

The T-Junction Conflict Palaver Amongst the Balikumbat and Bafanji People: Causes, Evolution, and Impacts 1966-1998

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Abstract

In Africa, ethnic conflicts were the main forms of political instability in the multi-ethnic societies during second half of twenty century and the beginning of the new century. The North West Region of Cameroon is a multi-ethnic region and is one of the main theatres for ethnic tension in the country. The ethnic conflict in this region reflects not only relations between the indigenous peoples in the region, but is also a treat to national unity. The relative absence of industries and growing unemployment has thus resulted in agrarian overpopulation and underemployment. This situation has aggravated the struggle for land and competition for the limited number of privileged and lucrative positions in the local administrations between members of the different ethnic groups. From this perspective, this paper appraises the root, evolution, and the impact of boundary conflict between Balikumbat and Bafanji with reference to the T-junction perspective as key site of contestation, and thus an integral aspect of conflict among the local population. This paper also illustrates the social context of ethnic conflict in multi-ethnic societies given the varied nature of various ethnic conflicts in the region and the deep historical roots. Data were derived from primary, secondary, and alternative sources. However, the author adopted the content analysis based on logical deduction and analysis of the available data. In sum, the study found out that the dominant causes of the conflict include ethnic differences, land grasping, and political power.

Keywords

T-junction, ethnic conflict, boundary, Balikumbat, Bafanji

There have been many land related conflicts in Ngoketunjia Division of the North West Region of Cameroon with Balikumbat Sub-division recording the highest number. For instance, that between Baligansin and Bamukumbit, Baligashu and Bamukumbit, Bamukumbit and Balikumbat, and the most devastating has been that between Balikumbat and Bafanji. The five communities that constitute the area claimed Tikar and Chamba origins. This latter conflict traces its roots as far back as the pre-colonial period. These two groups of people had migrated and settled on their respective sites at different intervals.

Alliances were created on the basis of their histories. These alliances, which did not constantly last mounted Balikumbat and Bafanji against each other as they fought over patches of agricultural plots. It is in this light that this paper examines the history of the conflict amongst the people of Balikumbat and

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Bafanji over the area known as T-Junction from 1966 to 1998. In this regards, issues such as inter-village relations before 1966, causes, evolution, and impact of the conflict shall constitute an answer to this paper.

CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY

Geographically, Balikumbat and Bafanji are located at the eastern end of the Ndop plain between Latitude 40° and 100° north of the Equator and Longitude 8° and 10° east of the Greenwich Meridian. Both villages are located in Ngoketunjia Division with Ndop (Bamunkah) as the Divisional Headquarters. Bafanji is founded in Balikumbat Sub-division with Balikumbat as the Sub-divisional Headquarters. Balikumbat Sub-division is made up of five villages, namely, Balikumbat, Bafanji, Bamukumbit, Baligansin, and Baligashu. The Sub-division is located to the south-west of Ngoketunjia Division. The Bamboutous and the Noun Divisions of the West Region bound it to the south and south-east respectively (SIRDEP 2001: 17). Mezam Division borders it to the west and north-east. The Sub-division is about 60 kilometres from Bamenda, and about 25 kilometres from Ndop, the divisional headquarters of Ngoketunjia. Balikumbat Sub-division covers a surface area of about 434.5 square kilometres (SIRDEP 2001: 20). Figure 1 shows Balikumbat Sub-division and the conflict zone (commonly called "T-junction"). The T-junction is locally called *Menchu* by the Balikumbat and *Teadong* by the Bafanji. For consistency, the author shall be using "T-junction" throughout this work to signify the conflict area.

According to the 1987 General Population and Housing Census (GPHS), the population of Balikumbat Sub-division stood at 31,910. In 2001, the population had increased to 36,304 and was estimated in 2004 at 37,763; with Balikumbat recording the highest population.

Villages in Balikumbat Sub-division are easily

accessible from Mbouda through Galim (West Region) and from Bamenda through Bamessing and Bamali (North-West Region). There are a variety of municipal and minor roads which link different quarters, settlements, and farm lands. The main municipal road goes round the famous Balikumbat Tableland commonly called the Balikumbat Plateau¹. It is, however worth noting that none of these roads are tarred, and so remain very difficult to access in the rainy season, especially in the months of July, August, and September. This poses a great handicap to peace builders during conflict moments to circulate fluently and other inhabitants who find it very difficult to evacuate their produce to the markets both within and beyond the area of study. However, the people of Balikumbat and Bafanji have good inter-village road network which helps promote inter-community relations.

Historically, the Toukung, Mbakwa, Munjong, Mbajang, Papiakum, Mbalang, and Mbatuo are said to be the original settlers of the areas now occupied by the Bafanji and Balikumbat. Though these people were the earliest inhabitants, no trace of tribal or cultural homogeneity seems to have existed among them. According to oral tradition, the Tikar are considered as the earliest migrants in the area. It is recorded that the Tikar arrived around the sixteenth century while the Chamba arrived later by the late eighteenth century (Nkwi 1987: 4). The communities that claimed Tikar origins in this area are Bafanji and Bamukumbit while the communities of Balikumbat, Baligashu, and Baligansin claimed Chamba origins (Nkwi 1987: 4).

The Bafanji call themselves *Fielungwe Mamgie* (people of Mamgie), while the Bamukumbit are referred to as *Makong* (people of the hill). For the Chamba derived villages, Balikumbat refer to themselves as *Nekolpe* (people of the hill), Baligashu, *Gasonep*, while Baligansin are *Doh nep* (successor of Gawolbe). Though these villages today have degrees of cultural homogeneity, the presence of conquered indigenous groups is evident. This is common with




Figure 1. Location of Balikumbat-Bafanji Conflict Zone in Balikumbat Sub-Division.

Note: Source: Adapted by author from the 1992 administrative map of the North-West Region, INC, Yaoundé, drawn by G. B. Enchaw, 2011.

Balikumbat and Bafanji. The former Mbalang and Papiakum who were conquered and incorporated into Balikumbat today constitute distinctive quarters of the Balikumbat community. The Toukung quarter chief was recognized and is today a sub-chief in Bafanji. The rest of the groups found new settlements out of area whereas others were incorporated into Bafanji². In Balikumbat, the conquered groups were given special status and their chiefs were recognized as sub-chiefs answerable to the Ga's palace at *Gayiru* (the traditional headquarters).

However, the Chamba derived chiefdoms still speak the Mubako dialect which is the original dialect of the Chamba band led by Gawolbe. In this sphere, the Mugaaka language which is spoken in the kindred

village of Bali Nyonga is widely spoken in these villages (Hougie Ngwochu 2005: 9). This is because of its adoption in 1903 as the medium of instruction and evangelization by the Basel Mission. Mubako survives as the court language. On the other hand, the Bafanji and Bamukumbit speak a dialect which they call *Nyeba*, which is common among the rest kindred villages of Bamumka (Ndop), Bambalang, and Bamali (Hougie Ngwochu 2005: 9). The local languages (vernacular) of both communities whether Tikar or Chamba, are variations of the Niger-Congo group of Bantu language.

