results table compares the evaluation of these commonly used methods by all experts interviewed over the past 13 years. We were very interested in the following picture. This is due to the fact that almost all six sub-indicators for detecting illegal consequences increased compared to the comparative results of the study. In particular, the number of cases of harassment, dismissals, and harassment of officials has increased significantly. In particular, a comparison of assessments conducted

between 2009 and 2013 shows that the prevalence of harassment and coercion by officials is the highest. However, the prevalence of direct remuneration of having an itchy palm is relatively small. Compared with the survey data conducted in the period from 2008 to 2013, the average score of these forms was 3.84, which did not show positive results for the specified period.

This is due to the fact that the average value of each indicator of illegal forms of political influence is steadily increasing, which indicates insufficient regulation of this type of activity. For each type of influence exerted by politicians, coercion through threats of dismissal or actions was evaluated (3.86). Instead, extortion of money in the name of mediation (3.18); illegal participation in internal activities (3.16); making illegal demands (3.13); Influence, such as extortion of remuneration (3.58), is more likely than politicians to increase to 5 points. The lack of serious attention to stopping it is a prime example of this risk. As a result, the average estimate of the prevalence of illegal forms of political influence from 2008 to 2013 by year is significantly higher in 2009, 2012, and 2013 (Figure 10). In fact, government and public officials are aware of the direct and indirect effects of such harassment, but they are aware of the need to prevent them from being exposed to such conditions, or to open the whistle in the event of this type of action, and therefore to provide real legal protection for whistleblowers. In fact, the law and legal status of the Civil Service and its related organizations, as well as the legislation following it, are not enough to disclose and resolve this issue within the framework of the law, but it is a real sign that it is not being implemented in practice. On the other hand, our subsequent analysis shows that in 2014-2020, politicians and high-ranking government officials continue to illegally influence the activities of state organizations and their officials for personal purposes. In particular, the results of expert surveys conducted during this period indicated that this type of illegal activity is becoming more widespread (Figure 10).




Figure 10. Average estimates and indicators of types of political influence (2009-2013). Source: Khatanbold (2021, pp. 51-176).

Note. The average value is estimated on a scale from 1 to 5 (5 very high, 4 high, 3 moderate, 2 low, 1 none).

Because of the following comparisons, political parties often use their connections to influence and exert pressure on government institutions and officials. In particular, it should be noted that experts noted the impact on activities through contacts with friends and acquaintances. In other words, it is a sign that politicians are increasingly using certain forms of influence. For example, the level of illegal influence in the political sphere over the past seven years indicates that politicians have created, influenced, and expanded their “network” of acquaintances with the help of promises, requests, and coercion. Analyzing this in more detail and taking into account their average indicators: the use of parties and friends and acquaintances is growing, the use of territorial ties, the use of family ties, the use of coercive forms of persecution. This is clearly shown by the average value of our analysis (Figure 11).

Indicator/Assessment	2014	2015	Changes (+/-)	2016	2017	Changes (+/-)	2018	2019	Changes (+/-)	2020	Changes (+/-)
Hustling	3.18	3.1	-0.08	2.96	3.49	0.53	3.58	3.67	0.09	3.69	0.02
Intimidation and threats	3.07	3.55	0.48	2.85	3.42	0.57	3.33	3.63	0.30	3.71	0.08
Make a request	3.45	3.56	0.11	3.29	3.66	0.37	3.85	3.97	0.12	3.89	-0.08
Make a promise	3.67	3.16	-0.51	3.54	3.77	0.23	4.03	4.05	0.02	3.95	-0.10
Using the local communities & connections	4.05	3.6	-0.45	3.87	4.14	0.27	4.21	4.27	0.06	3.98	-0.29
Using the families & kinship ties	3.86	3.55	-0.31	3.9	4.02	0.12	4.1	4.23	0.13	4.07	-0.16
Using the friends & acquaintances	3.97	3.86	-0.11	4.13	4.23	0.10	4.22	4.34	0.12	4.21	-0.13
Making the pressure/harassments	3.74	3.87	0.13	3.63	3.96	0.33	3.8	4.35	0.55	4.22	-0.13
Using the party connections	4.25	4.07	-0.18	4.41	4.47	0.06	4.5	4.51	0.01	4.44	-0.07

Figure 11. Common methods of influence for the politicians & high-ranking officials on state organizations and officials for selfish purposes (2014-2020). Source: Khatanbold (2021, pp. 51-176).

Note. The average value is estimated on a scale from 1 to 5 (5 very high, 4 high, 3 moderate, 2 low, 1 none).

All this suggests that such forms of influence as promises, requests, coercion, intimidation, and threats are illegal. At the same time, this type of illegal activity is becoming more frequent when politicians and high-ranking officials arbitrarily influence the activities of civil servants. The increase in this illegal trend is partly due to the appearance of such negative phenomena in society (Figure 12).




Figure 12. Forms of illegal influence in the political sphere (2014-2020). Source: Khatanbold (2021, pp. 51-176).

In the light of the above, politicians and high-ranking government officials compared the average over the past 13 years estimates of the impact of corruption on the activities of public organizations and officials for personal purposes. From the beginning of the study to 2013, the average annual assessment of the type of illegal influence ranged from 4.04 to 4.22 points, or “very high” impact. However, from 2014 to 2018, it “slightly” decreased from 3.71 to 3.96 points, and in 2019, for some reason, it increased to 4.12 points.

This is due to the fact that in the same year, high-ranking government officials, especially some members of Parliament, ministers, and heads of ministries and departments, were accused of receiving large loans from the Small-medium Enterprises Fund through their affiliates. In this corruption case, prominent political figures (J. Erdenebat, D. Erdenebat, etc.), in connection with mineral resources and the Oyutolgoi Agreement (S. Bayar, C. Saikhanbileg, S. Bayartsogt, etc.), in the railway investment agreement (M. Enkhsaikhan et al.), in this regard, some high-ranking officials abused their position and illegally took bribes, which may have contributed to an increase in the average rating. However, in 2020 it decreased by -0.10 points compared to the previous 2019. This suggests that in some years this trend has decreased somewhat, but this has not led to significant results.




Figure 13. Average assessment of illegal exposure (2009-2020). Source: Khatanbold (2021, pp. 51-176).

This indicates that the level of undue influence of politicians and high-ranking government officials on interference in any government activity is relatively low. In particular, it can be seen from the figure above (Figure 13) that most of the nine indicators for detecting illegal impacts have decreased. According to analysts, the number of threats and intimidation by politicians increased by +0.08 points compared to the previous year, and the number of coercive actions increased by +0.02 points. This is not something to be complacent about, and neglecting it is likely to be the root of a major conflict in the future. Thus, in previous years, relatively fading forms of influence revived, and increasing forms of influence declined. We will discuss this in more detail in the next series (subsection).

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