Violence and Discontents: Ruptures in the Relationship Between Individual and Society

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Recognized by Norbert Elias himself, the influence of Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalysis on his work is well established. However, Elias relation to Freud’s work raises many questions. If the sociologist turned to it to support his thesis on the civilization process, he did not hesitate to make various criticisms. The last text of Norbert Elias *The Freudian Concept of Society and Beyond* is the first time when he discusses and analyses the Freudians theory and concepts in his work. The aim of this article is to clarify the terms of this criticism, to explain the intrinsic veracity less than the significance for Elias’s work, and to propose the violence on the body as an effect of the rupture on the relationship between individual and society.

Keywords: social theory, psychoanalysis, Norbert Elias, Sigmund Freud

Introduction

We are used to say the words “individual” and “society” to refer to autonomous and independent entities. We could, for example, think of a person as an isolated human being, self-contained, and of society as a structure that goes beyond the level of individuals, relating only to what belongs to everyone and is for everyone. In this sense, the mind, the body, and society would be separate from each other and there would be no involvement between them. Sometimes, we think of these words as referring to completely different things. Within this logic of exclusion, we take on one side of the equation, either the individual or society. The tendency is to treat either one of these two elements as if it were the whole picture.

A society is made up of individuals, who constitute and who are constituted by society. A city is inhabited by citizens. At the root of the relationship between the individual and society lies the human body. The only way to think about this relationship is via the body and its occupation of space. Just as public spaces situate the places occupied by the bodies of individuals, bodies also circumscribe various other territories. Thus, social structures are determined not only by individuals, but also by their bodies and everything that they involve, namely, feelings and drives.

Norbert Elias Critic of Sigmund Freud’s Social Theory

The influence of Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalysis on the work of Norbert Elias was recognised by the sociologist himself, as can be seen in an interview with the French newspaper *Libération*, “Without Freud, I...”
would not have been able to write what I wrote. His theory was essential for my work and all his concepts (ego, super-ego, libido, etc.) are familiar to me” (Elias, 2000, p. 93). However, the relationship between Elias and Freud is characterised by certain ambiguities. On the one hand, if the sociologist turned to the principal Freudian concepts in order to support his thesis on the civilising process, and on the other hand, he did not shy away from critiquing psychoanalysis as a way of thinking derived from the paradigm of modern science.

Elias discussed and analysed the psychoanalytical concepts and theory formulated by Freud for the first time in his work the text *The Freudian Concept of Society and Beyond*. Written in 1990, it remained an unfinished work due to the death of Elias. Even so, we can consider it as one of the most important contemporary critiques of Freud’s thinking. Elias succeeded in conveying in a more detailed way some of the critiques that he gradually developed in relation to Freudian theory at other points in his work, in addition to proposing a procedural re-reading of some fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis.

In this paper, the aim is to present some reflections based on Norbert Elias’s critiques of Freud’s psychoanalytical concepts and theory. To do so, it will be necessary to briefly discuss the fundamental ideas of both authors. The author will thus follow the way, in which Elias organised his notes in the text *The Freudian Concept of Society and Beyond*. The author will begin with Elias’s argument that psychoanalysis is founded on the antagonism between psychological processes and social processes. The author will then turn to Elias’s views in relation to the Freudian myth of origins, concluding with his observations on Freud’s dualistic stance between nature and culture.

Despite the fact that Norbert Elias recognised how much his studies on the civilising process owed to Freudian discoveries, this did not prevent him from voicing, right from the start of his research, major critiques of Freud’s thinking. In Elias’s opinion, psychoanalysis is the product of modern science, and in this sense, it is founded on antinomies, like “subject and object”, “individual and society”, or “nature and culture”. Norbert Elias was always a critic of partisan theories, opposing ideas that support only one side of a given equation.