In line with modern administration, Balikumbat Sub-division was created in 1992 by Presidential Decree No. 92/187 of 1992 following transformation

of Ndop Sub-division into Ngoketunjia Division. In 1996, the Balikumbat Rural Council was accorded a special electoral constituency. Since the creation of the Balikumbat Sub-division, it has had seven Divisional Officers (DOs) out of which only the first three DOs had actually witnessed and managed in their own way the conflict situation (Hougie Ngwochu 2005: 11).

From the above analysis, it can be concluded that of all the people who migrated and settled in Balikumbat, they played a dominant role firstly in terms of population and secondly in terms of geo-strategic location of their traditional administrative unit. Balikumbat displaced Bamukumbit and occupied the plateau securing a defensive position. But securing a vantage position was not enough. They had to maintain it. The constant search for security therefore was to govern their relationship with their neighbours especially the Bafanji and some of the villages founded in the same Sub-division.

INTER-VILLAGE RELATIONS BEFORE 1966

Conflict was not done all the time as peace; cordiality and cooperation also reigned amongst them from time to time, and made manifestation by joint hunting ventures, exchange of gifts, and fishing expeditions. In this section, the author discusses inter-village relations in the domains of politics, economics, and socio-cultural relations between the two communities of Balikumbat and Bafanji before 1966.

Politically, after the sudden defeat and departure of the Germans in Cameroon in 1916 as a result of the First World War, the British and the French administered the former German Cameroon, and the area under study became a British control. Inter-village relations during this time were however strengthened during the British era, simply as a result of the nature of the British administrative policy. The

first was the new administrative set-up. The second was aligning relations among them to suit the socio-economic and political exigencies of the British era. The major changes came when Podevin, during the early years of his appointment to Bamenda as Governor, attempted to revive the former German system of regrouping chiefs under paramount chiefs. An attempt to put the Chamba from Ndop area (Balikumbat, Baligasin, and Baligashu) under the authority of Bali Nyonga met with stiff resistance, especially from Balikumbat. With the idea of Indirect Rule in the Division and with the creation of Native Authorities (NAs), the villages were rather put under different NAs. Balikumbat, Baligashu, and Baligasin formed part of Ndop NAs while Bafanji and Bamukumbit became part of Ndop NA³.

As a result of kinship relations, the neighbouring Balikumbat and other Chamba of Ndop plain rejected Bali Nyonga leadership. Series of complaints were levied to the British to that effect. These complaints by the Balikumbat and the Chamba of the Ndop area were justified and hence by 1928, the villages were detached from Bali NAs and put under Ndop NAs⁴. This decision of placing these villages under the same NA had both positive and adverse effects on their socio-economic and political relations in the area under study.

From all indications, the position held by the *Fon* of Balikumbat in the Federal Council for the South East Federation (SEF) in 1955 indicated the prominent role of *Fon* Galabe III within the NA. The Bafanji *Fon* also had the chance of becoming a member of the Federal Council in 1954. Such positions permitted them to influence the construction of a local bridge at Gabe in Balikumbat in 1956 and a culvert in Bafanji in the same year. The budget adopted in the Federal Council by the village Finance Committee was £48 (about 48,000 Fcfa) for Balikumbat and £30 (about 30,000 Fcfa) for Bafanji⁵. When the SEF NA was finally broken up in 1960 into Bafut-Ndop and Bansa NAs, the representation of Balikumbat was

ameliorated. The Bafut-Ndop NA (with a total of 39 members) was represented per village as follows: Balikumbat, three representatives (the *Fon*, Adamu Segah, and A. Nwana) and the other villages were represented only by their *Fons* except for Bamukumbit, which was represented by DA Tanti. Whatever, Balikumbat still played a dominant role in the area⁶. This political position of the Balikumbat during colonial period was adequately exploited by them during post-colonial period.

In the political domain, the unity provided by the Cameroon National Union (CNU), created in 1966, as the only national party was instrumental in cementing relations. This was later reinforced by the creation of the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM) in 1985. The sense of belonging to one party provided meeting grounds for cooperation between the villages of those areas. Militants from Baligashu and Bafanji attended party meetings in Balikumbat. That is why when Balikumbat attacked Bafanji in 1978, an elite from Bafanji and member of Sub-section of the CPDM for Ndop wrote to the DO for Ndop. In the letter, Thafung Peyechu regretted the fact that Balikumbat *Fon* could support his own people to carry such acts. He insisted that such acts were contrary to the principles of their party, the CNU⁷.

The formation of *Fon*'s conference and unity provided by the single party the CNU and later the CPDM provided forums for cordial relations between Balikumbat and Bafanji though at times too fragile. The participation of the *Fons* at each other's funeral celebrations, creation of tribal students unions, joint activities during National Day celebration, and church services evidently revealed the extent of cordiality. The relations alternated between cordiality and hostility. But what was undeniable was the fact that such movements were dictated by Balikumbat. During the 1990s, the villages were regrouped under a single administrative unit, namely, Balikumbat Sub-division and multiparty politics returned, and became principal factors that influenced traditional diplomacy in this

area during this period.

Economically, fishing promoted inter-community relations. Bafanji, one of the villages that are drained by the River Noun provided suitable grounds for fishing. The Tangwoang River and the Fombefu Island provided fish of all types to the Bafanji and Balikumbat. This area was at the boundary between Bafanji and Bagham in the West Region of Cameroon. Hence, Balikumbat could join Bafanji people in fishing as this was done in groups. This joint-fishing venture enhanced the degree of cordial relations between the two peoples. In this case, when any dispute erupted between Bafanji and Bagham over the fishing grounds of Fombefu, neighbouring communities intervened as mediators for the problem⁸.

Hunting, on its point was also an important factor in bringing cordiality between the communities. Balikumbat and her neighbours just like Bafanji and Baligashu hunted together, and performed especially in the Barefoh forest in Balikumbat. Balikumbat often accompanied their neighbours in the exercise, and after the expeditions, the animals caught were shared among them. According to Billa, an indigene of Baligashu, a portion of the catch was reserved for the *Fon* of Balikumbat who was considered as the later owner of the forest⁹. Hence, cordial relations existed amongst these chiefdoms, but the serenity that recouped amongst them was threatened as a result of Balikumbat expansionist tendency which obviously sparked hostilities among the villages and also bred suspicion amongst them¹⁰.