Instead of thinking of the individual as an autonomous being, whose structure is independent and isolated from objects and the context, it forms part of, separated by an invisible wall from his/her own body, from other people and from society, namely a *homo clausus*. Elias (2012, p. 214) proposed that we think of the individual as:

> An “open personality,” which possesses a greater or lesser degree of autonomy (but never absolute or total autonomy) in relation to that of other people, and which, in reality, throughout his/her entire life is fundamentally geared towards other people and is dependent on them.

In the same way, societies should also be thought of as structures that are “always more or less incomplete: from wherever they are looked at, they continue to be open in the temporal sphere towards the past and the future” (Elias, 1991, p. 25).

For Elias, society is formed from the network of functional interdependence that individuals establish between themselves. Each individual emerges from a context of “invisible bonds,” a network of relationships predating their birth that “is not something that exists outside individuals either” (Elias, 1991, p. 29), in so far as they are functions of dependence that each person exercises on other people. These bonds form a network within each individual that can circulate in a limited way, which is capable of being transferred only for functions previously determined by the structure of relationships that he/she is inserted.
In the text *The Freudian Concept of Society and Beyond*, Elias (2010) stated that Freud was not capable of understanding societies as such, in so far as the Freudian perspective on the social existence of human beings is fundamentally based, in Elias’s view, on the centrality of the individual. Elias recognised that Freud did not deny the importance of the other nor of social aspects for the formation of the psyche. However, in the opinion of the sociologist Elias, Freud represented society in an atomistic way and the various elements of the psychic apparatus (ego, super-ego, and id) as static objects. Social and psychological processes are two aspects that do not connect in psychoanalytical theory, according to the reading of Elias.

Incapable of establishing a connection between the individual and society that went beyond the antinomy between his terms, “Freud”, Elias stated, “conceived of a model of the eminently sociological individual and a model of the eminently individualistic society” (Elias, 2010, p. 137). To put it another way, the individual presents himself/herself as a complex of identifications with others, “a society in miniature”, and society proves to be an atomized structure, as exemplified by the masses, which function according to the same logic as psychological processes.

In the opinion of Elias, Freud’s difficulty in understanding social processes stems from his dedication to therapeutic practice, being interested only in the psychological suffering of individuals. However, much Freud stated that every individual psychology is nothing more than a social psychology. However open he was to considering a sociological explanation for the experiences of individuals, he did not take into consideration the “social identity of individuals—the identity of the ‘we’”. This is what, according to Elias, “can express itself in the sense that we are the centre of the universe” (Elias, 2010, p. 139). In Elias’s view, the levels of the discourses of a person’s “ego” and his/her “we” are interlinked, and psychoanalytical theory, when exclusively focused on the perspective of the “ego”, created an imbalance between the levels of the “ego” and of the “we”, which has consequences for people’s behaviour and feelings.

It is possible to interpret Freud’s thinking as stemming from the same objectives as Elias’s research, in that both sought to go beyond dichotomies, such as “individual and society”, “external and internal worlds”, “subject and object”, and “nature and culture”. In 1912, for example, Freud (2003a, p. 1722) declared that, “psychoanalysis has made us aware that we should abandon the unproductive opposition between external and internal factors, between fate and constitution”. In 1921, Freud (2003b, p. 1233) wrote one of his most well known passages concerning the relationship between the individual and society, “The contrast between individual psychology and social or mass psychology loses a great deal of its sharpness when examined more closely.”

One of the most important Freudian tenets is the concept of narcissism, which forms one of the three wounds suffered by humanity, together with Nicolai Copernic’s statement that the earth is not the centre of the universe and Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution, which proves that man did not descend from God. When Elias (2010, p. 140) criticized Freud for “characterising the individual as that which I am, and society as that which all others are, losing sight of the fact that, also in the sociologist’s view, we are another in the eyes of others.” We cannot fail to remember that famous Freudian maxim that “the ego is not even the master in its own house” (Freud, 2010, p. 184). With regard to the unconscious, we always speak from a place where the very ego differentiates from itself. We are also another in our own eyes.

The sense we have of our own ego is not that of a unitary element, independent, and distinct from the rest. The ego is not a self-contained and complete substance. It is marked by the traces of the investments over time of its relationship with others. Freud (2003c, p. 2711) stated in *The Ego and the Id*, “The character of the ego is
a precipitate of abandoned object investments, containing the history of those object choices.” The divisions between “subjective and objective” and the “ego and the external world,” therefore, are not rigidly established. A constant and repeated force (repression) is needed to determine the terms of these antitheses as two sides of the same structure, in a discontinuous continuity. One only has to think of instances of falling in love, jealousy or paranoia, in which there is confusion within an identity. “The ego’s borders are not stable” (Freud, 2010, p. 45).

Conversely, society, for Freud, is not simply, as Elia’s (2010, p. 152) stated, an “eternal adversary of individuals.” It is not simply an antagonist, in so far as the constitution of the psyche is impossible in a natural state, without social bonds. In this sense, social structures serve to regulate relationships between human beings, with the purpose of not leaving them entirely abandoned and subject to the whims of the power of a single individual. Via the formation of structures, like the family, society, the state, or any other authority that unifies communities, individuals feel protected against the violence of human relationships and their own violence internalized as a psychological conflict.

The recognition of common interests between men leads to the sustainment of social bonds via processes of identification. Freud (2003b, p. 2577) wrote that, “at the core of the collective soul there are also loving relationships, or to use a neutral term, affective bonds.” Norbert Elias is right in pointing out that Freud was not concerned with investigating in greater depth the effects of the changes of social processes on the different formations of psychological structures, in spite of the existence, in Totem and Taboo, of the thesis that changes are brought about within the psychological economy as a consequence of the different stages of civilization.

However, Freud was very conscious of the alterations in the psychological economy of individuals who moved from one social structure to another. InCivilized Sexual Morality and Modern Nervousness, for example, Freud (2003d, p. 1987) wrote:

For most people there is a limit beyond which their constitution cannot comply with the demands of civilization. All who wish to reach a higher standard than their constitution will allow, fall victims to neurosis. It would have been better for them if they could have remained less “perfect.”

And in Family Romances, he wrote, “the whole progress of society rests upon the opposition between successive generations. On the other hand, there is a class of neurotics whose condition is recognizably determined by their having failed in this task” (Freud, 2003e, p. 243).

Freud resorts to the creation of a fictional narrative and the myth of a primitive horde presented in the text Totem and Taboo, to illustrate that since the origins of civilization, psychological processes have not been distanced from social processes. The myth of origins refers to a primal horde led by an older, individual man, who dominated the group and had the privilege of sexual relationships with its female members. On the one hand, there was a relational structure between the tyrannized members of the group, “The members of the group were subjected to bonds, such as those that we recognize today” (Freud, 2003b, p. 2597). On the other hand, the father of the horde was outside the collective psychology, “his Ego had few libidinal bonds and he did not love anyone, apart from himself, or other people to the extent that they attended to his needs” (Freud, 2003b, p. 2597). Because of their jealousy, the other members were banished from the horde. However, “one day”, Freud (2003f, p. 1838) wrote,

The brothers who had been expelled returned together, killed and devoured the father, thus putting an end to the patriarchal horde. United, they had the courage to do so and were successful in doing what would have been impossible to do individually.
Norbert Elias considered Freud’s myth to be an explanation of the origin of social life that separates nature from culture, the individual from society, and biological factors from learned behavior. It is as if, for Freud, there was a time when the individual was isolated from others and free from social regulations. Freud, in the opinion of Elias, seeks an origin in a process that has no beginning. Elias (2010, p. 148) stated, “Such that a bio-social process spanning several thousand years, or millions of years, is precipitated in a single event that unfolded over the course of a few hours or perhaps a few days.” Thus, according to Elias, Freud would not need to resort to the construction of a myth of origins if he had accepted the evolutionist nature of human descent.