Viewing the geographical proximity and other socio-cultural factors, the people of this area were condemned to live together. It was for this reason that relations governing these villages were not always characterized by tension and wars. Occasionally, cordial relations, manifested through exchange of visits and gifts, hunting cooperation, inter-marriages, and cultural exchanges prevailed in the area. This strengthened relations between both villages.

According to Nkwi: “Alliances were methods by which chiefdoms sometimes turned their enemies into friends and allies. Alliances were second and forceful binding. The taking of oath and sacrificing of slaves gave religious alliances and sacred characters” (Nkwi 1987: 38). It is in this light that a noble of Balikumbat, Doh Ndima traced the origin of the Lela dance, a Bali state ceremony in Bafanji. According to him, this dance was given to Bafanji after the 1906 war.

In the socio-cultural domain, the communities also interacted during the German rule. In 1903, the Basel Mission established a station in Bali Nyonga (the first school created in Bali in 1907) and Mugaaka was adopted as the language of instruction and evangelisation by the Basel Missionaries. Balikumbat, which spoke, Mubako, was designated to this effect for its being at the centre of all the villages in the area, coupled with its prolonged experienced security and peace role played in that region. The creation of missionary schools and churches in Balikumbat made Balikumbat influential in the area. Many people from neighbouring villages used to go to Balikumbat to attend occasional church services. More so, the fact that the Baptist and the Presbyterians missionaries had also established their premises in this locality made thing the more explaining. Balikumbat became a converging point for the other villages which were obliged to get there to learn Mugaaka in order to understand the sermons (Penbaga Doh 2000: 72).

Inter-marriages also enhanced cordiality among these villages. From the informant, Tieowah Ignatius of Bafanji origin, it was gathered that inter-marriages followed to a great extent, tribal line, as was the case during the pre-colonial and colonial periods¹¹. A respectable woman in Bafanji by name Pongho traced the grandparents of her father to Balikumbat. That is why according to her, she performs some of her ancestral rites in Balikumbat. She also mentioned two of her children who were in Balikumbat with her relatives while some were with her in Bafanji (Hougie Ngwochu 2005: 32). Some cases of inter-village

marriages in these communities included the following among others: Mafanni Paul, a Balikumbat hunter got married to a Bafanji girl in 1953; Pungnoh, a prince from Bafanji got married to a Balikumbat girl in 1960; Tiehie Margerate got married to a Balikumbat man before the 1995 crisis; and Tiefa Samaon got married to a Balikumbat woman in 1997. Cases of inter-community marriages continued to date as noticed with the case of Lecigah Emmanuel who got married to a Bafanji girl in 2003¹².

The improved communication system during the German period also promoted inter-village links. The building of the Balikumbat-Ndop road was very instrumental in linking the villages of this area to Bamenda. It is, however, regrettable that Balikumbat took advantage of this facility and maltreated the people of the neighbouring villages especially during conflict moments. It was said that the Bafanji delegation to the meeting in Bamenda in 1908 had to pass through Babanki-Tungo to reach Bamenda. This was for fear of Balikumbat attacking them. In fact, Balikumbat took advantage of having encountered the Germans first. They used the road passing through their village to prevent other villages from having direct contact with the German administration¹³. Trade was a factor of inter-chiefdom relations. The advent of the Germans revolutionized trade contrary to the old traditional economy that was based on exchange system with cowries, beads, and iron-rods (shovels) as media of exchange. The German Mark becoming the only medium of exchange currency gradually replaced the old system. This facilitated exchange as the people carried their wares from one village to another for sale. The first market to be created in the area was the Ganji market in Balikumbat. The Bafanji people went there to sell items like fish and cocoyam, which they often got from and around streams like the Nchuagha, Nchuanung, and Tangwang. Also, maize and okro mostly produced in Balikumbat were also attractive to the people of Balikumbat and Bafanji¹⁴. Trade was also encouraged by the weaving ingenuity of the

Balikumbat. The Balikumbat experting in fabrication of women dresses and caps provided these items to their neighbours.

THE ORIGIN OF THE CONFLICT EPISODES

From the history of migration and settlement, the various communities especially the Balikumbat fought series of wars on their way from Northern Nigeria and Adamawa to their present site. In Ndop, they further embarked on an expansionist policy in order to gain physical and political power in the area as explained by Nkwi and Warnier (1982). This was one major remote cause of the Balikumbat-Bafanji conflict.

When the people of Balikumbat settled in the plateau, they soon expanded to occupy the low land areas. This was obviously done by force, as they attacked neighbouring villages which either escaped and abandoned their sites or simply submitted to their might. The first victims of this expansionist habit were the Papiakum and Mbalang, who had broken from Bamoum and settled here before the raids in Yola. In fact, they were later subdued by the Balikumbat. Other villages like Bafanji, Bamukumbit, and Baligasin were under these constant pressures from Balikumbat. Under constant Balikumbat attacks, these villages resorted to compact settlement in order to better resist the constant raids¹⁵. The Mbepa quarter became a safe place for the Bafanji who were avoiding Balikumbat raids. Most people had to leave Mbagang, Njamung, Bafanji, and Toukung to settle here because of Balikumbat attacks (Chilver and Kaberry 1968: 67).

Colonialism also played a dominant role as a remote cause to the Balikumbat and Bafanji conflict. The administrative system set by the Germans regrouped various communities in the Bamenda Grassfields under the authority of the *Fon* of Bali Nyonga who won their confidence. In this regard, Bali Nyonga was made the headquarters of German administration in the Bamenda Division for quite some time. This idea was resented by the other *Fons*

of the Division who wanted to be recognized as individual authorities in their own rights and not through the *Fon* of Bali Nyonga, as earlier designated by the Germans (Mbock 2000: 99). Within this era, all the chiefs were presumably under Galega I of Bali Nyonga, who was the only recognized Paramount Chief in the early years of German rule in the Bamenda Grassfields¹⁶. This idea, advocated by the German colonial authorities, instead encouraged inter-ethnic conflict since none of the communities were ready to lose their sovereignty to a neighbouring community.

When the British took over the administration of this area, the Bali Nyonga leadership over the said *Fons* was checked. This was as a result of the British policy of Indirect Rule. The result was that, this system brought some powerful *Fons* of the Bamenda Division in conflict with less powerful ones who had been struggling to regain their autonomy from the favoured chiefdoms. Since Bali Chamba was generally favoured from the time of the Germans, Balikumbat began mounting pressure and claiming to be superior to other chiefdoms around the Ndop plains (Bungfang 2000: 22). During the British period, series of administrative changes took place in the area. These changes were first of all noticed in the NA when the NAs of Ndop, Bafut, and Bansa were federated into the SEF as earlier discussed. In one way or the other, colonial administration was at the genesis of the Balikumbat-Bafanji territorial crisis.