Conversely, for Elias, the Freudian myth of the primitive horde supports the theory that human beings only submit to prohibitions and regulations in the interests of society, of co-existence with others. In Elias’s reading of Freud, individuals are exposed to the requests of their own desires that, in the absence of any regulatory control, demand immediate satisfaction. As if individuals aspired to be in the position of the father of the horde, that is to say, a person who lives without any restrictions on his libidinal desires.

In the sociologist’s opinion, however, the ability to exert self-control over urges is a function of the relationship between individuals and society. It is not a social function, which serves to enable the individual to live in society. According to Elias (2010, p. 151), “But Freud firmly believed that life in a society stood in opposition to human nature.” In other words, children are obliged to repress their innate urges, conscience, via the super-ego, takes on the task of diverting desires from their natural objects. In the view of Elias, all this constitutes the Freudian antagonism that establishes that nature and culture are entities entirely alien to each other.

Norbert Elias is right in re-visiting this Freudian definition, “the word ‘culture’ designates the sum total of those achievements and institutions that distinguish our life from that of our animal ancestors” (Freud, 2010, p. 87). However, this definition is not enough to conclude that we are dealing here with an antagonism between men and animals, or that Freud saw human beings only as something more than animals. A note in his book Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud (2010, p. 87) put forward a process of differentiation within biological evolution, “Thus, at the beginning of the fatal cultural process would be man’s elevation to a vertical position.” The loss of olfactory stimuli, its replacement by visual stimuli, man’s distancing from the land, his upright stance, and the foundation of the family, all of these were psychological influences that led to the threshold of human culture. Culture is thus an evolutionary process that serves to give protection to the individual faced with physical and psychological abandonment.

However, to state that psychoanalysis is founded on the antithesis between the individual and society is to ignore the fact that there is a relationship between these two terms, a relationship that is eminently conflictive. For Freud, not only is society responsible for the repression of urges, it is also responsible for the fact that “neurosis always manages to frustrate the aims of civilization” (Freud, 2003d, p. 1261). For the father of psychoanalysis, as is illustrated in Totem and Taboo, it is only possible to think about the separation of “nature” from “culture”, and of “the individual” from “society” by means of a mythical construction.

**State, Individual and the Traumatic Effects of the Civilizing Process**

In Brazil, public spaces, like squares, neighbourhoods and streets are constructed via political acts of inclusion and exclusion. Bodies are the targets of violent acts perpetrated by the state and by society. That is to say, certain public spaces are appropriated only by people who belong to a single social class. Thus, the institutions that should ensure equality for all citizens and facilitate civilized co-existence in a given community,
identify in the bodies of individuals the features that determine whether they are included (the establishment) or excluded (outsiders). Consequently, feelings of competitiveness, hatred and fear are generated between individuals. The civilizing pact between the individual and society, therefore, is not harmonious, but rather characterized by antagonisms, conflicts, and rivalries.

If social ties are rooted in the body, what happens to the body when there is a breakdown in the relationships between the individual and society? Situations of extreme violence fracture the relationship between the individual and society, causing a re-configuration of this relationship. What are the effects on society and what are the consequences for individuals when the civilizing pact is ruptured? Do these effects manifest themselves in the body? These questions will be considered from the starting point of a dialogue between the psychoanalysis of Sigmund Freud and the sociology of Norbert Elias.

Despite the fact that Freud and Elias are theoreticians from different areas, they share many points of view. For both of them the body, the individual and society are terms that should be correlated with each other. In other words, the subjectivity of individuals is constituted via different symbolic marks that society inscribes on their bodies. A person is born into a complex network of social relationships. The parent’s wishes constitute a symbolic place where their children become adults, society provides the individual with a means of being autonomous in his relationships with others, and the state provides the conditions of equality necessary to pursue a freer existence.

Civilization removes the individual from his state of physical vulnerability and psychic helplessness and protects him within social institutions. It provides the individual with a symbolic place via the formation of ties with his peers. However, situations of extreme violence have consequences for the autonomous and collective dimensions of individuals, that is, they destroy their place and their social relationships. “The annihilation of the citizen entails the annihilation of the subject” (Endo, 2005, p. 13). Consequently, the individual is forced to produce new subjective configurations in order to avoid descending into a state of barbarism or total destruction.

Throughout his work, Elias researched the effects of civilizing processes on the relationship between societies and individuals. His main thesis developed in the book *The Civilizing Process*, deals with the connection between the development of social structures and the changes in the structure of personality. When society changes, the possibilities for establishing subjective identities also change. According to Elias, throughout the history of social relationships, there is been an alteration in the balance of the relationship between the individual and society, especially when the levels of violence and aggression increase. For example, the shift from a feudal, warlike society to the monopoly of violence in the hands of modern states, led to the pacification of social ties. But all this happens at the expense of the internalization of violence in the form of the self-control that each individual imposes on their impulses, their bodies and their habits.

In the view of Elias, influenced by the psychoanalysis of Sigmund Freud, civilization is constituted by individuals abandoning the desire to satisfy some of their impulses. “Civilization has its price” (Fletcher, 1997, p. 54). This means that the civilizing process transfers to the sphere of private life behaviour and emotions that can no longer be expressed in the public sphere. “The battlefield has been transferred, in some sense, to within the individual” (Elias, 2012, p. 203). Everything concerning the body must be banished from the eyes of others. The civilizing process establishes, behind the scenarios of individuals’ daily lives, situations that were formerly outward-facing. As a result, individuals come into conflict not just with other people but also with themselves and their own bodies.
The civilizing process has modified the relationship between individuals and society over time. It has increased the identification between individuals and rendered more complex the network of interdependencies. With the imposition of self-control, the threshold of shame and embarrassment with regard to habits that have become socially prohibited has also increased. Also as a consequence of the civilizing process, individuals have become more capable of predicting the behaviour of others, in the sense that they can now identify a dangerous situation with greater foresight. Viewed over a long period of time, social relations have become more harmonious and controllable. But the price of this has been paid by the body.

Nevertheless, the development of civilization is not a linear process, but is rather achieved via confrontations with de-civilizing processes. As Elias (2005, p. 161) stated, “The civilization that I am referring to is never complete, and is always under threat. It is endangered because the safe-guarding of the most civilized patterns of behaviour and sentiment in society depends on specific conditions.” That is to say, the civilizing process is not achieved without some retrograde steps. We encounter extreme moments of the de-civilizing process when situations of violence predominate that sever the ties between the individual and society. The theory of the civilizing process has had to be reformulated in order to include barbarism as an effect of civilization.

Now, the author will list some of the possible symptoms caused when civilization goes backwards and heads in the opposite direction. The de-civilizing process: (a) severs links between people; (b) shortens chains of interdependency; (c) increases the level of danger, violence and cruelty in the public sphere; (d) reduces identifications, reduces the pressures that control impulses; (e) reduces the patterns of difference between children and adults; (f) aggression expresses itself more freely (Mennell, 1990). What are the effects of the de-civilizing process on the bodies of individuals? Freud can help us answer this question.

Sigmund Freud, the Jewish physician, died in 1939, but he also experienced the horrors of the war. He was obliged to seek exile in England and his two sisters were murdered in Nazi concentration camps. However, it was the First World War that first roused Freud from the illusion of civilization, leading to his disillusionment. Freud (2003g, p. 315) wrote that a war:

Disregards all the restrictions known as international law, which in peace-time the states had bound themselves to observe. It tramples in blind fury on all that comes in its way as though there were to be no future and no peace among men after it is over. It cuts all the common bonds between the contending peoples, and threatens to leave a legacy of embitterment that will make any renewal of those bonds impossible for a long time to come.

Wars no longer served to show the effects of the progress of civilization. Freud’s clinic was affected by the war via its patients, particularly the former soldiers, who arrived there with symptoms that he termed traumatic neuroses. Themes, like death, repetition, violence, destruction, and aggression came to be considered as part of the human condition. Let us consider how Freud deals with the theme of violence in relation to subjectivity.