But, it was after the 1933-1934 hostilities between Balikumbat and Bafanji that the SDO (Sub-divisional Officer) for Bamenda, Candler, together with his assistant EHF. Georges after dispatching the forces of law and order to restore peace visited the area. In fact, this conflict signalled much to the British colonial administrators and this explained why they introduced the inter-community Boundary Settlement Ordinance in 1933 to solve similar cases. The SDO, together with some elements of the police, the traditional rulers of the belligerent villages, the *Fons* of Bamunka and

Babungo, held a meeting in Bamukumbit on the May 28, 1934 with the aim of finding a lasting solution to the problem¹⁷. Though the *Fon* of Bafanji was not at the meeting, the SDO visited the area and designated the River Teadong as the boundary between the two villages. The boundary was termed in Bafanji as a punitive settlement for the simple fact that the day of the meeting organized by Candle, coincided with a traditional festival day in Bafanji on which the *Fon* was not supposed to go out. He only joined the SDO and his entourage later having been advised to do so. It is clear that before *Fon* Nkwangoh of Bafanji joined his colleagues, the boundary had been fixed and the Bafanji had no option than to pay the price of adherence to their tradition¹⁸.

It should be noted that the conflict between Bafanji and Balikumbat in the 1930s signalled wider conflicts of interest in the same area. In 1946, Baligashu that had been a tributary chiefdom to Bafanji was separated from that sphere. Relations between the two villages had been cordial and this explained why Bafanji gave farm land to Baligashu in the 1930s. The cordiality ended when it was alleged that Baligashu supported Balikumbat in the conflict of 1933¹⁹. Despite the fact that conflict over land issues did not characterize relations between villages in the 1930s and 1940s, the tension changed rapidly in the 1950s. This was attributed to the fact that by 1949, the NAs of Ndop, Bafut, and Bansa were federated into a SEF. This federation was headed by paramount chiefs like those of Bansa as President and those of Bafut as his Vice President. The presence of these *Fons* and the increased number of representatives in the Federal Council of the NA reduced Balikumbat preponderance. It was against such a background that the Balikumbat in 1959 requested the creation of separate court for the Chamba of Ndop area²⁰. This request by the Balikumbat *Fon* could also be as a leading weapon in order to effectively play a dominant role in the political landscape of the area.

It was noticed that during elections and voting of

the budget, villages or communities with hostile intensions such as Balikumbat were always found in opposing camps. This was the case with Bafanji and Balikumbat. When the *Fon* of Bafanji, Lwekui (Ngwana) was elected Chairman of the Council in 1963, the *Fon* of Balikumbat boycotted the council for a year because the election did not favour him. He only attended the last session of that year since election of a new chairman was to come up. However, he declared his candidacy and was elected as the next chairman. Among the 10 councillors in the Executive Council, six voted for him and the other three, those of Bambalang (Bafanji, Bamunka, and Babungo) voted against²¹. This mounted tensions within the councils since each leader expected more powers in the council so as to influence the political situation of the area.

Administratively, when the Balikumbat Sub-division was created, the Bafanji contested Balikumbat's position as headquarters for fear of expansionist tendency earlier noticed from the Balikumbat. According to the report of the then SDO of Ngoketunjia Division, the differences led to socio-political disorder in this area. According to the Bafanji people, this Sub-division created in 1993 with Balikumbat as the headquarters, will only generate further differences and war. To them, the Balikumbat like to impose their will on the other villages within the administrative set-up. This explains why the Bafanji people requested for this headquarters to escape from the domineering or expansionist tendency of Balikumbat. To some Bafanji, the Balikumbat took advantage of this leadership to renew old conflicts with Bafanji²².

Fon Doh Gah Gwanyi III (of blessed memory) of Balikumbat, who had been a Member of Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM), began to wield enormous political power within the Sub-divisional and Divisional levels. In addition, he had been the Mayor of the Balikumbat Rural Council from creation in 1995 to 2007. Beyond that, he had equally been one of the Members of Parliament (MP)

of the ruling CPDM. This political maturity favoured the Balikumbat *Fon* to persistently launch attacks on Bafanji claiming that Bafanji is a small quarter within his village. Some of the informants in Bafanji said he also used the said “unlimited powers” to order his subjects to uproot the pillars planted in 1969 demarcating the boundary between the two ethnic villages of Balikumbat and Bafanji²³.

In the same vein, the *Fon* of Bafanji, in an interview with *The Post* newspaper said that land was not the cause of all the disputes between them. He also said that they had worked together until the *Fon* of Balikumbat became “Mayor, *Fon* of *Fons* and Parliamentarian” (Mbunwe 1998a: 3). This is justified by the fact that these two villages had lived in peace since 1978 and only went back at loggerheads when the *Fon* of Balikumbat became Mayor of Balikumbat Rural Council and Member of Parliament. All attempts to get the point of view of the *Fon* of Balikumbat about the issue failed. In February 2000, the Land Commission which embarked on a mission to demarcate the boundary between the two chiefdoms was unable to accomplish his mission because the *Fon* of Balikumbat did not show concern and also failed to provide assistance needed by this commission. In extreme cases, the workers of the Ndop High Court attested that evidences of administrative and judiciary documents that were in their keeping were finally stolen and others were destroyed by the *Fon* and his messengers²⁴.

The topography of Balikumbat which is rugged thereby hindering extensive cultivation practices had been a major factor of the conflict. The lands in many cases are infertile and insufficient for the growing population of the locality. This situation caused Balikumbat to encroach upon the fertile lands at the conflict zone “T-junction”.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT

Following the above analysis, the Bafanji-Balikumbat

relation deteriorated following the election of the *Fon* of Bafanji, Ngwana, as the Chairman of the Bafut-Ndop Council in 1963. This was because the Balikumbat people had long been contesting the monopoly of this post. In 1964, when the chairmanship went to Balikumbat, events took a different turn since the people of Bafanji were now answerable to Balikumbat. This was as a result of the death of the *Fon* of Bafanji who had just handed the chairmanship to the Balikumbat *Fon* in 1964. His death led to accession of Ngwefunji II to the Bafanji throne. The young *Fon* of Bafanji had just assumed his functions when the hostilities with Balikumbat broke out.

The outbreak of hostility in 1966 was as a result of the erections of houses by Balikumbat on Bafanji land. The protest letter of the Bafanji Traditional Council to the SDO of Bamenda Division claimed how on September 13, 1966, the Balikumbat started erecting houses on Bafanji land²⁵. This was corroborated by the DO for Ndop, J.A Fominyen, when he explained how the Balikumbat people built houses on the Bafanji land. He further stated how a market was built overnight on this land, all in an effort to suppress the Bafanji market. Such action, according to the DO certainly irritated the Bafanji people²⁶.

As a result, the Bafanji had to rescue their land from occupation and the only way of doing so was to openly challenge the Balikumbat’s actions. This resulted to skirmishes in which some Bafanji people were injured. In order to avert further bloodshed, the Mezam Divisional Administration, through the SDO, promptly intervened. He instructed the Gendarmes and Police Officers to visit the area and investigate the matter. Upon arrival at the disputed area, the team encountered about 3,000 Bafanji women with their farm tools. These women decried the fact that the Balikumbat people had deprived them of their farm lands²⁷.

The DO appeased them by promising to forward their complaints to the higher authorities making

reference to the Governor and the Minister of Territorial Administration. The DO also cautioned both parties to remain calm forbidding them from farming on the disputed area till a permanent solution was reached. Nevertheless, the angry women expressed dissatisfaction as they needed to work their farms. The chief of Bafanji intervened and asked them to be calm and to wait for the administration to solve the problem. To provide temporal solution, the DO ordered all the houses built by Balikumbat to be demolished while waiting for a final solution. It is in this vain that some five mud houses, purported to have been built by some Balikumbat people were pulled down²⁸.

In 1977, *Fon* Galabe III died. According to the informants (the author promised not to cite them) together with DO of Ndop, when the successor *Fon* Doh Gwanyin III took over *Fonship* in Balikumbat, he instigated his people to uproot the pillars planted some 15 years earlier. The case was reported to the DO of Ndop who in turn ordered that some boundary plants should be planted on the spot where the pillars were removed. The people of Balikumbat removed the plants and continued encroaching into the Bafanji land. In this same light, *Fon* Doh Gwanyin III's foreign policy was summarized in his inauguration speech during his installation in 1978. He declared his intension to re-conquer all Balikumbat lands from her neighbours²⁹. This declaration and his attitude not to recognize any agreement concluded by his fathers and the neighbours created tensions in the region.

In this atmosphere, relations between these two villages deteriorated soon after Balikumbat lost the land case at the Supreme Court. Hence on the March 4, 1978, again during the planting season, an invading force of some 200 Balikumbat youths reached Bafanji in Mbangang. With machetes and clubs, they destroyed crops, looted, burnt, and pulled down houses. It was also revealed that they took away some food items. War signs were displayed in the area around the Bafanji Health Centre³⁰. Unfortunately, the

Bafanji chief was not in the village. Some people who were around chased them off and seized their identification cards. In the same wave, the matter was not promptly reported to the DO in Ndop. Two days later that is on the March 6, some Bafanji people who had been victims of the Bamendjim dam returning from Ndop with their compensation from the State were attacked by the Balikumbat people who caught them and got them wounded. The Balikumbat people equally seized their bicycles. Sources revealed that, four Bafanji people were seriously injured and were helped by the Bamukumbit people to nearby hospitals³¹.

On the March 7, 1978, an announcement was made in the Balikumbat market by the King Makers of Balikumbat for people to go and continue fighting. This was in connection to the fact that the following day was Bafanji market day and people would be there, and of course the attack on the Bafanji market would be effective. The Bafanji retaliated, a retaliation that left many on both sides seriously injured. Bafanji women were captured as war prisoners³².

When the Bafanji *Fon* returned from his journey to Yaounde, he formally lodged a complaint with the administration in Ndop and Bamenda. On the March 11, 1978, the then Governor of the North West Region, Abouem Atchoyi, together with the SDO for Mezam and DO for Ndop, visited the disputed area accompanied by Gendarmes and *Fons* of the belligerent villages. On the site, some disobedient people from both sides were arrested and detained. The two *Fons*, who accompanied the Governor and his entourage to Ndop, later signed a pact before the Governor never to go to war again. They also promised to respect the various Court decisions concerning the boundary³³.

However, the peace that reigned in this area in the 1980s was disturbed by a series of administrative and political developments in the 1990s. It is quite true that problems resurfaced in 1992 when both villages applied for and were expecting a secondary school.

After a careful study of two villages, the Cameroon Government saw Balikumbat to be the central point in the villages of the West of Ndop, which included Bafanji, Balikumbat, Baligham, Baligashu, Baligansin, and Bamukumbit. The churches particularly the Catholic Church had also seen Balikumbat as the central point of those villages (Sama 1998: 4). Again, Balikumbat had the highest population in the region, that is, about 32,000 inhabitants as against 10,000 for the Bafanji following estimates after the 1987 population census. As a result of the above facts, the Government, in 1992 erected a Government Secondary School (GSS) in Balikumbat. Since then, the Bafanji expressed their bitterness against Balikumbat. This bitterness was openly expressed in their boycott of GSS Balikumbat from its creation, even when there was no problem between the two villages (Sama 1998: 4).

After the creation of GSS Balikumbat, there was the possibility of raising Ndop a full Division with Babessi and Balikumbat as Sub-divisions. This embittered the Bafanji the more³⁴. The pillar stones which acted as boundary between Balikumbat and Bafanji disappeared creating suspicion in both villages. The gossips finally came to pass and Balikumbat was made Sub-division with Bafanji as one of the village unit under the new administrative unit. It was not long after the creation of Balikumbat Sub-division that another Presidential Decree, signed in 1995 created the Balikumbat Rural Council.

In the midst of all these, the Bafanji protested. They wanted the Sub-division changed to Ndop West and its headquarters moved to Bafanji. They said that the headquarters was far away from them. But the Balikumbat maintained that the area was suitable. They took one of their quarters Fombagoun as an example of an area whose inhabitants had to trudge a longer distance to get to the administrative headquarters³⁵.

The tension in the area increased when Balikumbat *Fon*, Gwanyin III won the parliamentary

election in the constituency under the CPDM. This was preceded by the council election in which the CPDM had won in the Balikumbat Rural Council. Though the CPDM list that won the Municipal election included the *Fons* and the indigenes of all the villages, the *Fon* of Balikumbat was elected as the first Mayor of the Council, a post he held till 2007. Many of the informants from both villages made us to understand that they thought that since the Balikumbat *Fon* was already a Parliamentarian, he would not stand for election for the post of a Mayor again. In this regard, other councillors, especially from Bafanji, refused to take seats in the council, accusing Balikumbat of domination. One of the informants revealed that the *Fon* of Bafanji who seems to have an eye on the Mayorship, even refused the position of Assistant Mayor (1st Deputy Mayor), after the Balikumbat won the 1995 elections³⁶.

Tension and distrust heightened when in 1993, the cairns and pillars which had been planted to mark the boundary between Balikumbat and Bafanji, following the 1969 demarcation, were destroyed by unknown persons. The destruction of these pillars created tension in the area and it needed just a spark to set the situation ablaze. This spark came in 1995, when Tadagumba and two others from Balikumbat were kidnapped by the Bafanji. In fact, this act marked the beginning of the 1995 Balikumbat-Bafanji territorial dispute (Tume 1996: 4).