The human being is born into a state of physical and psychic helplessness. He depends on another individual to satisfy his impulses and needs and in order to situate himself subjectively in a given place in the world. Gradually, the individual establishes identifications with his peers and introjects aspects of these experiences into his own personality. This results in the formation of the ego and the super-ego, psychic apparatus that protect the individual from his helplessness.

Furthermore, we live by a universal symbolic law that protects individuals against acts of violence perpetrated by others. The state and society, analogously to the ego and the super-ego, protect the individual via
the civilizing pacts established with his peers. However, the state of helplessness remains as a mark of the psychic apparatus. In a situation of extreme violence, in which social ties are severed, the individual is returned to this place of psychic helplessness, and has to cope alone with the high intensity of violence that affects his mind and body. The symptoms that result from a traumatic situation stem from a lack of psychic preparedness, because the individual’s mind is not ready to react to experiences of intense violence.

Civilization must protect individuals from the impulses to destroy social ties. We are protected by a universal symbolic law that obliges us to give up some of our desires in order to establish a connection with others. Within the legal framework, this law regulates relationships between members of a given society. For the civilizing pact to be feasible, both individuals and nation-states must give up the power of privileges. We should all be subject to a universal law that balances the scales so that they are not tipped in favour of either of the parties within the individual-society relationship. But when a situation of violence fractures this relationship, it is the body, as a fundamental element of this relationship, which ends up being affected.

As previously stated, the ego and the super-ego function as psychic apparatus that protect the individual from destruction, transforming impulses that come from within and external forces. However, in a situation of violence, the amount of energy that affects the individual externally acts as a force for destruction, fracturing the possibility of the individual representing this violent event. The ego is not capable of producing psychic associations to deal with the intensity of the traumatic violence.

Freud (2003h), in an exchange of correspondence with the physicist Albert Einstein, for example, committed himself not to accept violence that annihilates social ties. In 1932, on the eve of a situation in which barbarism will overpower civilization, Freud presented us with a question, without however providing an answer: what are the psychic effects of a situation in which entities that serve to regulate human violence are not in evidence?

Situations of war or extreme violence rupture the apparatus that protects the individual and society, fracturing the civilizing pact of social ties. The state, instead of providing protection and citizenship, violates the rights of individuals and subjects them to the threat of death, to the annihilation of the possibilities of individuals establishing themselves as human beings. State violence destroys memory, public places, and the spaces of social circulation, all of which enable the individual to become an autonomous someone within a collective history.

This violence that affects the individual becomes traumatic because it eliminates his sources of protection. A tyrannical state that ruptures the civilizing pact strips the relationship between the individual and society down to its very foundations, that is, to the body. The psychic, then, shifts from the symbolic to the corporeal domain. The ego alone can no longer deal with the intensity coming from the external world. It thus returns to its primordial state of unpreparedness. In the face of such excess, the ego is left in complete physical and psychic helplessness. It is incapable of finding symbolic representations to process the events it is presented with. Paralyzed by the violence that it is abruptly confronted with, without the necessary readiness and protection to react, the ego can only seek to rebuild itself via the body.

Individuals are reduced to the body’s ability to survive. The violated ego loses its autonomy and becomes a slave to a traumatic situation that it cannot control. In the face of the impossibility of resolving an external conflict that it cannot escape from, the ego turns in on itself. “In terror, taken by surprise, the powerless ego leans on the body, as if it were a literal version of itself” (Endo, 2005, p. 17). The ego embodies itself, transmitting the psychic suffering to the body via the production of symptoms.
Pain in the body is a way of reconstructing oneself, of inscribing this alien and unrepresentable violence. It transforms the external problem into a corporeal problem and recreates, via symptoms, some kind of possible representation of that violence. It is now the violated body’s turn to take on the responsibility for re-establishing the ego intact. It is a body displaying symptoms that manifests traumatic violence within itself.

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