According to *Fon* Ngwefumi II of Bafanji, the attack by Balikumbat was well prepared. This was because the Balikumbat refused to co-operate with the administration to replant the pillars and cairns that were destroyed in 1993. This, coupled with the fact that the Bafanji and Balikumbat provide a 300m Buffer Zone between their two villages as a “worthless piece of paper” by the *Fon* of Balikumbat, opened the way for serious clashes on the June 3, 4, and 5, 1995³⁷. According to oral sources, the clashes of the June 3, 1995 left 18 people dead, six from Balikumbat and 12 from Bafanji. The Bafanji people

equally lost a lot of property including houses still visible today in the disputed area.

The Bafanji Health Centre, the Mbangang market, the co-operative society, and Ali Nekenbeng's coffee factory were equally destroyed. About three thousand Bafanji people fled to Bagam and Mbouda in the West Region of Cameroon³⁸. On the second day of hostilities, June 4, 1995, the early morning attacks almost pushed Bafanji into Bambalang. On the third day, June 5, 1995, a Bafanji farmer by name Oscar Punchu died while fleeing for safety. The number of people who fled from Bafanji was estimated to be about 5,000 and damages caused were outstanding. Over 300 people were wounded and about 460 houses were destroyed³⁹. Later, the SDO wrote a letter to the two *Fons*, informing them of the Governor's visit to the area on June 8, 1995. On that day, the SDO, the Governor, Bell Luc René visited and reiterated the fact that both villages should respect the boundary of 1969.

In the 1997 parliamentary election, the *Fon* of Balikumbat won another five years mandate as a Parliamentarian for the CPDM. As a result, he was protected by parliamentary immunity. This privilege forbade him to appear in a court of law except the immunity was uplifted⁴⁰. While such immunity was a relief to the Balikumbat people, Bafanji people were completely frustrated. Their attempt to revenge the attack on the village had been foiled. All these helped to aggravate the mutual distrust and boycott that characterized relations between them. With all the forces seemingly militating against peace, it needed another spark for a confrontation between the two villages.

This came up in 1998 leading to the second serious confrontation for a period of less than four years. In this case, many people thought that, no war was still envisaged since the two communities had suffered a lot during the previous dispute of 1995. But this was not the case as 1998 began with the villages in crises. The Bafanji claimed that the renewed

fighting began when a certain Stephen Pasiah led a gang to attack a group of Bafut women in Bafanji. On their part, the Balikumbat claimed fighting began when Stephen Pasiah was kidnapped on his way from Baligashu. Then, they in turn captured a certain John Lewoh and retained that the said John Lewoh would be released only if Stephen Pasiah was also released. The Bafanji claimed they handed over Stephen to the Balikumbat gendarmes while the Balikumbat intimated that Stephen was dropped in Balikumbat after suffering serious corporal and psychological torture (Sama 1998: 5).

Some informants from Balikumbat who lived at Njuguru quarter on the border with Bafanji explained how a notorious thief in Bafanji, nicknamed "Bruce Lee" constantly attacked them in broad day light and took away valuable items. According to him, the said thief had a rifle, purportedly given to him by the Bafanji *Fon* to use in case of an attack from Balikumbat. Bruce Lee was considered as a war hero in Bafanji and was given weapons which he used to intimidate and even extort money and goods from defenceless people. The operating area was a border quarter of both villages, especially as most of these quarters suffered damages during the war. Since they were deserted by their inhabitants, they became hiding places for thieves who carried out cross-border mischievous acts in surrounding villages (Hougie Ngwochu 2005: 76).

It was in this circumstance that when a Bafanji man by name Joseph Maligufeh was caught by the Balikumbat, beaten and his bicycle seized, the Bafanji people had no option than to launch an attack on the Balikumbat. This seems to be the first confrontation between the two villages barely 48 hours after the *Fons* of Balikumbat and Bafanji agreed at the office of the Governor of the North West Province (Region) not to go to war. Some sources revealed that, Balikumbat people harassed and attacked Bafanji women who had gone to farm on the disputed piece of land on January 29, 1998⁴¹. Pansiah, a Balikumbat notable

contradicted the view by saying that it was Bafanji people who launched an incursion into Balikumbat by burning farm herds in the quarters of Njuguru and Manchu⁴².

This saying on Balikumbat attacking Bafanji was also clarified by Hongie Godlove. Having suffered serious casualties, on the first day, the Balikumbat retaliated in the most heinous manner. The Njanung, Mbangang, and part of the Ekwo quarters in Bafanji were completely burnt down. Plants, animals, and other items were destroyed (Mbunwe 1998b: 20). In an attempt to defend their village, the Bafanji people registered about 20 deaths. Series of hostilities proceeded from the January 29 and the February 19, 1998. These attacks painted a different scene in the Bafanji history for more than half of Bafanji inhabitants were sent to neighbouring chiefdoms for refuge. The issue came to a halt when a joint Gendarmerie and Army forces from Bamenda caught some inhabitants of both villages with weapons. They were seriously beaten and some of them, mostly from Bafanji were taken to Bamenda where they were locked up in the Bamenda Central Prison (Formi 1998: 12).

The non-aggression pact of 1995 by the Ngoketunjia *Fons* in Ndop could not stop the two communities from fighting the 1998 war as earlier discussed. Military action was therefore agreed upon after several consultations at the Sub-divisional, Divisional, and Provincial (Regional) levels. This was applied between March and April 1998 by the Governor of the then North West Province, Fai Yengo Francis and the Senior DO for Ngoketunjia Division, Nji Mouliom Ali. Damages recorded during the 1998 war were enormous. More than 80 people were killed, about 6,000 were displaced, and more than 853 houses were destroyed.

The 1998 war came and went with its numerous casualties as briefed above, but with many things coming to light. In this sphere, the *Fon* of Balikumbat who was one of the CPDM Parliamentarians from the

North West Region held an enviable position in the political scene. Administrators in the North West Region especially those of Ngoketunjia including some CPDM barons, now look at the *Fon* as a threat to their ambitions. Consequently, the administration, some *Fons*, and some CPDM barons go behind to investigate wars between the two villages just to discredit him. Again the Bafanji have been deceived to believe that they can have a Sub-division through violence.

This is evident by the declaration of the *Fon* of Bafanji, Ngwefuni II who said:

My humble proposal to the government for a lasting solution is: one that a big trench be dug separating Balikumbat from Bafanji; two, that permanent security be installed in Bafanji; and three, that the government should carve out Bafanji from Balikumbat and create an administrative unit in Bafanji with other villages included⁴³.

Fon Ngwefuni III therefore insinuates that there can be no peace between Balikumbat and Bafanji unless a Sub-division is given to Bafanji. Whatever the case, the Balikumbat-Bafanji conflict especially over the disputed area at T-Junction has had far reaching effects on both sides which have disturbed inter-village relations for a reasonable period.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT

The Balikumbat-Bafanji conflicts of 1966, 1995, and 1998 left tremendous consequences in the two communities in particular, and in the entire Nation in general. It should be made known that these consequences significantly disrupted political, economic, and social relations between the contestants.

Political Consequence

Politically, there had been series of total breakdown in inter-village relations between Balikumbat and Bafanji since colonial period. The breakdown during

colonial and post-colonial periods was widening since the colonial masters created their own administrative system to suit their taste contrary to the thoughts of the people within these communities. During post-colonial regime, inter-village boundaries were already delimited and others well demarcated for administrative purpose. It is as a result of such conflict that some of the canes and pillars were often off rooted by the unsatisfied communities especially when some traditional rulers, as was the case of Balikumbat after 1978 opted for an expansionist tendency. This view was further aggravated by both communities leaving in mutual suspicion. It is in the same light that one can say that the Balikumbat and Bafanji conflicts of 1995 and 1998 were another example of some of the conflicts emanating from a renaissance of land and boundary dispute. As we have noticed earlier, the immediate causes of this conflict can be attributed to the vaulting “ambitions for territorial aggrandisement on the part of some politicians, *Fons* and local elites” (Simo Mope 1996: 18).

It was in this framework of destruction that after the bloody and destructive conflict of the June 4, 1995, the *Fon* of Balikumbat and some of his subjects were dragged to Court by the Bafanji elite. Standing trial on a 550 million Fcfa suit filed by Peter Ngufor, an elite from Bafanji whose property was destroyed during the conflict, on behalf of the Bafanji elite on charges of invasion said:

Wanton destruction and looting of property, the *Fon* of Balikumbat and some of his subjects were found guilty by the Bamenda High Court and awarded to the plaintiff general damages of 172 million Fcfa. The Court was satisfied that the Bafanji people had really suffered damages as a result of the Balikumbat invasion of their chiefdom in 1995 and so passed a verdict of guilt against the aggressors. (Andu Ezieh 1996: 6)

In fact, the above Court decision was however short-lived for the Balikumbat *Fon* being a CPDM

Parliamentarian took an appeal at the Yaounde Supreme Court and the 1997 election accorded him another mandate on parliament. From this regard, inter-village diplomacy was now at risk since a *Fon* could possibly become a Parliamentarian as to safeguard his interest in his traditional milieu.

What became clear during this last decade of conflict was the fact that Balikumbat continued dictating the peace of inter-village relations in the region. The advent of multiparty politics and her political position in the CPDM seemed to have favoured this state of being. Being the CPDM central committee member, a Parliamentarian, Mayor, and later President of the North West *Fons* Conference, the Balikumbat *Fon*, Doh Gwanyin III had everything going his way as he dictated the pace of relations between the villages of this area and that of the entire Division.

Economic Consequences

In the economic domain, it was investigated that the conflict that took place on the June 2, 1995 was the most bloody and devastating in the whole of the North West Region. In this conflict, some sources revealed that as many as 60 or more Bafanji people were killed, 450 compounds were destroyed including farmlands, the Bafanji water supply tank, and property worth hundreds of millions Fcfa. More than 2,000 people rendered homeless as a result of the war (Mbunwe 1998a: 5).

In hide manner of destruction, during the second main confrontation in 1998, the Bafanji village was thoroughly ransacked and destroyed. Besides the unprecedented displacement of human beings, huge amount of properties were looted and burnt. The Balikumbat Society Building, Government Primary School, and a coffee factory which belonged to Ali Nekenbeng (home base elite) were all destroyed. Evidently, Balikumbat brought Bafanji village crashing to a state of ruin (Simo Mope 1996: 18).

Since there was no peace between the two communities, the Bafanji people who were going to Ndop did not use the Balikumbat road especially during the inter-war periods.

Political cooperation never excluded economic relations because such relations were in paired between Balikumbat and Bafanji. However, economic relations continued between these two communities when the conflict became an issue of the past. For instance, the destruction of the Bafanji main market following the last two confrontations with Balikumbat, made Balikumbat main market to be the other alternative for the neighbouring villages. The Bamukumbit, who used to sell their goods in the Bafanji market were forced to use the Balikumbat market. In this regard, the poor treatment given by the Bafanji people to their Chamba chiefdoms, accusing them of having supported Balikumbat during their confrontations, made Balikumbat market the only alternative to them.

Socio-Cultural Consequences

In the social and cultural domains, the conflict opposing the Balikumbat-Bafanji people also resulted to the burning down of houses, the destruction of Government Primary School Bafanji, the Bafanji Cooperative Society buildings, and the Bafanji Health Centre. In retaliation, the Bafanji people destroyed crops and houses of some Balikumbat people founded at the periphery of the Balikumbat Headquarters. During the research in the area, the author was equally briefed that no Bafanji person came to the Balikumbat market. It was evident that the boycott had to do with fear or was designed to affect the economy of Balikumbat. On the contrary, the Balikumbat people attended the Bafanji market although no Balikumbat villager was resident in Bafanji and vice versa during conflict moments⁴⁴.

Judging from the above fact, the villages devised new ways of living without depending on each other. It is for this reason that a bridge was constructed

overnight on the Nchuagha swamps by the Bafanji to link their village to Bambalang just after the 1998 conflict. The Bafanji, after the conflict did everything to avoid passing through Balikumbat to Ndop. In the same manner, the Balikumbat preferred to pass through Bamukumbit, though farer, to Mbouda in the West Region than through Bafanji. More families who had inter-married, disintegrated, and friendship ties were broken⁴⁵. It is no doubt that the Bafanji people suffered enormously from material damage since most of the wars were fought in the Bafanji settled areas. The Bafanji people boycotted Balikumbat, the Sub-divisional Headquarters. There was total breakdown in relationship between the two communities.

It should be noted that, conflicts have an enormous effect on education. In areas of conflict, in the Balikumbat-Bafanji for example, a secondary school building on the buffer land was destroyed by the Balikumbat people. The Bafanji villagers tried to reconstruct this school located at the buffer land (T-junction). The building had gone up to the roofing level but an injunction was given by the DO of Balikumbat that the school building should not be roofed. The Bafanji people hold that the *Fon* of Balikumbat, who was by then a Parliamentarian, influenced the DO⁴⁶.

During inter-war moments, it was difficult to see any Bafanji student attending Government High School Balikumbat during inter-war period. The parents consider it insecure to send their children to Balikumbat. The Bafanji children stopped attending the lone High School in the Sub-division because it was located in Balikumbat village but preferred to Ndop, the headquarters of Ngohkitungia Division. The distance from Bafanji to Balikumbat is about 10 kilometres while the distance between Bafanji and Ndop is about 40 kilometres⁴⁷.

In a similar situation, there was a slowdown in the usage of the health services located in Balikumbat by the Bafanji villagers. The then medical officer in

charge of the Ndop Health District Dr. Teta Godwin reported that diseases and illnesses increased among the Bafanji people because some of them found it difficult to travel far to seek medical care. In his words:

This conflict has consequences on my practice since the conflict started again in 1995; the Bafanji people do not visit the health centre any more. They rather go all the way to Ndop and spend a lot of money than coming to the health centre in Balikumbat. Some people have died because of this very long way to Ndop and they do not reach there in time. (Groele 2004: 39)

Developmental activities in the Sub-division were greatly inhibited by these conflicts. Since the headquarters of the Sub-division is Balikumbat, the natives of Bafanji after the conflict, were no longer willing to go there for any administrative reason. The road linking the two villages could not be maintained. Council revenue collection dropped since the conflict rendered collection very difficult in Bafanji area. The Bafanji people stopped using the social amenities provided by the Sub-division since they were mostly founded in Balikumbat. For example, the lone secondary school by then in the area and the road itself were boycotted. The Sub-division suffered from fear, mistrust, and lack of communication between the two villages in terms of diplomacy. This act rendered administration difficult⁴⁸.

The electrification of Balikumbat and the improvement of the communication network by the Council made Balikumbat an inviting business centre in the Sub-division to buy vital items. Though the Bafanji seemed to have been indifferent to such a favourable atmosphere, the Bafanji people were later obliged to visit Balikumbat village. First, as the Sub-divisional headquarters, they were bound to go there for some administrative services such as signing and certification of documents and complaints. It was equally briefed that many marriages between the two villages broke down after the confrontations.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper had thus examined the T-junction conflict episodes amongst the people of Balikumbat and the Bafanji in the Ndop plain from 1966 to 1998. The contextual framework of this study has enlightened us on the physical and historical context of the area under study. The origin and the stages of the conflicts over land and boundary matters constituted the major focal point in this conflict. In this regard, the author equally attempted to throw more light on the successive series of the conflicts drowned from 1966 to 1998. Note should be taken that these people had been experiencing friendly relations before and after the wars. That is why care was taken to analyze friendly relations before, during, and after the calamities. In this regard, post-war effects were equally noted on both communities. The author demonstrated that Bafanji suffered enormously from properties damaged. In this manner, this perennial conflict still persists in the North West Region in particular and other parts of Cameroon in general.

Notes

1. Observations of the author during field work, February 2007 and July 2008.
2. Interview with *Fon* A. Y. Ngwefumi II, Bafanji, June 20, 2008.
3. National Archives Buea (NAB). W.E Hunt, 1922, Annual Report for Bamenda for Bamenda Division.
4. NBB, NW/Ea, 1929/1, File N.B. 86, 34/1929, Inspection Notes by Resident, Cameroon Province 1929, PAB, Annual Report for Bamenda Division, 1929.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Provincial Archives Bamenda (PAB). File No. 1491/sh/s, 4: Unproved Aggression against the Bafanji People.
8. Interview with Billa Dennis, Baligashu, June 22, 2008.
9. Ibid.
10. Interview with Tieowah Ignatius, Yaounde, April 1, 2010.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. PAB. NW/Ac. 1960/1/Bk. Historical Notes on Bamenda. 1960.

14. Ibid.
15. PAB. NW/Ac, 1960/1/Bk: Historical Notes on Bamenda Grassfields, p. 9.
16. PAB. NW/Ha. 1972/2. DD45A: Dossiers for *Fons* and Chiefs of the North West Region.
17. PAB. NW/Fe/1934/1: No. 748: Tours and Visits of the SDO for the Bamenda Division, Notes, Addresses, 1934-36.
18. Interview with *Fon* A. Y. Ngwefumi II, Bafanji, June 20, 2008.
19. Ibid.
20. PAB. NW/La/D/1958/1: SEF N.A, Executive Committee Meetings, Minutes, 1958-60.
21. PAB. NW/Jc/d/1961/1, File No. B. 393, Minutes of the Bafut-Ndop Council, 1961-63.
22. Interview with Tiebubagang Victor, Bafanji, July 17, 2008.
23. Interview with Tieowah Ignatius, Yaounde, April 1, 2010.
24. Interview with Ngum Martin Yong, Ndop, July 15, 2008.
25. PAB. File No. Ga, 54/s.4, 2030: Violation of Government and Court Decision into Bafanji Land.
26. PAB. File No. DBA. 2912/145: Balikumbat vs. Bafanji Land Dispute, March 22, 1968.
27. PAB. File No. NSB, 39/67: Balikumbat vs. Bafanji Land Dispute, March 16, 1968.
28. Ibid.
29. PAB. NW/Ha, 1980/1, *Fon* of Balikumbat Installation Ceremony Address.
30. PAB. File No. 1491/5H/s.4, Unprovoked Aggression against the Bafanji People by Balikumbat of Ndop Sub Division, March 8, 1978.
31. PAB. File N. Ga. 54/s.4, 2030: Violation of Government and Court Decision into Bafanji Land on March 4, 6 and 7, 1978.
32. PAB. File No. 1491/S.H./S.4 Unprovoked Aggression against the Bafanji.
33. PAB. NW/Fa/1978/4, File No. CE 58, NW Provincial Tours of Governor to Noni, Ndop, Nkambe, and Wum. Reports on the Governor Tours, 1978-79.
34. Interview with Liwo Lawrence, Bafanji, June 14, 2008.
35. Interview with Pa Pansiah Stephen, Balikumbat, June 18, 2008.
36. Interview with Joseph Honsieh, Bafanji, June 20, 2008.
37. Interview with *Fon* A. Y. Ngwefumi II, Bafanji, June 20, 2008.
38. Ibid.
39. Evaluation report of the commission set up to assess the value of individual property destroyed during the 1995 war.
40. Special Official Gazette of January 30, 1996, Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon.
41. Interview with Liwo Lawrence, Bafanji, June 14, 2008.
42. Interview with Pa Pansiah Stephen, Balikumbat, June 21, 2008.
43. Interview with *Fon* A. Y. Ngwefumi II, Bafanji, June 20, 2008.
44. Interview with Wasum Augustin Lehdogha, Balikumbat, June 20, 2008.
45. Interview with Florence Ngwefuni, Bafanji, June 17, 2008.
46. Interview with Joseph Honsieh, Bafanji, June 20, 2008.
47. Interview with Florence Ngwefuni, Bafanji, June 17, 2008.
48. Interview with Wasum Augustin Lehdogha, Balikumbat, June 20, 2008.

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